The Dissertation Committee for Kristi Nichole Barnwell Certifies that this is the approved version of the following dissertation:

From Trucial States to Nation State: Decolonization and the Formation of the United Arab Emirates, 1952-1971

Committee:

Wm. Roger Louis, Supervisor

Kamran S. Aghaie

Clement Henry

Antony G. Hopkins

Abraham Marcus

From Trucial States to Nation State: Decolonization and the Formation of the United Arab Emirates, 1952-1971

by

Kristi Nichole Barnwell, B.A.; M.A.

Dissertation

Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of

The University of Texas at Austin

in Partial Fulfillment

of the Requirements

for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

The University of Texas at Austin

August 2011

Dedication

For my mother

Acknowledgements

I am indebted to countless people who provided direct and indirect aid while I researched and wrote this dissertation. People across three continents helped in myriad ways, both direct and indirect, to bring this project to fruition. The staff at The National Archive in Kew and at the Gulf Research Center at the University of Exeter were an enormous source of help and knowledge. Additionally, the library staff at the Center for Documentation and Research welcomed me, provided me with a quiet space to work, and copied hundreds of pages for me without complaint. I would like to offer special thanks to Dr. Jassim Jirjees and Dr. Jayanti Maitra al-Hajji for their help and interest in my work. Many thanks to Robin Dougherty, the Middle East librarian at the University of Texas, for the books and the chocolate.

This dissertation would not have come into being if it had not been for the suggestion of my advisor, Wm. Roger Louis. It was he who first suggested the general topic, he who encouraged my research, and he who carefully read and commented on my chapters as I wrote them. His guidance and support kept me moving forward throughout my too-long graduate career and I am grateful for his continued encouragement.

Several other mentors went above and beyond their usual duties as members of my dissertation committee. Kamran Aghaie served as a constant source of encouragement as well as a formidable devil's advocate throughout my graduate career. With him, I honed my answers for those who would ask, "Why work on the UAE?" I

also am grateful to Clement Henry for his enthusiasm for my research topic. Our conversations always led me down new avenues of inquiry and his contributions helped to make my dissertation a richer study. Mary Wilson served as my mentor at the University of Massachusetts and guided me toward graduate studies in Middle Eastern History. She was the first of my professors to demonstrate interest in me and my work as an undergraduate. Mary is the kind of teacher and mentor I strive to be. Additional thanks go to: Antony Hopkins, Abraham Marcus, Peter Shapinsky, Hina Azam, James Onley, Steven Wright, Hanan Hamad, Somy Kim, Nora Eltahawy, Lauren Apter, Stefanie Wichart, Marian Barber, Ann Genova, and Roy Doron.

Jane Bristol-Rhys deserves particular mention. She helped me—a stranger in a strange land—to navigate the pitfalls of research in the Emirates, to find my voice as a writer, and to become a scholar of the Gulf. She is also much more: a generous and kind friend. Thank you for the *JITC* marathons.

My family members provided a non-academic oasis to which I could escape in times of great stress. Of those, my mother deserves the most thanks for being my number one fan and loudest cheerleader. It is for these reasons that I dedicate this work to her.

From Trucial States to Nation State: Decolonization and the Formation of the United Arab Emirates, 1952-1971

Kristi Nichole Barnwell, Ph.D.

The University of Texas at Austin, 2011

Supervisor: Wm. Roger Louis

Harold Wilson, the British Prime Minister, announced in January 1968 that the British government would withdraw from the Persian Gulf by the end of 1971. For Britain, the decision indicated a re-prioritization of British global defense obligations. For the rulers of the Arab emirates of the Persian Gulf, Wilson's announcement signaled an end of British military protection, and the beginning of a process of negotiations that culminated in the establishment of the United Arab Emirates on December 3, 1971. An examination of the process by which the individual Persian Gulf states became a sovereign federation presents an opportunity to examine the roles of nationalism and anti-imperialism played in the establishment of the Union. This work demonstrates that Arab rulers in the Persian Gulf strove to establish their new state with close ties to Great Britain, which provided technical, military, and administrative assistance to the emirates, while also publicly embracing the popular ideologies of anti-imperialism and Arab socialism, which dominated the political discourse in the Arab world through most of the twentieth century.

This dissertation draws on primary source materials from British and American government archives, speeches and government publications from the Arab Emirates, memoirs and a wide variety of secondary sources. These materials provide the basis for understanding the state-building process of the United Arab Emirates in the areas of pre-withdrawal development, the decision to withdraw, the problems of establishing a federal constitution, and the problems posed by the need for security in the post-withdrawal Persian Gulf.

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List of Abbreviations

Public Record Office (The National Archives), London:

CAB	Cabinet Office
DEFE	Ministry of Defence
FCO	Foreign and Commonwealth Office
FO	Foreign Office
PREM	Prime Minister's Office
WO	War Office

Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library (LBJL), Austin:

NSF	National Security Files

Other abbreviations are defined in the footnotes in which they appear.

Note on Transliteration

[c]Ayns [[c]] and hamzas [’] are the only diacriticals included in the transliteration of Arabic terms, personal and place names, and sources. Commonly accepted English forms are used for some personal and place names. In all other cases, words are transliterated in accordance with the guidelines from the *International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* (*IJMES*).

Chapter 1: Introduction

On a day in February, 1972, Sheikh Zayid bin Sultan al-Nahayan stood in front of the members of the new parliamentary body of the United Arab Emirates. It was the first meeting of the national parliament of the newly formed union. The last of the seven states, Ras al-Khaimah, had signed the constitution only a few days before.[1] Sheikh Zayid, the ruler of Abu Dhabi and the first president of the Union, articulated his vision for the new state and its place among other Arab states.

> The constitution aimed for the United Arab Emirates to be a federal state, independent and sovereign. And the Union is a part of the great Arab nation, bound to it by ties of religion, language, history, and shared destiny; and the people of the Union are one people and are a part of the Arab '*umma* and Islam is the official religion of the Union; and Islamic s*har*^{c}*iyah* is the official source of law; and the official language of the Union is Arabic.[2]

Zayid's words marked the culmination of three years' negotiations between Persian Gulf rulers and the British government, which had begun in the wake of British Prime Minister Harold Wilson's announcement that Britain would end its 150 year presence in the area.

British informal rule of the Arab States in the Persian Gulf began as a series of maritime treaties between the East India Company and tribal leaders along the eastern Arabian Peninsula in the early nineteenth century. The truces gave rise to the states'

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[1] The United Arab Emirates consist of Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Ajman, Fujairah, Um al-Qaiwain, and Ras al-Khaimah. Each of these was considered part of the "Trucial States" and collectively was known as the "Trucial Coast." Bahrain and Qatar, also tied to Britain through security agreements and truces were frequently referred to as Trucial States as well, though British administration and policy between the nine states was never as fully integrated as it was among the smaller seven that made up the final Union.

[2] "Speech of His Highness Sheikh Zayid bin Sultan Al-Nahayan, President of the State, at the opening of the first national *majlis* of the Union," (Arabic) in *Al-Fara'id min Aqwal Zayid* (Abu Dhabi: Center for Documentation and Research, 2001), 15.

designation as the Trucial States or Trucial Coast. The treaties initially established peaceful relations between the prominent Gulf rulers and the East India Company. Over the course of the next hundred years, British involvement in the Persian Gulf expanded to include British authority over foreign affairs, effectively isolating the Trucial States from both western and Middle Eastern governments. The Trucial States never became colonies of the British Empire; nevertheless, by the twentieth century, British administrative structures effectively guided and dominated the politics and development of the Trucial States.

Wilson's decision in 1968 to leave the Persian Gulf shocked both members of the British government and the rulers of the Trucial States. The sheikhs had come to depend on the British military for security, as well as British financial and technical advisers who provided assistance in the running of expanding government administrations and growing economies. Equally significant, however, was the potential risk to Britain's economic and political interests in the Persian Gulf. By 1958, the Arab Gulf states were the last proof of British influence and power in the Middle East. The Gulf had also come to take on great strategic importance as the nexus of British naval and air power for its positions east of Suez. Finally, the oil wealth of Kuwait, Abu Dhabi, and Dubai provided a strong incentive for Britain to retain a physical presence in the region for the foreseeable future.

Events in the Middle East as well as Britain's changing global defense role in the latter half of the 1960s forced Harold Wilson and his cabinet members to reconsider the nature of Anglo-Gulf relations. In the aftermath of World War II, Britain became increasingly committed to extensive defense responsibilities in Europe and the Pacific, as

well as a burgeoning nuclear security role in the Cold War. The British economy, already weakened by two world wars and colonial independence movements in the 1950s and 1960s, could no longer support expenditure in the Persian Gulf.

At the same time, pressure mounted from British officials in the Gulf urging the Foreign Office to spend greater amounts of money to build up the nascent states there. Under British protection, the Trucial governments had languished in isolation from the modernization going on elsewhere in the Middle East. The discovery, production, and export of oil from the Gulf raised their global profile and drew the attention of outside economic and political interests—particularly those of Arab nationalist leaders. Gamal Abdul Nasser of Egypt had made his career on political rhetoric denouncing imperialist powers as exploitative as had presidents in Syria and Iraq, and nationalists in the Yemen. The failure of the Trucial States to modernize, combined with their friendly and dependent relationship with Britain, placed Gulf rulers in a potentially precarious position.

Arab nationalism in its varied forms had ousted Arab rulers and steadily curtailed British influence in the Middle East since the 1930s. Frustrated with the heavy handedness of the Veiled Protectorate in Egypt, the nationalist Wafd pressed for Egyptian independence in the 1920s. Britain responded by imposing an unsatisfactory and limited independence on the Egypt in 1922, but new constitutional monarchy proved corrupt and survived only with British support. The government finally fell in 1952 when a group of young Egyptian officers forced King Farouq into exile and replaced his government with a nationalist republic. Four years later, Nasser succeeded in ejecting Britain from the

Suez Canal, which had been the nerve center of British defense and trade operations since the nineteenth century. Only months before, the British head of the Arab Legion, John Glubb "Pasha", had been ejected from Jordan by King Hussein—regarded by many as the most moderate and pro-Western of all the Arab leaders. Two years later, nationalists in Iraq toppled the Hashemite monarchy in a bloody coup, murdering the eighteen-year-old king and his pro-British prime minister, Nuri al-Said. British economic and strategic interests in the region increasingly centered on the Arabian Peninsula which, by the 1960s, was the only place British officials in the region seemed welcome.

Following Nasser's ejection of British soldiers from the Suez Canal, Britain relocated its naval base east to Aden and built up military support in the Persian Gulf. Aden had become a British colony in 1937 following one hundred years of occupation and administration under the East India Company and then British India. Britain had also expanded its influence in southwest Arabia to include formal agreements with rulers in the principalities surrounding Aden proper.

Even as Britain re-centered its defense on Aden, it became increasingly apparent that Britain's stay in the region would come to an end sooner rather than later. By 1962, anti-imperialist nationalists in Aden were loosening Britain's grip there as well. With the outbreak of a civil war in the Yemen and its subsequent expansion into Aden and South Arabia, Britain once again determined to abandon yet another sphere of influence in the Middle East and move its military operations to the Persian Gulf by 1968.

Britain's path through the Middle East, littered with broken policies and failed diplomacy, forced the Labour government to accept the limitations of its approach to

sustaining a relationship with the Trucial States. Past experience showed that continuing a formal, visible military and political presence only placed the stability of friendly Arab rulers—and British interests—at risk. Harold Wilson tacitly acknowledged this reality when he announced in January 1968 that Britain would withdraw its forces from the Persian Gulf and cancel its treaties with the Trucial States by the end of 1971. Wilson's decision did not amount to the official abandonment of British strategic and economic interests in the Arab Gulf. Rather, it represented a hope for the continuation of British predominance in the region through alternative means. Britain would withdraw from a Persian Gulf with stable, friendly rulers who would continue to invest in British businesses, rely on British expertise, and would build on the foundations Britain laid in the course of the previous century.

Such was the British government's intent. In reality, however, the process of fashioning one or more loyal and enduring governments on the Trucial Coast exposed a shifting political dynamic between Britain and the Gulf rulers. The rise of Arab nationalism throughout the Middle East showed Foreign Office officials that they must concede power to the Trucial Sheikhs; and more and more frequently, the Trucial Sheikhs exercised influence in shaping the future Union, using the specter of anti-imperialism and Arab nationalism as leverage in their negotiations. By December 1971, the rulers of the Trucial States had broken the British monopoly of influence over the Arab Gulf and had established a seven-state Union that reflected local political alliances and economic circumstances, rather than a nine-state Union that the British government believed was convenient and practicable.

Britain's need for the Arab Gulf states' stability and goodwill strengthened the rulers' positions in their negotiations with the local British administrators and, through them, the Foreign Office. As the threat of Arab nationalism in the Trucial Coast grew more potent, the Trucial sheikhs became more adept at using the specter of encroaching nationalism to gain British cooperation. In the 1950s, as the Foreign Office took over British-Trucial relations, the local British administrators had almost total charge of the rulers and could direct their general policies with impunity. By the 1960s, Arab rulers began to use nationalist rhetoric and to cooperate with Arab nationalist leaders to balance British power and occasionally to convince Britain to serve the local rulers' interests. They also invoked the threat of Arab nationalism against themselves in order to persuade British officials to support the rulers' policies over British-designed plans.

As Britain's Foreign Office resigned itself to withdrawing its forces from the Persian Gulf, Britain faced the further question of how to secure the region and its oil resources. The small Gulf States lacked the population and military force to safeguard themselves. To ensure the Trucial States' safety after 1971, the British Government enlisted the support of Iran and Saudi Arabia as the twin guardians of the Persian Gulf. After three years of working to secure the two powers' cooperation, Britain relinquished its military role to its allies.

THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES TODAY

The United Arab Emirates today consists of a federation of seven individual states, or emirates: Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Ajman, Fujairah, Umm al-Qaiwain and Ras al-Khaimah. The UAE is located on the eastern side of the Arabian Peninsula, east of Saudi Arabia and north of the Sultanate and Oman. Much of the country's 30,000 square miles is made up of desert and salt flats in the east, though the terrain is varied by the presence of the Hajar Mountain range that extends from Oman into the southern region of Abu Dhabi and also along the eastern coast near Ras al-Khaimah and Fujairah. Small strips of fertile agricultural land are situated on the Batinah Coast south of Sharjah. In addition to the mainland, the emirates include numerous small islands in the Persian Gulf, including Das Island off the north coast of Abu Dhabi.

The location of the United Arab Emirates on the Persian Gulf has made the emirates a center of trade and migration from the Arabian Peninsula, South Asia and Iran. The population of the Emirates today is estimated at approximate 4.4 million, though only a small percentage (between 15-20 percent) are legally recognized as Emiratis. The local Emirati population is largely Arab originating from the tribes that have historically inhabited the region, though marriage and immigration before the twentieth century has added a substantial number of ethnically Persians, Omanis, and South Asians to the population. The remainder of the population is comprised of migrant labor from Europe, South Asia, East Asia, and other Arab states.

Each emirate maintains its own government for local affairs. The ruler of each emirate is given the honorary title of "sheikh" (*shayukh*, plural); members of the ruling families are also referred to as "sheikh" or "sheikhah" (feminine). The ruler of each emirate serves on the Supreme Federal Council, which manages foreign relations and inter-emirate cooperation on issues such as labor, immigration, and healthcare. The Supreme Federal Council elects a president and vice-president, who serve five-year terms. An additional national assembly serves as a consultative legislative body consisting of forty appointed and elected members.

CHAPTER STRUCTURE

Chapter one traces the development of British involvement in the region from the nineteenth century through the evolution of British informal empire in the Persian Gulf into the early part of the twentieth century. Britain initially established a dominant presence there to monopolize and protect its trade routes with India, but ultimately administered the foreign affairs of the Trucial Coast via the India Office. In the nineteenth century, the Government of India concerned itself primarily with resolving political disruptions between the Trucial Rulers themselves in order to prevent the disruption of trade. In the twentieth century, however, the British government became increasingly interested in the Arab Gulf's strategic position vis-à-vis India and the rest of Britain's East of Suez commitments. The region's importance grew further with the

discovery of oil in some of the Gulf States, and the expected discovery of oil in the others.

Chapter two begins in 1952, when Bernard Burrows, the British Resident in the Persian Gulf, established the Trucial States Council. The Council began as a consultative body consisting of the rulers of the seven smaller states and the British resident. This new institution marked the beginning of an active development and modernization program under British leadership, and particularly the British Resident, Bernard Burrows. This new direction in British policy in the Trucial States was an attempt to prevent Arab nationalism and anti-imperialist sentiment from gaining influence in the Arab Gulf.

Development throughout the Arab Gulf had been unequal. The larger Gulf States, such as Kuwait, Bahrain, and Qatar, had benefited from the early discovery of oil deposits in the 1930s and 1940s. The lower Gulf States, however, would not find oil in commercial quantities until the mid-1960s. Thus, while Kuwait and Bahrain in 1952 could boast of hospitals, expanded road systems, increased infrastructure, and an increasingly educated populace, the populations of the lower Trucial States struggled to obtain sufficient water for their small populations. Burrows worried that the discrepancy would encourage opposition within the Trucial States and sought to establish a development plan for public works, public services, infrastructure, and health care as necessary for preventing the appearance of anti-imperialist, anti-British feeling. Subsequent British Residents followed Burrows' lead, advocating for greater funds from the Foreign Office in order to expand services and infrastructure within the Trucial

States. Their urgency intensified through the 1950s and 1960s as anti-imperialist movements gained momentum all over the world, and especially in the Middle East.

The chapter, then, considers the establishment of the Trucial Council and British attitudes toward development in the region. Significantly, however, it also considers the Trucial Rulers' attitudes toward British development priorities. In the early years of the Trucial States Council, the rulers' only reluctantly participated in the activities of the Council. Over time, however, Britain sought to create a greater sense of Trucial participation in Trucial Development, particularly after Gamal Abdel Nasser ousted the British from Suez. This move gave the Trucial Rulers more visibility in development programs; the rulers, though, also began to place more pressure on the British government to expand development projects more quickly, and to prioritize those projects along the lines delineated by Arab rulers. Egypt and the Arab League began making diplomatic overtures to the Gulf Rulers in the mid-1960s, and this gave the Trucial Sheikhs even greater leverage in their negotiations with British officials in the Gulf over the future of Trucial development.

Chapter three focuses on the decision-making process in London that resulted in Britain's exit from East of Suez, and thus the Persian Gulf, by 1971. Between the end of World War II and January 1968, successive British governments attempted to balance a struggling economy with ambitions for a prominent role in global politics and defense. Economic limitations at a time of world-wide opposition to traditional imperialism led Harold Wilson and other British ministers to reevaluate the British strategy for retaining political influence. In the Trucial States, officials came to believe that a withdrawal

would help stabilize the British economy and place Britain in a stronger position to influence the development and political orientation of those states.

Chapters four and five consider the relationship between the Trucial Coast States and Britain in the context of state formation and Arab nationalism between 1952 and 1971. The first efforts on the part of British officials in the Persian Gulf to establish cooperation between the smaller sheikhdoms of the Trucial Coast occurred in 1952 and created the foundation for what would eventually become the United Arab Emirates in 1971. These chapters examine the relationship between the British government and the Trucial States in the period before and during the creation of the United Arab Emirates, with special focus on the rise of Arab nationalism and its influence on the Anglo-Trucial relationship.

The fourth chapter looks at the process of creating a federation following Britain's announcement in 1968. British policy makers pushed for a federation between the Trucial States that would include all of the Trucial Coast as well as Bahrain and Qatar. In the previous period, tensions had emerged between the Trucial sheikhs and British policy makers over the speed and direction of development and the Trucial States' connections with other Arab states. Between 1968 and 1971, these tensions became more pronounced as the various sheikhs attempted to exert their autonomy from the British government and create alliances amongst themselves to best preserve their own powers within the structures of a future federation.

Internal security and national defense became a central area of debate between local rulers and British policymakers during the federation negotiations. Chapter five thus

examines the process of creating a federal defense structure for the future United Arab Emirates. The Foreign Office urged the rulers of the Trucial States to use the British-created and British-officered Trucial Oman Scouts as the basis for the future federal military. At the same time, the individual rulers of the Trucial States wished to utilize individual state armies, parts of which could contribute to a federal force. Such an arrangement would provide the rulers with greater autonomy within the federal structure.

COMMENT ON SOURCES

Historical research in the Persian Gulf is complicated in myriad ways. Arab Gulf society relied heavily on oral tradition through the middle of the twentieth century. A relatively small number of the population had more than basic reading and writing skills. Among the nomadic segments of the population, paper records would have been impractical and cumbersome. Even within the governing structures in the Gulf, written records were largely unnecessary. The population was small enough that disputes were usually resolved directly by the leading sheikh, who listened to direct testimony of witnesses and decided and executed the outcome immediately. Such a small and mobile population required little in the way of government infrastructure. Transportation taxes were collected by the leading sheikhs in each of the Gulf States; but even in these cases records either do not survive or are not available from the period before 1971. The structure that was used for the purpose in Abu Dhabi is a small, one-room, wood and palm frond shack that still stands preserved as a heritage site under the modern highway

that now stretches from inland Abu Dhabi across to Abu Dhabi island. The employees that would have worked there would collect fees, but probably did not need to record detailed information about those who passed through the town.

This is not to say that documentary evidence does not exist in the Persian Gulf states. Scholars of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries have succeeded in producing excellent studies based on merchant records and contracts.[3] Anthropologists and cultural experts have also begun working to collect oral histories in order to preserve information about traditional social and cultural patterns in the area, as well as the changes in those patterns in contemporary society.[4]

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[3] For examples, see Jill Crystal, *Oil and Politics in the Gulf: Rulers and Merchants in Kuwait and Qatar* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990); James Onley, *Arabian Frontier of the British Raj: Merchants, Rulers and the British in the Nineteenth Century Gulf* (London: Oxford University Press, 2007) and "Transnational Merchants in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Century Gulf" *The Gulf Family: Modernity and Kinship Policies,* edited by Alanoud Alshareskh. (London: Saqi Books, 2007), 37-56; Gad G. Gilbar, "Muslim Tujjar of the Middle East and their Commercial Networks in the Long Nineteenth Century" *Studia Islamica* 100/101 (2005): 183-202.

Scholarship on the Gulf, for a time, was dominated largely by political scientists who were concerned with the structures of rentier states and the survival of monarchies into the late twentieth century. For examples of such works, see Christopher M. Davidson, *The United Arab Emirates: A Study in Survival* (London: Lynne Rienner, 2005); Michael Herb, *All in the Family: Absolutism, Revolution, and Democracy in the Middle Eastern Monarchies* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999); Kiren Aziz Chaudhry, *The Price of Wealth: Economies and Institutions in the Middle East* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997); Gregory Gause, *Oil Monarchies: Domestic and Security Challenges in the Arab Gulf States* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1994); John Waterbury, "Democracy without Democrats: The Potential for Political Liberalization in the Middle East," *Democracy Without Democracts? The Renewal of Politics in the Muslim World,* ed. Ghassan Salam, (London: I. B. Tauris, 1970), 23-47.

[4] For a sampling, see: Jane Bristol-Rhys, *Emirati Women: Generations of Change* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010); Andrea B. Rugh, *The Political Culture of Leadership in the United Arab Emirates* (New York: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2007) is a less rigorous but useful study based on interviews; Sulayman Khalaf. "Dubai Camel Market Transnational Workers: An Enthnographic Portrait," *City and Society* 22, no. 1 (2010): 97-118.

In regards to Union and Emirate-level preservation of culture, the Union government established the creation of a National Center for Documentation and Research, which serves as the national archive of the UAE. Additionally, the individual emirates have made efforts to preserve and advertise culture and heritage. Abu Dhabi has an Authority for Culture & Heritage, which sponsors "heritage villages" and promotes the preservation of "intangible heritage", see *Abu Dhabi Culture Heritage,* [http://www.adach.ae/en/portal/adach/about.authority.aspx] accessed August 6, 2010 at 3:51pm. Sharjah's Department of Culture and Information provides similar kinds of programs designed to preserve and

Scholars looking for more "traditional" archival sources have access to voluminous records from Portuguese, Ottoman, French, Dutch and British sources. Several research centers in the United Arab Emirates and other Gulf states purchased copies of these materials in order to establish their own national archives. These documents are in the process of being digitized and made easily available to scholars within the region. The National Center for Documentation and Research in Abu Dhabi serves as the national archive for the United Arab Emirates; the American University at Sharjah has also received grants from Sheikh Sultan bin Muhammad al-Qasimi to establish a similar archive there. Scholars of the nineteenth and twentieth century also have access to edited archive editions of British records on the Persian Gulf, which the British Stationary Office published in the 1990s.

For the period under consideration in this study, the British residency and Foreign Office records in The National Archive (formerly the Public Record Office) provide the bulk of the primary sources. These records are extremely useful. British officials in the Persian Gulf had close and frequent contact with the various sheikhs of the Persian Gulf. They also kept lengthy and detailed records of their conversations with those rulers and often included candid reflections of their experiences there. Following their careers, several British officials also supplemented the historical record with their autobiographies and memoirs.

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promote local heritage, including a historical district that houses several museums, as does Dubai's Ministry of Culture.

These sources, however informative, only provide part of the story. Though British officials recorded and summarized conversations with members of the Gulf governments, these conversations were often filtered through translators and were divulged in reference to the British government's goals and interests in the region. Such reports were also colored by the friendships and personality conflicts between the British officials and the local rulers.[5]

Locally produced records are becoming increasingly available. Like many of their British counterparts, public servants, businessmen and even some of the rulers in the Persian Gulf states have been writing their own memoirs and autobiographies. Most of these have been published in English rather than Arabic. Few government documents have been made publically available, or even exist. Where possible, however, this work has drawn on government publications, such as the *al-Jareeda al-Rasmiyya*, or Official Gazette, which Abu Dhabi began publishing in 1968. This government quarterly published new laws and decrees issued by Sheikh Zayid of Abu Dhabi. Collections of speeches from before 1971 are not available; however, a collection of Sheikh Zayid's speeches do exist for the post-1971 in his role as the new president of the United Arab Emirates and in many of those speeches he refers back to goals of the federation and reflects on Britain's involvement in the region, and these materials help to shed additional light on the British relationship with the Persian Gulf states.

[5] In his official report on political affairs in the Trucial Coast, for example, Political Resident Rupert Hay commented on the Ruler of Qatar, "Sheikh Ali, with his increasing wealth becomes more self-opinionated and difficult." "Persian Gulf: Annual Review for 1952," February 16, 1953. FO 371/104259. TNA.

New secondary literature on the development of the Persian Gulf states in general, and of the United Arab Emirates in particular, is being published as well. Scholarship from Britain as well as from the Persian Gulf states has grown in the last two decades in light of the rapid, and sometimes spectacular, development there. Once again, much of this material is available in English. Instruction throughout the Persian Gulf is taught in English. All of the major national universities in the United Arab Emirates conduct instruction in English, as do international studies programs in Qatari and Bahraini universities. Magisterial and doctoral students frequently receive their educations abroad in British, American, and European institutions. Consequently most of the academic research of scholars from the Persian Gulf states is published in English before being translated and published in Arabic in subsequent editions.[6] That being said, this work has also tried to incorporate some of the scholarly research on the Persian Gulf that has been published elsewhere in the Middle East, which has been published by Arab publishing houses.

[6] More recently, there have been some exceptions to this—the ruler of Sharjah has published work on the British in Aden in Arabic, though his *Myth of Piracy in the Gulf* was published first in English and subsequently released in Arabic. His new memoir, however, was released first in Arabic (2009) and translated into English the following year (2010): Sultan ibn Muhammad al-Qasimi, *Sard al-That* (Sharjah: Manshurat al-Qasimi, 2009); *Ahtilal al-Britany li Aden, 1839* (United Arab Emirates: s.n., 1991); and *The Myth of Arab Piracy in the Gulf*, 2nd ed. (London: Routledge, 1988). This is not unique to the Persian Gulf states, but rather is a legacy of the colonial and semi-colonial experience throughout post-colonial states. Umaru Ahmed, "The Cultural Content in Nigerian Education: The Language Curriculum," *Nigeria Since Independence: The First Twenty-Five Years*, v. 7, *Culture*, eds. Peter P. Ekeh and Garba Ashinwaju, (Ibadan: Heineman Educational Books, 1986), 32-59 discusses English as the language of culture and education in Nigeria.



Figure 1: The Arabian Peninsula and Persian Gulf[7]

[7] From Rosemarie Said-Zahlan, *The Making of the Modern Gulf States: Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and Oman* (Reading, UK: Ithaca Press, 1998), ix.



Figure 2: The Gulf States[8]

[8] Ibid., viii.

Chapter 2: Protected Status, 1820-1952

The nineteenth century witnessed the gradual expansion of the British Empire into the Persian Gulf, and ultimately, into the affairs of the Arab Gulf states. What began as a British economic enterprise in India led first to competition with Arab merchants and tribes in the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf, and then to a series of British-brokered treaties binding the Arab Gulf to British protection. Over the next century, British administration increasingly interfered in the political affairs of the rulers of the Arab Gulf coast. The early twentieth century then witnessed a rise in British involvement in the Trucial States as the Persian Gulf. The discovery of oil in the upper Gulf in the inter-war years and the establishment of an air route to India via the Trucial States intensified Britain's reliance on the region. By the 1950s, the Trucial States and the Arab Gulf generally had become an essential component of the empire's strategic and economic strength.

THE ARAB GULF BEFORE THE TRUCIAL AGREEMENTS

Historians and geographers have expressed interest in the Persian Gulf since as early as the fifth century BC as a locus for trade. Trade networks between China and Arabs in the Persian Gulf existed as early as the eighth century and commercial traffic in

the Gulf has remained a constant feature from that time forward.[9] Pearls are the most famous of the goods transported from the Persian Gulf. Arab sources in the fifteenth claim that, at Bahrain, there were around 1,000 ships in use for pearl harvesting.[10] Other trade in the region comprised inter-regional shipments of agricultural goods, including dried fruits, grains, eggplant, wheat, and sugarcane, as well as timber for boat building. There was also a strong market for dhow ship trade between Iran and the Arab Gulf states, particularly Dubai and Kuwait.[11] More long range trade with the Subcontinent and East Asia included spices, textiles, and gold, and it is probably to India that much of the Gulf pearls traveled.

From the sixteenth century onward, several empires attempted to establish economic and political footholds in the Persian Gulf. The discovery of a sea route from Europe to India allowed European merchants to compete for a portion of trade in the

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[9] C. Edmund Bosworth, "The Nomenclature of the Persian Gulf," *Iranian Studies* 30, no.1-2 (1997): 77-94 serves as a useful discussion for the evolution of geographic labels for what is now known primarily as the Persian Gulf. At various times, the Persian Gulf was the "Erythraean Sea," the "Green Sea," as well as the "Sea of Fars." The Persian Gulf, in the fifteenth century was subdivided into smaller areas of water including the "Cape of the Arabs", which included several islands, and which Bosworth believes is likely Ra's Musandam today. As Bosworth notes, the Persian Gulf was not referred to as the "al-Khaleej al-[c]Arabi", or Arab Gulf, until the 1960s in opposition to Iran's efforts to expand influence there. In the current work, I refer to the Arab Gulf to describe the Arab states of the Persian Gulf collectively.

[10] Robert Carter, "The History and Preshistory of Pearling in the Persian Gulf," *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient* 48, no.2 (2005): 139-209, 152. Carter cites Ahmed ibn Majid's description of "1000 ships"; Bosworth also uses ibn Majid's estimation in his study: Bosworth, "The Nomenclature of the Persian Gulf," *Iranian Studies* (1997): 146.

[11] The most important study of the dhow trade in the Persian Gulf is Dionisius A. Agius, *In the Wake of the Dhow: The Arabian Gulf and Oman* (Reading, UK: Ithaca Press, 2002) which focuses on the technical aspects of the dhow trade in the medieval period, but is incredibly useful as background to the modern trade, as it demonstrates the connections across the Gulf between the Persian and Arab trading communities. Ya'qub Yusuf al-Hijji, *The Art of Dhow-Building in Kuwait* (London: London Centre of Arab Studies and Centre for Research and Studies on Kuwait, 2001) is a largely photographic study in the evolution and technicques of dhow building, but also provides a useful historical account of the development of the dhow trade in Kuwait and the connections between Kuwait, Bahrain and Oman; Alan Villiers, "Some Aspects of the Arab Dhow Trade," *Middle East Journal* 2, no. 4 (1948): 399-416 serves as a useful snapshot of the dhow trade in the 1930s and includes Villiers' personal account of a trip via dhow.

Indian Ocean and nearby seas. European governments threw their support behind their merchants in the first half of the seventeenth century, granting state backed monopolies over trade in an effort to secure trade routes at the expense of their rivals. Britain chartered its East India Company in 1600; the Dutch followed shortly after in 1602. Portugal established its commercial monopoly in India in 1628, when King Philip IV granted a charter to the *Companhia de India Oriental*.[12] France established its *Compagnie Française des Indes Orientales* relatively late, in 1664.[13] These European companies competed with the established merchants in the Persian Gulf and surrounding trade routes of the Indian Ocean.

Through the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, regional trade remained largely in the hands of the Mughal and Omani empires. European merchants struggled to gain shares in maritime trade. At times, European companies succeeded in gaining control over trade routes in the region, but this control was intermittent and limited to some trade routes and goods.[14] As long as the Omani and Mughal Empires remained strong,

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[12] Francisco Bethencourt and Diogo Ramada Curto, *Portuguese Oceanic Expansion, 1400-1800* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007); Sanjay Subrahmanyam, *The Portuguese Empire in Asia, 1500-1700: A Political and Economic History* (London: Longman Group, 1995); Portugal's expansion into the eastern seas and trade with Asia played an integral role in shifting world trade patterns and weakening trade through the Mediterranean. For more on how these changes impacted Persian Gulf trade, see Aqil Kazim, *The United Arab Emirates A.D. 600 to the Present: A Socio-Discursive Transformation in the Arabian Gulf* (Dubai: Gulf Book Center, 2000) 83-108.

[13] Glenn J. Ames, *Colbert, Mercantilism, and the French Quest for Asian Trade* (DeKalb, IL: Northern Illinois University Press, 1996).

[14] Om Prakash, "The Indian Maritime Merchant, 1500-1800," *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient* 47, no.3 (2004): 435-57, 453. This is a helpful work discussing interactions between Indian merchants and early European merchants in the sixteenth century. Prakash observes that the Portuguese were able, in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, to control some aspects of trade in the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean through issuing passports and limiting traffic on some trade routes. This, however, was limited in scope and intermittent.

however, European merchants failed to penetrate the commercial trade in a meaningful and lasting way.

Significant changes in both the global economy and the regional political structures provided new openings in commercial trade, which the British East India Company in particular successfully exploited in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Portuguese trade collapsed in the mid-seventeenth century as the British and Dutch cooperated to squeeze out competitors. By the middle of the eighteenth century, Dutch fortunes declined as well. By 1798, only the British and French remained active in the European contest for domination in the Indian Ocean.

This coincided with the decline of the strength of the empires along the Persian Gulf. Merchants' successes in the subcontinent had increased wealth among provincial leaders who exercised greater autonomy from the central Mughal government. Along the Persian Gulf coasts, this pattern was repeated. The Ottoman Government held only nominal control over the province of Basra, while the Safavid dynasty that had ruled over Persia crumbled in the mid-eighteenth century. In the midst of these changes, Britain's rising sea power and influence allowed its merchants to take advantage of local rivalries and ultimately dominate the waters of the Persian Gulf.[15]

[15] C. A. Bayly, *Imperial Meridian: The British Empire and the World 1780-1830* (New York: Longman, 1989). Of great use for understanding the shifting balance from non-European trade in favor of European trade in the Persian Gulf is Patricia Risso, "Cross Cultural Perceptions of Piracy: Maritime Violence in the Western Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf Region During a Long Eighteenth Century," *Journal of World History* 12, no. 2 (2001): 293-319. Risso describes the rise of the Qawasim and their interactions with Oman in the context of the rise of British power in the region and the application of "piracy" to describe Qawasim maritime activities.

Among the most significant Arab maritime forces in the late eighteenth century was the Qasimi merchant fleet, based in what is now Ras al-Khaimah in the United Arab Emirates.[16] Jutting out from the Arabian Peninsula just north of Oman, the Qawasim had come to rival Omani traders as well as smaller fleets of merchants in Bahrain and Qatar. They also maintained ports at Sharjah on the Arab coast and Linga on the Persian coast. The Qasimi fleet consisted of approximately 900 ships and included large numbers of *dhows* and some European-style ships.[17]

The British rivalry with the Qawasim began in the late eighteenth century when the East India Company established an alliance with Oman. From that point forward, Oman's rivalry with the Qawasim became a British concern.[18] Between 1797 and 1820, British and Qawasim merchant ships frequently attacked one another. Using international sea laws, the British at Bombay justified their attacks on the Qawasim based on claims that their acts of maritime violence constituted piracy.[19]

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[16] The plural of Qasim is Qawasim, while the adjectival form is Qasimi. Frequently, the word appears in primary and some secondary sources as "Jasim" and "Jawasim" because the *qaf* sound often changes to a *jim* in colloquial Gulf Arabic.

[17] The estimate of 900 is from the height of Qasimi power at the beginning of the nineteenth century. Charles E. Davies, *The Blood-Red Arab Flag: An Investigation into Qasimi Piracy, 1797-1820* (Exeter: Exeter University Press, 1997); and al-Qasimi, *The Myth of Arab Piracy in the Gulf* (1988). Al-Qasimi is the current ruler of Sharjah and his work very much reflects a vein of Sharjah-Emirati nationalism as a consequence.

[18] Risso, "Cross Cultural Perceptions of Piracy," *Journal of World History* (2001): 309-12. Risso argues that this alliance gave Britain the necessary power to define piracy in the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean, and specifically to define Qawasim activities there as piracy.

[19] The debate over the legitimacy of this claim remains outside the scope of this work, though several historians have attempted to determine whether or not the Qawasim violated maritime. Davies, *Blood-Red Arab Flag* (1997) is a detailed work examining maritime laws and the Qawasim and British activities in the Persian Gulf. He refutes the idea that the Qawasim, broadly defined, were pirates, though some of their activities were piratical under the growing influence of the Wahhabi movement from the interior of the Arabian Peninsula. Al-Qasimi, *Myth of Arab Piracy in the Gulf* (1988) argues that the Qawasim were no pirates at all; rather, piracy was an excuse to justify the extension of British power in the Gulf and monopolize trade there. Perhaps most useful, though, is Risso's interpretation, which argues that "piracy"

The East India Company sought, in the second decade of the nineteenth century, to crush Qawasim activity in the Persian Gulf. Conflict between the East India Company and the Qasimi fleet broke into war in 1809, when the British succeeded in occupying the naval port at Ras al-Khaimah. A second attack on Ras al-Khaimah in 1819 decimated the already crippled Qasimi navy. The Qasimi defeat opened up the whole of the Persian Gulf to British influence. After 1820 the Arab tribes of the Persian Gulf became inextricably linked to the British Empire.[20] The British negotiated a series of treaties with Arab rulers on the eastern Arabian coast between 1820 and 1861. The first treaties were General Treaties of Peace. These established peace between the leading sheikhs of the coast and also of Bahrain. Between 1835 and 1853, sheikhs from Abu Dhabi, Dubai and Sharjah also signed additional peace treaties under British auspices agreeing to truces amongst themselves, intended to end disruptive warring. This peace was made permanent in 1853 in the Perpetual Treaty of Maritime Peace.[21]

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did not exist as a term in Arabic; instead, she argues that by the nineteenth century, British power in the region allowed Britain to determine who did and did not classify as pirates. Their determination, in part, that Qawasim activity constituted piracy came from the fact that they did not recognize the Qawasim as legitimate sovereigns capable of conferring the necessary permits to designate Qasimi merchants as "privateers." Notably, in Risso's study, "pirates" were almost always non-Europeans, whereas "privateers", or legitimate merchants, usually were, or had the support of, Europeans. See Risso, "Cross Cultural Perceptions of Piracy," *Journal of World History* (2001).

[20] J. B. Kelly, *Britain and the Persian Gulf, 1795-1800* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968); and Onley, *Arabian Frontier of the British Raj* (2007) are both essential for understanding the rise of British involvement in the Persian Gulf in the nineteenth century. Onley's book, furthermore, provides an in-depth study of the native agents serving under the British Resident in the Gulf with special emphasis on the nineteenth century. For a clear explanation of the development and reorganization of the Residency system in the Gulf, see Rosemarie Said Zahlan, *The Origins of the United Arab Emirates* (London: Macmillan, 1978), especially pp. 20-33. Zahlan argues that the administrative restructuring that took place in the 1930s and 1940s was in large part the consequence of the weakening of the British position vis-à-vis Iran and the rising interest of other states in the Persian Gulf.

[21] "Treaty of Maritime Peace in Perpetuity," May 4, 1853 in *Arabian Treaties: 1600-1960.* Edited by Penelope Tuson and Emma Quick. v.2, 469-72.

BRITISH ADMINISTRATION IN THE ARAB GULF STATES

The treaties not only established agreements among the Trucial States and with the East India Company. They also established a protective relationship between the British Empire and the Trucial Sheikhs. These agreements furthermore limited the Trucial Rulers to the administration of internal affairs. All negotiations with foreign governments would go through the British administration.[22] Maintaining these protective agreements with minimal effort and expense required the British government to find sovereigns they could cooperate with and rely on to protect East India Company and British interests in the region.

The Trucial agreements on the Trucial Coast recognized as leaders the two tribal groups that would come to dominate the future and politics of the area. The ruling families of the seven emirates are the same ruling families that were in place before the nineteenth century, when Britain established its first treaties. The primary tribal confederations in the Persian Gulf in the eighteenth and nineteenth century were the Bani Yas and the al-Qasimi. The branches of the al-Qasim family are based in what is now Ras al-Khaimah and Sharjah, and the rulers of both emirates are from the Qasimi tribe. The

[22] This was first partially required under the Perpetual Maritime Treaty of 1853, which stated that, "aggression being committed at sea by any of those who are subscribers with us to this engagement… we will not proceed immediately to retaliate, but will inform the British Resident or the Commodore at Bassidore, who will forthwith take the necessary steps for obtaining reparation…." "The Perpetual Maritime Treaty," May 4, 1853 in *Arabian Treaties*, 467-72. This was further cemented by the Protectorate Treaties of 1892, in which the rulers of Abu Dhabi, Sharjah, Dubai, Ajman, Umm al-Qaiwain and Ras al-Khaimah agreed not to correspond with foreign powers, not to accept any official agent, and not to cede or sell territory to anyone but the British Government. "Protectorate Treaties, 1892," 1892, in *Arabian Treaties*, 505-06. Al-Hamdani argues that this was the real mark of occupation by the British legal and political control, rather than the earlier treaties and bombardment of the Arabian ports. ᶜAli Hasan al-Hamdani, *Dawlat al-Amaraat al-ᶜArabiya: Nisha'ituha wa Tatawuruha* (Kuwait: Maktaba al-Maᶜala, 1986) 18-19.

Bani Yas was a confederation of in-land tribes largely based in what now makes up modern Abu Dhabi and Dubai. The two ruling families of those states—the al-Nahayan of Abu Dhabi and the al-Maktoum of Dubai—are actually branches of the Bani Yas confederation and were part of the same political alliance until the al-Maktoum broke away and established themselves as a rival power in the 1838.[23]

While the Qasimi agreements with the British were forged consequent to Britain's destruction of the Qawasim navy, the relationship between Britain and the Bani Yas families were reached out of a more mutually beneficial circumstance. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, the Bani Yas families faced the possibility of becoming subservient to the expanding Wahhabist movement in the Arabian Peninsula.[24] The Wahhabis had established themselves as the dominant power in the northeastern area of the Arabian Peninsula by the early nineteenth century and begun pushing toward the southern coasts in the direction of Oman. They certainly exercised some influence over the Qawasim until Britain destroyed their fleets and extended their protection to Qasimi territory; they were also beginning to push into the territories of the Bani Yas families in

[23]Al-Hamdani, *Dawlat al-Amirat al-ᶜArabiyya al-Muttahida* (1986), 18. For detailed lists of the various tribes of the emirates and their geographical origins, see Mahmood ᶜAbd al-Hamid al-Kufri, *Al-Amaraat al-ᶜArabiya al-Mutahida Bayn al-Qadeem wa al-Hadith wa Mushkilat al-Juzr al-Thalath* (Damascus: Dar al-Qutaba lil Tabaᶜa wa al-Nashr wa al-Tawzeeᶜa, n.d.), 27-43, which also includes a useful map identifying the tribal groups and their territories.

[24] "Wahhabists" or *Muwahiddun* are those who follow the teachings of the Islamic reformist, Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab. Abd al-Wahhab established an alliance with the al-Saud family in the eighteenth century. The religio-political alliance took on an active expansion policy through the eighteenth and nineteenth century in order to spread Saudi influence and expand Wahhabist doctrine and "purify" Islam in the Arabian Peninsula.

the areas of Abu Dhabi and Dubai. Thus the relationship between Britain and some of the Trucial Rulers helped maintain the Arab sheikhs' independence from regional powers.[25]

The East India Company, in order to maintain its political and protective role in the Persian Gulf and over the Arab states, established a system of political residents and native agents. The Residency system in the Persian Gulf was officially established around 1850 when the new post of Resident of the Persian Gulf was created at Bushire. The British Political Resident served as the point of contact between the Trucial Coast and the

[25] The aspect of mutual benefits of the Anglo-Trucial relationship has come under intense debate among Gulf historians. Was the relationship a coercive imposition on the part of the British, or was it forged by Trucial Rulers actively seeking British intervention and protection? In part, the debate has centered on James Onley, *Arabian Frontiers of the British Raj* (2007), who has argued in that book and elsewhere that the collaborative relationship between the Arab rulers and the British "protectors" was, in fact, mutually beneficial and that rulers sought out British protection as an extension of the Arab tradition of *dakhala* or *zabana*, in which protection is "granted" to the "protégé… 'on the honor' of his protector." James Onley, "Britain and the Gulf Shaikhdoms, 1820-1971: The Politics of Protection," *Occasional Paper, No. 4*. (Georgetown University, Center for International and Regional Studies, 2009): 1-44, 3. Several historians, myself included, have argued that this argument, though perhaps true in specific case studies, fails to recognize the coercive nature of the overall structure of the Anglo-Trucial relationship during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. For comments specific to this, see Nelida Fuccaro, review of *The Arabian Frontier of the British Raj: Merchants, Rulers and the British in the Nineteenth-Century Gulf*, *Reviews in History*, accessed March 28, 2011 (http://www.history.ac.uk/reviews/review/726); Priya Satia, review of *The Arabian Frontier of the British Raj*, *Journal of British Studies* 48 (2009): 789-91; and also Kristi Barnwell, review of *The Arabian Frontier of the British Raj*, *British Scholar* 2, no.1 (2009): 162-63.

This latter view, I believe, is in keeping with those studies by the early scholars of collaboration theory, who argued that the power of the British Empire rested on its ability to mobilize those willing to cooperate with and participate in the imperial project: Ronald Robinson, "Non-European Foundations of European Imperialism: Sketch for a Theory of Collaboration," *Studies in the Theory of Imperialism*, eds. Roger Owen and Bob Sutcliffe. (London: Longman, 1972); C. A. Bayly, *Empire and Information: Intelligence Gathering and Social Communication in India, 1780-1870* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997) are two examples of several, which make the argument that for a collaborative relationship to exist, both the British Government and the "collaborator" must benefit from the relationship. This does not suggest, however, that those benefits were equally beneficial or were available in all places of the empire at the same time. As is the case in the Trucial Coast, the protective relationship in the beginning benefitted the Bani Yas of Abu Dhabi and Dubai; but the Qawasim originally signed the treaty as a consequence of their losses to British maritime power.

Bombay Office. On the Trucial Coast itself, a Political Agent, usually Arab or Indian, acted as the coastal extension of British authority in the Persian Gulf.[26]

Administration of India transferred from the East India Company to the British Government in 1857 following the Indian Mutiny and administration of Anglo-Trucial affairs, consequently, shifted to the India Office.[27] The India Office appointed a Political Resident for the Persian Gulf, who acted as the mediator between the British government in India and the rulers on the Trucial Coast. When India gained its independence from Britain in 1947, the residency remained in place in the Persian Gulf, but came under the authority of the Foreign Office.

The structure of the British residency changed in the inter-war period in response to the need for streamlined communication between Bushire and the Trucial Coast. The Political Agent in Bahrain gained increased importance as the administrative officer responsible for communications with the Trucial rulers, including the ruler of Qatar. Following World War II the Persian Gulf's importance grew further both because of the

[26] Onley, *The Arabian Frontier of the British Raj* (2007). Also of great use is Vanessa Martin, *The Qajar Pact: Bargaining, Protest and the State in Nineteenth-Century Persia* (New York: I. B. Tauris, 2005), especially her chapter on Britain and the Qajars at Bushire, which looks at the period 1836-1850 and provides a useful picture of the interatctions between local merchants and the British Political Resident in the early years of the British Residency in the Persian Gulf. Her argument, that the local population there—especially merchants— used points of conflict between the British and Qajar powers as a way of shaping policy is echoes aspects of the relationship between the local Trucial rulers and British administrators in the current study. Martin, "The People, the State and the British in Bushire and Kharg Island, 1836-1850," in *The Qajar Pact* (2005), 28-47.

[27] Zahlan, *Origins of the United Arab Emirates* (1978), 22-25 describes the ambiguities of administration in the Gulf in greater detail. Essentially, the Political Resident answered to both the Colonial Office and the India Office, which coordinated Gulf policy through inter-departmental committees. The Persian Gulf grew in importance in the 1930s with the establishment of an air-route to India via the Persian Gulf. In order to streamline policy and command decisions, the Persian Gulf came entirely under the purview of the India Office in 1933.

creation of an air-route to India and speculation about oil reserves in the area.[28] This led to the further expansion of the administration. The subordinate Native Agent at Sharjah was replaced by a Political Agent until the office was moved to Dubai in 1953. Abu Dhabi also gained a Political Officer directly subordinate to the Agent at Dubai until the office there rose to the level of Agent in 1961.

The reach and authority of the British Resident in the Persian Gulf was disproportionately extensive compared to the size of the area the office managed. Though the Trucial States were formally independent of the British Empire, the reality of the circumstances was such that the Resident could and did interfere in both local and foreign affairs of the Rulers. The Resident oversaw issues regarding customs, imports and exports from the Trucial States and the acquisition of any land required for foreign nationals. He also served as the appellate judge for all of the British courts in the Arab states of the Persian Gulf. Moreover, he was charged with preserving British economic interests in the Trucial States.[29]

The Political Agents were responsible for a wide variety of administrative tasks within the Trucial States in addition to their responsibilities of implementing and enforcing decisions from the Political Resident. The Political Agent maintained contact between the Rulers and the Political Resident, was in charge of decisions concerning foreign affairs that could be resolved without the Resident, and served as judge for the British court in the Trucial States, which maintained jurisdiction over a growing number

[28] Zahlan, *Origins of the United Arab Emirates* (1978), 22-25.
[29] Kazim, *United Arab Emirates* (2000), 213.

of British subjects and protected persons.[30] The Agent also served as an assistant judge in the Joint Court for cases in which the parties fell under both British and local jurisdiction.

The British Government provided ample military support to the Political Resident. At sea, he could rely on the Royal Navy's Gulf Squadron to enforce any decisions the British Resident enacted should the rulers refuse to cooperate.[31] This was the primary source of military force throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth century. After 1951, the Political Resident also had an armed force at his disposal in the form of the Trucial Oman Scouts.[32] The Scouts, originally called the Trucial Oman Levies, grew from seventy men to more than 1,000 and were under the sole authority of the Resident.

These forces were ostensibly intended for the purposes of protecting British personnel and providing support for defense commitments in the area. The Trucial Oman

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[30] Those eligible for British protection and jurisdictional consideration included British subjects, British-protected persons and all "non-natives" living in the Trucial States. See Kazim, *United Arab Emirates* (2000), 213. These kinds of duties were similar to those of other British colonial administrators throughout the British Empire, including the Palestine Mandate, in Africa and India. For examples, see Edwin Eames and Parmata Sara, eds., *District Administration in India* (New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1988); William Grant, *Zambia Then and Now: Colonial Rulers and their African Successors* (Hoboken: Taylor & Francis, 2009); Roland Hunt, *The District Officer in India, 1930-1947* (London: Scholar Press, 1980). Onley, *The Arabian Frontier of the British Raj* (2007) argues that, in fact, the Residency system in the Gulf began as an extension of the Indian colonial administration. Also see Glenn Balfour-Paul, *Bagpipes in Babylon: A Lifetime in the Arab World and Beyond* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2006) for descriptions of Balfour-Paul's duties as a civil servant in the Sudan and the Persian Gulf.

[31] James Onley, "Britain's Informal Empire in the Gulf, 1820-1971" *Journal of Social Affairs* 22, no. 87 (2005): 31. The squadron patrolled the Persian Gulf from 1850 through 1971.

[32] Glenn Balfour-Paul, *The End of Empire in the Middle East: Britain's Relinquishment of Power in her Last Three Arab Dependencies* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 110. According to Balfour-Paul, the Trucial Oman Scouts was, "…the only instance… of a British diplomat commanding a private army." Also see: Kazim, *The United Arab Emirates* (2000), 216-17; Malcolm C. Peck, *The United Arab Emirates* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1986), 44-45; Muhammad Morsy Abdullah, *The United Arab Emirates: A Modern History* (London: Croom Helm, 1978), 80; Frauke Heard-Bey, *From Trucial States to United Arab Emirates: A Society in Transition* (Abu Dhabi: Motivate Publishing, 2004), 312-14.

Scouts, in particular, were primarily a frontier force that secured disputed borders with Saudi Arabia.[33] In a number of cases, however, the British intervened militarily in what were arguably local, internal affairs.

During the 1820s, the British navy sought to establish an offensive policy that demonstrated Britain's commitment to maintaining the peace treaties. In cases of maritime violence during this period, naval leadership sought to establish precedents that would discourage future incidents. In 1825, for example, a Qasimi attack on a Bahraini vessel. In response, the Senior Marine Officer met with the ruler of Sharjah, Sultan ibn Saqr in order to gain his cooperation in punishing the offenders. This event caused Saqr to take a more proactive role in future incidents in order to forestall British interference. When, three years later, an incident between a Qasimi ship and another from Oman broke out, Saqr imprisoned and then killed the Qasimi commander.[34] Such intervention, however, was not limited to "piratical" activities. They were also extended to cases where

[33] In 1952, Saudi Arabia occupied the Buraimi Oasis on the border of Abu Dhabi, Saudi Arabia and Oman. This led to a protracted disagreement between the Saudi government, backed by the American ARAMCO oil company, and the British, Omani and Abu Dhabi governments on the other. The Trucial Oman Scouts ejected the Saudi soldiers from the oasis in the mid-1950s, but the borders remained in dispute until 1974. The Saudi government had laid claim to the oasis on the basis of a previous historical presence in the oasis. The oasis was potentially valuable in the 1950s in part because oil companies believed there could be substantial oil reserves there. Furthermore, an entrée into the Buraimi Oasis would have provided Saudi Arabia with a strong position on the Trucial Coast, thereby facilitating the expansion of Saudi Arabia's political sphere. J. B. Kelly, *Eastern Arabian Frontiers* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964) and J. B. Kelly, "The Buraimi Oasis Dispute," *International Affairs* 32, no. 3 (1956): 318-26; Bernard Burrows, *Footnotes in the Sand: The Gulf in Transition, 1953-1958* (Salisbury: Michael Russell, 1990); Tore T. Peterson, *The Middle East Between the Great Powers: Anglo-American Conflict and Cooperation, 1952-7* (Houndmills: Macmillan, 2000), 36-47; Tore T. Petersen, "Anglo-American Rivalry in the Middle East: The Struggle for the Buraimi Oasis, 1952-1957," *The International History Review* 14, no. 1 (1992): 71-91; Nelida Fuccaro, "Between *Imara*, Empire and Oil: Saudis in the Frontier Society of the Persian Gulf," in *Kingdom Without Borders: Saudi Political, Religious and Media Frontiers*, ed. by Madawi al-Rasheed, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), 39-64; John C. Wilkinson, *Arabia's Frontiers: The Story of Britain's Boundary Drawing in the Desert* (New York: I. B. Tauris, 1991).

[34] Kelly, *Britain and the Persian Gulf* (1968), 205-08.

land-based rivalries extended into the sea, as was the case with the Bani Yas of Abu Dhabi and the Al Bu Falasah of Abu Dhabi. Between 1839 and 1841, Britain responded to reports of fighting on the pearl banks by dispatching a cruiser to order the sheikhs to control such activities.[35]

After 1951, the Trucial Oman Scouts became the more readily available force involved in maintaining British interests in internal affairs. Despite the fact that they were intended originally for the purposes of maintaining frontiers, there were occasions where the resident used the TOS to enact political changes. In 1954, for example, the Trucial Oman Scouts assisted in preserving Sheikh Sa'id bin Maktoum's rule in Dubai when it was potentially threatened by his brother, Juma.[36] Of greater significance, however, was the 1966 removal of Sheikh Shakhbut of Abu Dhabi from power and Britain's replacement of him with his brother Sheikh Zayid bin Sultan al-Nahayan.[37]

BRITISH AIR AND OIL INTERESTS IN THE ARAB GULF

British involvement in the affairs of the Trucial States, and particularly the lower Arab Gulf, increased in the inter-war years with the discovery of oil in several of the upper Gulf States and the advent of the air route to India. The two developments

[35] Ibid., 364.

[36] This is noted by Peter Lienhardt, who performed anthropological fieldwork in the Trucial States in the 1950s and also briefly served as advisor to Sheikh Shakhbut of Abu Dhabi. See Peter Lienhardt, *Shaikhdoms of Eastern Arabia* (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 15.

[37] "Colonel Edward 'Tug' Wilson," *Telegraph*. February 3, 2009. [http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/obituaries/4449618/Colonel-Edward-Tug-Wilson.html]. Accessed September 21, 2010, 11:14PM. "Tug" Wilson was a British serving with the Trucial Oman Scouts and led a contingent of soldiers when they removed Sheikh Shakhbut from power. Shakhbut had become increasingly distrustful and uncooperative with the British Resident in the 1950s and 1960s.

intensified British commitment to its position in the Persian Gulf. They would also serve to draw the Arab states into the world economy and regional politics. Before the Great War, the Arab Gulf had been isolated by British protection; by the end of World War II, the Gulf States were inextricably enmeshed in both the global strategy of the British Empire and, subsequently, the politics of the Arab world.

The Trucial States had gained strategic significance in the 1930s as a stop on the Royal Air Force air route to India.[38] The British government had begun to place increasing value on the use of air forces for the purposes both of maintaining communication between its positions in the Middle East and India, as well as in putting down anti-British rebellions in its Middle East mandates.[39] Airpower had been used with success in various parts of the Arab world at the end of the war and after. After the war, Britain sought to withdraw its troops from abroad and reduce the expense of the war; at the same time, however, Britain had faced insurrections in Egypt, Palestine, and Iraq. The British Cabinet lauded the successful use of airpower during and after the war in a report in 1921, stating that, "In more distant theatres, however, such as Palestine, Mesopotamia and East Africa the war has proved that the air has capabilities of its own."[40] The

[38] Zahlan, *Origins of the United Arab Emirates* (1978), 92-106.

[39] Ibid., 93-97. Zahlan argues that the development of the air route to India was a crucial element in the deepening relationship between Britain and the Trucial States in the 1930s. This view has been endorsed in Kazim, *The United Arab Emirates* (2000), 189-93. Britain's growing dependence on air power for controlling dissident populations in the Middle East, and particularly in Iraq and "Arabia" is discussed in Priya Satia, "The Defense of Inhumanity: Air Control and the British Idea of Arabia," *The American Historical Review* 111, no. 1 (2006): 16-51.

[40] Air Staff, "On the Power of the Air Force and the Application of that Power to Hold and Police Mesopotamia," March 1920, AIR 1/426/15/260/3, PRO quoted in Satia, "The Defense of Inhumanity," *American Historical Review* (2006), 26. See also H. Burchall, "The Politics of International Air Routes," *International Affairs* 14, no. 1 (1935): 89-107.

capabilities of airpower in the region led to the expansion of its use in the Persian Gulf in the following decade.

In the course of the 1930s, Britain negotiated a series of concessions with the sheikhs of the Persian Gulf to establish air installations. Britain built a landing strip in Bahrain, as well as another in Muscat, Oman in 1930, and a third in Kuwait in 1931. In addition to landing facilities, Britain sought to create auxiliary facilities for fuelling and storage. These were more difficult to obtain permission for, as both the rulers of Dubai and Ras al-Khaimah attempted to resist pressure to concede to the establishment of fuel storage facilities and airports for night service between 1930 and 1937. Both rulers eventually capitulated; Sheikh Sultan bin Salim al-Qasimi of Ras al-Khaimah permitted British storage facilities under threat of a naval bombardment and Sheikh Sa^{c}id al-Maktoum finally authorized an airport in Dubai in 1937. Another airport was built in Sharjah in 1932.[41]

These installations further entrenched Britain's commitment to a military presence in the Persian Gulf; but it was the oil concessions established between the 1920s and 1930s which solidified Britain's long-term presence in the region.[42] Britain had

[41] Zahlan, *Origins of the United Arab Emirates* (92-106) and Kazim, *The United Arab Emirates* (2000), 189-94. Kazim is explicit about the role of British coercion in gaining consent from the local rulers to build the air facilities.

[42] For introductory descriptions of British oil concessions in the Persian Gulf, see: Aileen Keating, *Mirage: Power, Politics, and the Hidden History of Arabian Oil* (New York: Prometheus Books, 2005); Daniel Yergin, *The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money & Power* (New York: Touchstone, 1991); James H. Bamberg, *British Petroleum and Global Oil, 1950-1975: The Challenge of Nationalism* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000). On the advent of concessions as they pertained to the Arab states there, see: Crystal, *Oil and Politics in the Gulf* (1990); Simon Smith, *Kuwait, 1950-1965: Britain, the al-Sabah, and Oil* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999); A. O. Taryam, *The Establishment of the United Arab Emirates, 1950-85* (New York: Croom Helm, 1987), pp. 10-13. Of great significance is Steven G. Galpern, *Money, Oil, and Empire in the Middle East: Sterling and Postwar Imperialism, 1944-1971* (New York:

begun the process of monopolizing oil exploration rights in the Middle East in the early twentieth century when William Knox D'Arcy obtained the first oil concession from Iran in 1901. The D'Arcy Concession, as it came to be known, secured exclusive rights to D'Arcy and his company to search for petroleum in Iran for sixty years, and in exchange, he would pay royalty fees to the Iranian government.

This concession served as the model for subsequent oil agreements throughout the Middle East, including the Arab Gulf States. Just over ten years later, the British Government began securing assurances from the Arab sheikhs in the Persian Gulf that they would not grant exploratory concessions without Britain's agreement. By 1922, all of the Trucial States and Kuwait had agreed to negotiate all concessions through the British Government.[43] In the interwar period, the competition between Western powers to gain access to oil led Britain to press forward with exclusive rulers in the Persian Gulf. Britain's Anglo-Persian Oil Company partnered with the American Gulf Oil Company to gain exploratory rights in Kuwait in 1934. The following year the Anglo-Persian Oil Company gained concessions in Qatar. The first oil concession agreement on the Trucial Coast was reached in January 1939 between Sheikh Shakhbut of Abu Dhabi and the Petroleum Development (Trucial Coast), Ltd.[44]

Cambridge University Press, 2009), which provides an in-depth analysis of the ways in which British economic well-being depended less on the oil in the Persian Gulf, and more on the sterling reserves invested in the British economy by the Arab Gulf rulers.

[43] Taryam, *Establishment of the United Arab Emirates* (1987), 10. Kuwait signed an agreement in 1913, Bahrain in 1915, Qatar in 1916, and the Trucial Coast in 1922.

[44] "Abu Dhabi: Petroleum Development (Trucial Coast) Ltd.: Agreement Dated 11 January 1939," in *The Petroleum Concession Agreements of the United Arab Emirates*, v. 1: 1939-1971, ed. by Mana Saeed al-Otaiba, (London: Croom Helm, 1982), 11-18.

The agreements came at a time when the economies of the Persian Gulf were suffering from the Global Depression. The Persian Gulf economies had become constricted in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries as British monopolization of maritime trade eliminated the diversity of the Trucial Coast. Consequently, the main source of revenue in the region came from the pearl trade. Pearling became the primary source of income for merchants in Bahrain, Abu Dhabi, and Dubai, especially. With the advent of the Depression, world demand for luxury goods, including pearls, dropped. At the same time, world preference for natural pearls from the Persian Gulf declined in favor of Japanese cultured pearls. By the end of World War II, the pearling trade in the Persian Gulf had collapsed almost entirely.[45] The economic decline in the Persian Gulf made the oil concession agreements more palatable, though it is reasonable to assume that resistance to such negotiations would have followed a course analogous to that of airpower-related concessions.

The concession agreements did provide some immediate economic relief to Persian Gulf governments. The rulers of the various sheikhdoms received guarantees of annual royalty payments for anywhere between sixty and seventy-five years.[46] They would also receive a percentage of the profits from oil sales when oil was discovered.

Almost immediately, oil exploration paid off in some areas of the Persian Gulf. The Bahrain Petroleum Company began drilling for oil late in 1931 and found oil in the

[45] Estimates place the value of the Pearl trade in Abu Dhabi after World War II to just one tenth of what it had been fifteen years before. See Christopher M. Davidson, *Abu Dhabi: Oil and Beyond* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), pp. 30-31. Heard-Bey, *Trucial States to United Arab Emirates* (2004), 188-91, 219-22.

[46] Al-Otaiba, ed., *Petroleum Concession Agreements of the United Arab Emirates* (1982).

late spring of the following year.[47] Before World War II, Bahrain Petroleum had even succeeded in being the first of the Arab Gulf states to export oil. The Kuwait Oil Company began exploring in 1935, but did not have success tapping oil until 1938; the outbreak of war prevented the oil companies in both Kuwait and Bahrain from continuing production until after the war.[48]

Elsewhere, the Arab Gulf states waited much longer to achieve any substantial benefits from oil exploration. The first discovery of oil in commercial quantities in Trucial Sheikhdoms did not occur until 1958. The Abu Dhabi Marine Areas found oil off of Das Island in Abu Dhabi; but even then the company was not able to produce and process oil until 1962.[49] Between 1958 and 1962, two more major oilfields were discovered on shore in Abu Dhabi, immediately increasing the wealth and political significance in the Trucial States.[50] Elsewhere in the smaller sheikhdoms, oil discoveries took place even later. Dubai's first commercial oilfield was first discovered in 1966, and subsequent oilfields only began production in the 1970s.[51] Until the late 1950s, then, the smaller Trucial States were critical not for their oil wealth, but mainly for their proximity

[47] Yergin, *The Prize* (1992), 282-83.
[48] Ibid., 300-01. Yergin notes that oil production shut down almost entirely, even in Saudi Arabia, during most of the war. In the case of Kuwait, he notes that "all the wells in Kuwait were plugged with cement, putting them out of commission, for fear that they would fall into German hands." Yergin, *The Prize* (1992), 301.
[49] Gerald Butt, "Oil and Gas in the UAE," *United Arab Emirates: A New Perspective*, eds., Ibrahim Al Abed and Peter Hellyer (London: Trident Press Ltd., 2001), 231-32.
[50] Ibid., 232. The Umm Shaif oilfield off of Das Island was discovered first, in 1958. This was followed later that year by the discovery of the Bab oilfield and then the Bu Hasa oilfield in 1962.
[51] Dubai's first oilfield was discovered in 1966; two subsequent large deposits were found in 1972 and 1973. The other Emirates with productive oilfields are Sharjah and Ras al-Khaimah, neither of which began production until after the United Arab Emirates was created in 1971. Butt, "Oil and Gas in the UAE," *United Arab Emirates* (2001), 248.

to the oil states of Bahrain and Kuwait, and for their convenience en route to other areas of Britain's Empire.

ARAB NATIONALISM AND THE PERSIAN GULF

Arab nationalism played a defining role in the establishment of the UAE. The development of Arab nationalism all over the Middle East informed the Foreign Office's administrative policies in the Trucial States through 1968. Britain's decision to withdraw from East of Suez and especially the Persian Gulf was, in part, due to Britain's recognition that its presence as an imperial power in the area no longer served its interests. Instead, their presence it drew attention and criticism to the rulers Britain supported and relied on. In leaving the Trucial Coast, Britain hoped to return to an informal role in the Persian Gulf that would allow the British government to sustain its economic and political connections without subjecting its collaborators to nationalist opposition.

Arab nationalism incorporated the belief that the whole of the Arab *watn*, or nation, was bound through common language, history, and culture; the creation of individual Arab states was the consequence of imperial forces that divided the Arab *watn* in the service of European interests.[52] Arab nationalism had been a driving force behind

[52] Abu Khaldun Sa'ti al-Husri is the primary intellectual architect of the Arab nationalist philosophy in the early- and mid-twentieth century. His work influenced other Arab nationalists and political movements including the Ba^{c}ath party. Adeed Dawisha, *Arab Nationalism in the Twentieth Century: From Triumph to Despair* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003) provides a clear and precise summary of al-Husri's

politics in the Middle East through the twentieth century and continued to be influential even as late as 1968.[53] Three major events in the wider Middle East, which determined the trajectory of the Arab nationalist movement, did permeate the political atmosphere of the Persian Gulf States and ultimately served to define the way the Trucial Sheikhs viewed federation in the period of 1968-71.

The first of these events, the "Great Revolt" of 1936 and the subsequent General Strike in Palestine was the first major nationalist event to send ripples of opposition to the Persian Gulf. The events in Palestine only created relatively minor disturbances in most of the Arab Gulf. Kuwait, Bahrain, and Dubai each experienced political movements in the 1930s that were triggered by the events in Palestine. These events did, however, serve to bring attention to growing tensions between the Arab populations and the British presence in the states where Britain's presence in the region had most significantly altered the local political and economic structures.

Britain obtained the Palestine Mandate following World War I and administered the territory until it withdrew in 1948. British officers in charge of the mandate were

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nationalism. See pp. 1-2, 49-74. Albert Hourani, *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 1798-1939* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 312-23.

[53] Historiography marks the failure of Arab armies in the 1967 War with Israel as the death knell of pan-Arab nationalism as a working political ideology. Arab forces failed to effectively unite their forces, which contributed to the Arab loss and Israel's occupation of the West Bank, Jerusalem, and the Golan Heights. As Adeed Dawisha points out, Arab nationalism failed to revive after the war, but Arab leaders in the wake of the war did not know that this would be the case at the time. See Dawisha, *Arab Nationalism in the Twentieth Century* (2003), 252-81. Two works have become the standard military and diplomatic histories of the 1967 War: Eric Hammel, *Six Days in June: How Israel Won the 1967 Arab-Israeli War* (New York: Scribner's, 1992) and Michael B. Oren, *Six Days of War: June 1967 and the Making of the Modern Middle East* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002). For critical analysis of the 1967 War, see I. Abu-Lughod, *The Arab-Israeli Confrontation of June 1967: An Arab Perspective* (Evanston: Northwestern University, 1970) and Avi Shlaim, *The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World* (New York: Clarendon Press, 2000), 218-64.

tasked with establishing control over the Zionist immigrant population there and the local Arab population, which had previously belonged to the Ottoman Empire. Britain had promised to help the Zionists establish there a "national home for the Jewish people" in the now infamous Balfour Declaration during World War I.[54] The Arab inhabitants of Palestine rejected the creation of a new nation state within the boundaries of Palestine; Zionists argued that the Balfour Declaration promised exactly that. British administrators and policy makers attempted to establish a two-state solution.[55]

Tensions between the opposing populations reached a boiling point in 1936 when violence broke out between Arab nationalists, angered by growing Zionist immigration, attacked Jewish immigrants in April. On 19 April, Palestinians formed the Arab National Committee and organized a general strike to protest Jewish immigration and British policy. The General Strike called for Arabs to refuse to work and shut down shops and subsequently refused to pay taxes. Several armed rebellions broke out among Arab peasants, which increased in number and frequency until British forces succeeded in quashing the uprising in October.

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[54] George Antonius' *Arab Awakening* provides a glimpse into the creation of an Arab identity in response to disillusionment with Britain's Mandate policy. George Antonius, *The Arab Awakening* (Safety Harbor, FL: Simon Publications, 2001).

[55] For a comprehensive introduction to the Mandate period, see James Gelvin. *The Israel-Palestine Conflict: One Hundred Years of War*, 2d ed., (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007). Eugene L. Rogan and Avi Shlaim, eds. *The War for Palestine: Rewriting the History of 1948* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), especially, Rashid Khalidi's essay "Palestinians and 1948: The Underlying Causes of Failure" pp. 12-36; and Rashid Khalidi, *The Iron Cage: The Story of the Palestinian People for Statehood* (Boston: Beacon Press, 2006). The relevant works on British policy in the Palestine Mandate, see: Michael Cohen, *Palestine, Retreat from the Mandate: The Making of British Policy, 1936-1945* (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1978); Wm. Roger Louis and Robert W. Stookey, eds., *The End of the Palestine Mandate* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1986); Elizabeth Monroe, *Britain's Moment in the Middle East, 1914-1971*, 2d revised ed., (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981) considers Palestine in the wider context of Britain's Middle East role.

A brief lull followed the initial strike while Britain formed a commission to investigate the origins of the violence and propose a solution. In July 1937, the Peel Commission endorsed a plan for partitioning Palestine. The territory would be divided into a Jewish State, an Arab State and a shared Jerusalem. Palestinian Arabs responded to the recommendations with a peasant-based revolt directed primarily at British forces. Britain responded with great force, deploying between 25,000 and 50,000 of its own soldiers, along with Jewish policemen, Zionist Haganah fighters and members of the Palestine Police Force. Despite the large numbers on their side, the revolt continued into 1939.[56]

The events in Palestine triggered outrage throughout the Middle East. In many countries, members of the community collected money to support the Palestinian cause. Merchants in Kuwait sought to do just that, but British officials discouraged the sheikhs from taking public positions on the Palestine question and the ruler prohibited public contributions. Sheikh Ahmad al-Jabir also refused to denounce the findings of the Peel Commission in 1937 when Kuwaiti merchants formed a committee to organize a protest against Britain.[57]

The dispute between the merchant community and the ruler of Kuwait over support for the Palestinian cause set off a political conflict that had been brewing there for several years. Before the 1930s, the economies of the Gulf States relied heavily on the wealth generated by regional trade, particularly the pearl trade. The merchant community,

[56] Matthew Hughes, "The Banality of Brutality: British Armed Forces and the Repression of the Arab Revolt in Palestine, 1936-39," *The English Historical Review* 124, no. 507 (2009): 314-54. Hughes' article examines the extent to which British colonial violence was systemic in the case of Palestine in 1936-39.
[57] Zahlan, *The Making of the Modern Gulf States* (1998), 36-39.

because of its relative wealth and access to capital, served as a center of finance for the states and loaned money to the ruler and his family both for personal and government expenses. This arrangement established strong personal and political ties between the merchants and the rulers.[58]

The 1930s marked a dramatic decline in the influence merchants enjoyed, especially in the major merchant centers of Kuwait, Bahrain, and Dubai. The global depression destroyed the pearl market, which was the main source of trade. Additionally, western oil companies offered the rulers of the various Gulf States concessions for oil exploration.[59] The concessions granted oil companies the exclusive right to explore and extract oil in exchange for paying the individual rulers a yearly sum. The influx of capital from the annual stipends to the rulers freed the sheikhs from their dependence on the merchants.

A group of Kuwaiti merchants made a list of reforms calling for changes that would allow them greater oversight in questions of trade as well as social services. Merchants who were not rounded up and arrested appealed to Sheikh Ahmad to establish an elective council. The council, consisting of 150 notables, elected a Legislative Assembly (*majlis*). Many of the reforms passed by the assembly dealt with local matters: they reduced market taxes, regulated the sale of food products, established schools and a

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[58] Fatma al-Sayegh, "Merchants' Role in a Changing Society: The Case of Dubai, 1900-90," *Middle Eastern Studies* 34, no. 1 (1998): 87-102; Crystal, *Oil and Politics in the Gulf* (1995), 41-47. Crystal discusses the interdependence of the ruler and merchants in Kuwait very well, but she does not bring in the link to the Great Revolt. For that connection, see Rosemarie Said Zahlan, *Palestine and the Gulf: the presence at the table* (Hoboken: Taylor & Francis, 2009), 16-20.

[59] Qatar 1935 Anglo-Persian Oil Co; Kuwait 1934, Kuwait oil Co (jointly held by Anglo-Persian and Gulf Oil Cos; Bahrain, 1925, Eastern and General Syndicate replaced 1934 Bahrain Oil Concession; Dubai 1937, Sharjah 1937; Abu Dhabi 1939; Ras, Umm 1945; Ajman 1951; Fujairah 1953.

police force and repaired municipal buildings. Other reforms, however, sought to reestablish the merchants' position of influence at the cost of British power. When, in December, the *majlis* attempted to force Sheikh Ahmad to reject the payments for oil from the British-owned oil company. Ahmad responded by dissolving the m*ajlis* and dispersed its members with force.[60]

The initial successes of the Kuwaiti reform movement inspired two more movements in the Persian Gulf that same year. Four hundred merchants in Dubai attempted to establish a *majlis* in order to press for social reforms and improve their economic plight. The *majlis* there was a consultative one, with fifteen members including the ruler.[61] The new *majlis* established a number of important reforms and placed heavy emphasis on establishing a stronger education system. As with the *majlis* in Kuwait, however, the Dubai *majlis* lasted only a few months; and as with Kuwait, the dissolution of the council came in response to the council's efforts to limit the ruler's control over the state revenue.[62]

The reform movement in Bahrain in 1938 took on a more outwardly anti-British tone than that of the Dubai and Kuwait reform movements. In response to the General Strike in Palestine, people in Bahrain circulated publications in the general population,

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[60] Crystal, *Oil and Politics in the Gulf* (1995), 48-9; Michael S. Casey, *The History of Kuwait* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2007), 57-58.

[61] Davidson, *Dubai* (2008), 32-39.

[62] The Dubai *majlis* refused to disband and took up defensive positions on the shore of the creek that now divides "old" Dubai from "new" Dubai. In order to eliminate the opposition, Sheikh Said's son Rashid, who had recently married, offered to hold a wedding feast on the side of the creek where the council members and their supporters were located, ostensibly as a showing of peace. Sheikh Said's Bedouin forces crossed over during the day while preparations were being made for the feast and shot the rulers' opponents from nearby rooftops in the evening, before the wedding festivities began. See Davidson's account in Davidson, *Dubai* (2008), 33-34.

but again, the ruler chose not to publicly take sides with the Palestinian cause at the recommendation of the Political Agent there. As had been the case in Kuwait and Dubai, the reform movement that appeared in Bahrain at the end of 1938 was inspired in part by the political agitations throughout the region, but the reforms were aimed primarily at changing local circumstances.

The merchant community of Bahrain, which had previously enjoyed influence with the ruling family, became further alienated from their position as a consequence of the oil revenue that came to form the basis of state revenue. By 1938, oil revenue had extended opportunities for education in Bahrain from just 600 students in 1930 to almost 2,000 students in 1938.[63] Many of the newly educated Bahrainis found themselves unable to gain access to the best-paying jobs at the Bahrain Petroleum Company (BAPCO), where all but the lower labor positions were filled by British and American technical experts. Furthermore, the bureaucratization of government in Bahrain consequent to the expanding role of government in developing schools, state and municipal infrastructure, and health industries, had the undesirable effect of distancing the ruler from a population accustomed to direct access.[64]

This time, British officials aided the ruler to curb the development of a full-fledged *majlis* movement. Reformers held a number of meetings in which they called for changes to the administration of a number of British-directed institutions, including the passport office, police force and customs office. In late 1938, rumors of a coming strike

[63] Zahlan, *Making of the Modern Gulf States* (1998), 64-65. Zahlan, *Palestine and the Gulf* (2009), 18.
[64] Zahlan, *Making of the Modern Gulf States* (1998), 64-66.

among oil workers led British officials to deport two leaders; dissatisfaction among laborers and the student-merchant coalition spread. BAPCO, in consultation with the Political Agent at the time, agreed to fire any workers who participated in the strike and the movement subsequently lost momentum.[65]

A second wave of nationalism came in the 1950s following Gamal Abdel Nasser's ascent to the position of regional leader and international spokesman for anti-imperialist, pan-Arab ideology. By this time, Britain's presence throughout the Arab Gulf states had expanded to penetrate more deeply the smaller Trucial States, which had largely remained outside of the earlier anti-British movements of the 1930s. Members of the populations in Abu Dhabi, Sharjah, and Dubai, all demonstrated increasing awareness of Britain's presence and interference in local affairs through public demonstrations and individual attacks on British property.

The pan-Arab nationalist of the 1950s that Nasser came to personify had grown out of Arab resentment for Britain's part in the establishment of Israel and the weaking of the Arab states through the Mandate system. The creation of the state of Israel in 1948 at the expense of Palestinians living under the rule of the British mandate aroused the anger of Arabs throughout the region. Following World War II, Britain lacked both the will and the resources to continue administering the territory, which was erupting in violence with greater frequency. British forces withdrew from the area that year without first finding a workable solution to the Palestine question.

[65] Ibid.

Following the British withdrawal, the conflict between the Zionist and Palestinian communities changed to a regional struggle involving most of the Arab states. Following the British withdrawal, the Zionist forces declared themselves victorious and announced the creation of the state of Israel. In response, the Arab states entered the fray. Nominally, the armies of Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and Iraq were combined under the leadership of a committee formed by the Arab League. In reality, they were unable to establish a unified plan of war; they also were neither properly armed nor trained to undertake the task of fighting Israeli forces that had been mobilized as an underground army for several years under the mandate.[66]

The poor performance of the Egyptian army against Israel led to revolutionary changes in Egypt that quickly extended through the region and impacted even the most isolated states in the Persian Gulf. Within the Egyptian army, a group of junior officers banded together to establish a command council that led a coup in 1952 to overthrow the British-supported monarchy in Egypt. The following year, Gamal Abdel Nasser emerged to take over the Egyptian presidency. His personal charisma and his determination to make Egypt independent of imperial powers created a strong popular following.

A few years later, in 1956, Nasser stood up to western powers publically and successfully when he nationalized the Suez Canal. Despite being built at Egyptian expense and with Egyptian labor in 1869, the Canal had remained under the financial and military control of foreign powers since its opening. When Britain declared Egyptian independence in 1922, the British maintained sovereignty in the Canal Zone. Following

[66] Gelvin, *Israel-Palestine Conflict* (2007), 116-34.

the establishment of the Egyptian Republic in 1953, Britain still maintained military control over Suez for at least another two years, with the right to return to the Canal for a further seven years.

In an effort to weaken British influence in the Middle East, Nasser sought financial support from the United States for funding the Aswan Dam project that would increase the amount of arable land in Egypt. He also openly opposed the British-sponsored Baghdad Pact that sought to create a military alliance between Middle Eastern states centered on Iraq, the monarchy of which had been installed by the British in 1938. As the result of Nasser's pressure, King Hussein of Jordan removed his British military advisor, John Glubb "Pasha" and refused to join the Baghdad Pact.[67]

Britain responded to Nasser's threats to British hegemony in the region in 1956 with an invasion of the Sinai Peninsula in an effort to take reacquire the Suez Canal. In a secret operation with French and Israeli forces, Britain orchestrated a military take over. On October 29, Israeli forces parachuted into the Sinai desert. Two days later, British and French bombers provided support with a bombing campaign. Fighting between the British, French, and Israeli forces on one side, and Egyptian forces on the other, continued until American pressure for a cease fire brought fighting to an end on November 6, 1956. Despite the military successes of the Anglo-French-Israeli invasion,

[67] The Baghdad Pact was created in an effort to prevent the spread of communism in the Middle East through an American-subsidized collective security agreement, established in 1954-55. The participating states included Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, Iraq, and Britain. Elie Podeh, *The Quest for Hegemony in the Arab World: The Struggle over the Baghdad Pact* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1995) discusses the view of the Baghdad Pact from the perspectives of the Hashemite monarchy in Iraq, which viewed the alliance as a necessary security measure against Soviet expansion, while Nasser saw the Pact as an extension of British imperialism.

international pressure forced them to withdraw their troops.[68] Nasser's victory solidified his position as an effective leader in Egypt as well as throughout the Middle East. It also seemed to confirm the power of Arab nationalism in the face of imperial forces and inspired Arab nationalists throughout the region for more than a decade after Suez.

This time, the Persian Gulf States felt the impact of nationalism much more fully than they had in the 1930s. Several Emirati figures recall the impact of Suez in their memoirs. Easa Saleh al-Gurg was nearly thirty and completing his studies in England during the Suez crisis and in the months following when the extent of Britain's involvement became public. When Anthony Eden resigned from office in January of the following year, al-Gurg recalled viewing the event "…as a victory for what Nasser and Arab Nationalism represented."[69]

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[68] The foregoing details have been considered by a number of scholars. Wm. Roger Louis, *The British Empire in the Middle East, 1945-1951: Arab Nationalism, the United States, and Post-War Imperialism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986) provides an excellent discussion of British policy in the Middle East leading up to 1951 with focus on the significance of Egypt in British policy in the Middle East. Monroe, *Britain's Moment in the Middle East* (1981) also considers the subject of British policy in the Middle East, but carries the history further into the 1960s. Her later edition, following the 1956 crisis demonstrates frustration with what Monroe viewed as Britain's disastrous decision to fight for Suez. Keith Kyle, *Suez* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1991) and Wm. Roger Louis and Roger Owen, eds., *Suez 1956: The Crisis and its Consequences* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989) each provide excellent analysis of the details of the policy decisions that led to the Suez crisis. Michael T. Thornhill, *Road to Suez: The Battle of the Canal Zone* (Stroud: Sutton Publishing, 2006).

[69] Easa Saleh al-Gurg, *The Wells of Memory: An Autobiography* (London: John Murray, 1998) pg. 72. Later in his memoir, al-Gurg recalls meeting Nasser and, "[becoming] very emotional… 'Long Live Nasser,' I cried and kissed him." p. 90. Despite al-Gurg's apparent admiration for Nasser and the cause of Arab nationalism, he went on to continue working with the British administration upon returning to Dubai in 1957. Before the formation of the UAE, al-Gurg worked in the Trucial States Development Office. He later went on to serve as the UAE ambassador to the United Kingdom. In his memoir, he discusses his conflicting feelings: "My friends used to tease me by saying that although my heart belonged to Gamal Abdul Nasser, my brain belonged to the British… my admiration for [British] dedication and efficiency did not for one instant diminish my belief in the destiny of the Arab world which Nasser seemed to have come closest to realizing. But I respected the British for their genius for order and administration…." p. 78.

The most prolonged response in the Persian Gulf came from Qatar. Immediately following the invasion of the Suez Canal, shops in the market closed in protest and public demonstrations of outrage continued for several days more. Qatar's response also disrupted oil distribution in the Gulf. Not only did protesters cut off pipelines near the refinery in the wake of the attack, but Qatar's Sheikh Ali refused to export Qatari oil through Bahrain in objection to Britain's support of Israel.[70] In December 1956, people in Kuwait sabotaged oil company installations.[71] In the remaining Trucial States, there was not much of an organized response, but traces of nationalist and Nasserist activities surfaced in the Persian Gulf through the next decade.

The fate of the Trucial States was determined in large part by the British decision in 1947 to transfer the administration of the Trucial States from the India Office to the Foreign Office rather than the Colonial Office following Indian independence. The Colonial Office and Foreign Office were both considered as viable options for taking over the Trucial States. The Colonial Office, in many ways, was the more appropriate choice because of its experience developing infrastructure in colonies and because its staff seemed better equipped for the administrative needs of the Trucial sheikhs. The head of Near Eastern Affaires in 1966 added that though the Colonial Office would have been better suited to provide technical and administrative support, the decision to place the

[70] Zahlan, *Palestine and the Gulf* (2009), 31.
[71] Ibid.

Trucial States under the purview of the Foreign Office had been made, "…out of concern for world opinion about the intrusion of British 'imperialism' in this region and because of the major problems which arose for decision in the Gulf were seen as political in character."[72] The Sheikhdoms, since 1947, were expected to function independently of the British Government at some future date. The question at the time was only "when" and not "if" they would become modern nation states.

[72] "The Arab States of the Gulf since 1947: Their Evolution and Development, with Particular Reference to their Neighbours, Arab Nationalism and the British Presence," by J. Peter Tripp, December 1966, G.5, Papers of Sir William Luce, Special Collections, University of Exeter.

Chapter 3: Development, 1952-1967

Britain's relationship with the Trucial Coast underwent significant changes in the 1950s. The discovery of oil in Kuwait and Bahrain provided strong economic incentives for the British government to maintain its position of dominance in the region. To accomplish this, Britain established a greater political presence in the Trucial States where they hoped they would find greater oil reserves, and which they saw as an important strategic location for the protection of their economic interests in Kuwait and Bahrain in particular. In order to boost stability in the lower Arab Gulf States, British officials began to exercise greater influence in the minutiae of the Trucial States' domestic concerns.

The British government had been involved in mediating between the rulers of the various Trucial States since the early 19th century. The British Residency arbitrated a number of disagreements between the rulers of Abu Dhabi and Dubai over the years, had determined the validity of rulers' claims in the smaller sheikhdoms, and had even in some cases, determined the very existence of the sheikhdoms by choosing whether or not to officially recognize those rulers' claims.[73] In many ways, the rulers owed their very

[73] One important example of this is the sheikhdom of Kalba, which is located within the current boundaries of Sharjah. In 1952, the British government retracted its recognition of the sheikhdom, which had existed as a separate sheikhdom from 1937 until 1952. The ruler of Kalba was murdered in an attempt by a member of the Ras al-Khaimah ruling family. The Foreign Office refused to recognize him as a legitimate successor and the sheikhdom was absorbed into the territory of Sharjah. Davidson, *Dubai* (2008) has a succinct description of the rise and fall of the Kalba sheikhdom. Fujairah was only recognized by the British as a separate sheikhdom in 1952.

sovereignty to the British government's intervention in local politics through the last 150 years.

The economic and strategic changes in the Persian gulf during the inter-war period had not only drawn Britain further into the local politics of the region. They also attracted the attention of other Arab states. Money from oil concessions and exports flowed out to Palestine and Syria in the 1930s and 1940s from Bahrain and Kuwait, and merchants in the Persian Gulf followed the strikes and upheaval in the Levant with some interest. Perhaps more significantly, though, Arab laborers flowed into the Arab Gulf states looking for jobs in construction and oil. These new changes continued to occur at a time when the political milieu of the Middle East underwent dramatic changes as nationalist, anti-imperialist ideologies in Iran and the Arab Middle East came to dominate the public discourse.

British officials in the Persian Gulf became increasingly concerned that nationalism would soon expand its influence to the Trucial Coast. British policy began to focus on expanding administrative and civic development to rebuff nationalist advances and keep the Trucial States closely aligned with British interests. The Political Residency developed a number of cooperative administrative institutions that were designed to streamline British decision making and policy implementation on the Trucial Coast in the post-war period. These included the creation of a Trucial States Council, which aimed at bringing the Trucial Rulers in the smaller sheikhdoms into greater cooperation with British policymakers.

These policies did help to increase the infrastructure and general coordination between the rulers of the Trucial States. Britain's increasing interference in the daily affairs of the Gulf, however, also served to intensify the tensions among the Trucial sheikhs, and between some of the sheikhs and British administrators. Such frustrations tempted some of the Trucial rulers to seek alternative sources of patronage, including other Arab nations as well as regional organizations that threatened to undermine Britain's monopoly of political and economic influence in the Arab Gulf.

THE TRUCIAL STATES COUNCIL

The Trucial States Council, beginning in 1952, served as a forum for communication between the Resident and the seven rulers at a time when British involvement was growing in the Persian Gulf. The early agendas of the Council were determined by the Political Agent at Dubai with little input on the part of the rulers. As Arab nationalism gained currency in the wider Middle East and began penetrating the Trucial Coast, the Residency responded by encouraging the Trucial Rulers to take a greater part in the Council. This culminated in the creation of the Trucial States Development Council, which served to distribute oil wealth from the wealthier Trucial States, most notably Abu Dhabi, to the poorer states. By 1968, these two institutions had created the framework that would constitute the backbone of the federation in 1971; moreover, the role that Abu Dhabi came to play as the financier of development projects

within the Trucial Coast established that sheikhdom as a leading force in federation negotiations.

Administration of the emirates became increasingly complex following World War II. The Trucial States had gained strategic significance in the 1930s as a stop on the Royal Air Force air route to India.[74] The discovery of oil added additional significance to the Persian Gulf's security. The oil exploration that began in the 1930s yielded significant results in the 1940s and 1950s. Kuwait and Bahrain began exporting oil in significant quantities in 1946 while Qatar's exports began in 1949.[75] Abu Dhabi and Dubai continued to receive concession payments until the 1960s, when oil was discovered in commercial quantities.[76] Consequently, British interest in the administration of the emirates grew exponentially in the decades after the War.

The creation of oil and military facilities and their supporting industries required large numbers of people. The populations of the Trucial States were very small, and so laborers and experts were imported from throughout the Arab world and the British Empire and Commonwealth.[77] An official census does not exist for most of the Trucial States until 1968, so it is difficult to gain a clear picture of the population growth in the Trucial Coast before then. In Kuwait, however, Rupert Hay estimated in 1955 that the population there

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[74] Zahlan, *Origins of the United Arab Emirates* (1978), 92-106.

[75] Oil was first discovered in Bahrain in 1931 and exports began the following year. Exports slowed during World War II and did not pick up again until after the war ended. Zahlan, *Making of the Modern Gulf States* (1998), 39, 64.

[76] Abu Dhabi began exporting oil in 1962 and Dubai followed four years later.

[77] One scholar has commented that when the oil industry began to develop in Abu Dhabi in the late 1950s and 1960s, there was still no noticeable infrastructure: "Expatriate workers from Bahrain or Kuwait—where the petroleum industry was much more advanced—were flown in on small aircraft which landed on runways of flattened sand mixed with oil." Butt, "Oil and Gas in the UAE," *United Arab Emirates* (2001), 231-2.

	1939	1962	1968	1970
Abu Dhabi	10,000	28,000	46,500	60,000
Dubai	20,000	50,000	59,000	75,000
Sharjah	5,000	33,000	31,500	40,000
Ras al-Khaimah	--	10,000	24,500	30,000
Fujairah	--	6,000	9,700	10,000
Umm al-Quwain	--	5,000	3,700	4,500
Ajman	--	4,500	4,200	5,500
Total		136,500	179,100	225,000

Table 1: Population Growth in the Trucial Coast in the mid-Twentieth Century[78]

had nearly doubled from the approximately 100,000 people living there when oil was discovered in 1946.[79] In Abu Dhabi, the picture of population growth patterns is less clear, but the population was estimated at 10,000 in 1939; in 1968, the population reached 46,500 and 60,000 in 1970. Similarly, Dubai grew from an estimated 20,000 in

[78] Zahlan, *Origins of the United Arab Emirates* (1978) p. 4; Kazim, *United Arab Emirates* (2000), 227; al-Hamdani, *Dawlat al-Amirat al-ᶜArabiyya al-Muttahida* (1986), 10.

[79] Rupert Hay, "The Impact of the Oil Industry on the Persian Gulf Shaykhdoms," *Middle East Journal* 9, no. 4 (1955): 361-72. Hay served as the Political Resident in Bahrain, 1946-52.

1939 to 59,000 in 1968, and to 75,000 two years later. Sharjah witnessed an analogous expansion due to its position as a military post: between 1939 and 1968, the population grew from 5,000 to 31,500.[80] The rapid population growth created a greater need for infrastructure and coordination.

The British Residency created the Trucial States Council in 1952 to facilitate communication and coordination among the Trucial Sheikhs and the Political Agent in Dubai. The Trucial Council was organized as a consultative body in which the rulers of each of the lower seven sheikhdoms met to discuss and make recommendations on matters that affected all of the territories. The Political Agent at Dubai chaired the Council, which had no legal authority to implement laws and regulations. The Political Resident was not obliged to follow any of the recommendations made by the Rulers at Council meetings and the Rulers themselves were furthermore obliged by their special treaty relations to fulfill the requests of the Political Agent and Political Resident even if their decisions went against the recommendations of the council members.[81]

The Trucial States Council ostensibly began as a forum for including the Rulers in the decision-making process.[82] Cynicism was apparent among the Rulers in the first meetings of the Council in 1952, however. Despite the Political Agent's request of the

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[80] Zahlan, *Origins of the United Arab Emirates* (1978), 4; Kazim, *United Arab Emirates* (2000), 227.

[81] See Kazim, *United Arab Emirates* (2000), 213; Ibrahim al-Abed, "The Historical Background and Constitutional Basis to the Federation," in *United Arab Emirates: a New Perspective*, edited by Ibrahim al-Abed and Peter Hellyer, (London: Trident Press, Ltd., 2001), 121-44.

[82] Al-Gurg, *Wells of Memory* (1998), 112, generously suggests that among the reasons for the creation of the Trucial Council was, "…guilt among the more enlightened British officials… that so little, in real terms, had been done during the period when they had been in control." Al-Gurg worked for the Trucial Council and the Development Council in the 1960s and became the UAE ambassador to the UK and Republic of Ireland.

Rulers' presence at the first meeting of the Council, the rulers of Dubai and Abu Dhabi both sent representatives rather than attend the meeting in person.[83] Sheikh Shakhbut, the ruler of Abu Dhabi, also failed to appear at the second meeting in May 1952.[84]

The tone and agendas of the first meetings did little to persuade the Rulers to take an active and meaningful role in the Council's proceedings. The Political Agent advised the Rulers on problems with efforts to control locusts and the establishment of a joint effort among the Trucial States to found a hospital in Dubai. More significantly, however, both the first and second Trucial Meeting addressed a problem of succession and sovereignty.

The British Government had recognized the independence of the territory of Kalba from Sharjah in 1936. Until 1936, Kalba had remained part of the territory of Sharjah and was ruled semi-independently by a branch of the Qawasim. In the 1930s, the British Government attempted to gain an agreement with Sheikh Sa^{c}id bin Hamad of Kalba through the ruler of Sharjah to gain permission to establish a landing strip. When Sheikh Sultan of Sharjah could not secure Sheikh Sa^{c}id's acquiescence, Political Resident Trenchard Fowle opened direct negotiations with Kalba. In order to do this legally, the British Government recognized Kalba as an independent emirate on December 8, 1936.

The Ruler of Kalba was assassinated in 1951 without an heir.[85] The Political Agent notified the rulers that the British Government was abrogating its recognition of

[83] "Minutes of the First Meeting of the Trucial Council," March 23, 1952. FO 371/98331. TNA. Sheikh Sa^{c}id bin Maktoum r.1912-1958) of Dubai sent his sons while Abu Dhabi's Sheikh Shakhbut (r.1928-1966) sent two secretaries in his stead.
[84] Minute by D. N. Lane, May 26, 1952. FO 371/98331. TNA.

the emirate of Kalba and would recognize the creation of the emirate of Fujairah from territory within Sharjah. According to the minutes of the first meeting, the Political Agent, "reminded [the Rulers] of Her Majesty's Government's refusal to recognize Saqr bin Sultan bin Salim as Ruler of Kalba, or to accept murder as a title to succession in any Shaikhdom…," and warned the Rulers against providing asylum to Saqr bin Sultan if he were expelled.[86] Such a potent reminder of the British Resident's power in determining the legitimacy of any of the Sheikhs' sovereignty effectively stifled meaningful participation in the Council's proceedings.

The Trucial Council met an average of twice per year through the 1950s and the 1960s. Despite the difficulties the Political Agent faced in garnering the Trucial Sheikhs' interest and participation in the Trucial Council, and establishing cooperative efforts between them, the Political Officer at Sharjah commented that the Council nevertheless proved effective in bringing the Rulers together:

> …even in its present embryonic form… [the Council] serves a useful purpose in bringing the Rulers together, not only so that they may be faced with some of the problems that concern them all, but to instill in them a corporate sense which, owing to the distances between them, the lack of communications and their natural jealousy, has in the past been notably lacking.[87]

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[85] Abdullah, *United Arab Emirates* (1978), 307-15 describes the independence of Kalba as one of several incidents in the 1930s where the British Government interfered with inter-emirate independence struggles within the various branches of the Qasimi family that ruled the territory of Sharjah.

[86] "Minutes of the First Meeting of the Trucial Council," March 23, 1952. FO 371/98331. TNA. In the second meeting of the council, the Political Agent informed the rulers that Kalba's special treaty with the British Government had officially been ended and that Sharjah had officially re-absorbed the territory. "Minutes of the Second Meeting of the Trucial Council," May 1, 1952. FO 371/98331. TNA.

[87] Bernard Burrows (Political Resident, Bahrain) to Anthony Eden (Foreign Secretary, FO). December 5, 1953. FO 371/104261. TNA.

The very act of bringing the Rulers together, from the Political Resident's point of view, sufficed to begin the process of cooperation.

The view of the Trucial States Council from within the Trucial States and the wider Middle East did not reflect the optimism of the British civil servant. The Trucial States Council was viewed"…an entirely British institution...." [88] Throughout the 1950s, and 1960s, successive Political Agents complained about the Rulers' "apathy" and "querulous" attitudes demonstrated in Council proceedings.[89]

The failure of the Trucial Council to garner the support of the seven Trucial Rulers became a more significant concern between 1952 and 1964 as the British Foreign Office became increasingly concerned about nationalist movements in the Persian Gulf. During the 1950s and 1960s, the British Government faced growing anti-imperialist sentiment throughout its empire and particularly in the Middle East. By 1964, the Foreign Office felt sufficient pressure from Arab nationalist groups to create greater incentives for the Trucial Rulers participate in the British administrative structures. As early as 1953, the political agent recognized that the rulers would not contribute much energy to the Council meetings "…until the Council has some real authority."[90]

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[88] Al-Gurg, *Wells of Memory* (1998), 113.

[89] C. M. Pirie-Gordon (Political Agent, Sharjah) to Bernard Burrows (Political Resident, Bahrain). December 1, 1953. FO 371/104261. TNA. Pirie-Gordon complained that during the third Council meeting Sheikh Shakhbut of Abu Dhabi only, "…spoke once to opine when his opinion was directly asked that H.M.G. knew best…." The only other significant contribution from the Rulers was that the Ruler of Sharjah criticized "every item" on the agenda. In 1956 the Political Agent described the ninth meeting of the Council pessimistically as "less stale" than previous meetings: J. P. Tripp (Political Agent, Sharjah) to Burrows (Political Resident, Bahrain), June 25, 1956. FO 371/120553. TNA.

[90] Pirie-Gordon (Political Agent, Sharjah) to Burrows (Political Resident, Bahrain), December 1, 1953. FO 371/104261. TNA.

DEVELOPMENT AND THE THREAT OF NATIONALISM

The need to imbue the Council with "real authority" and with some semblance of that authority coming from the local Rulers became a more pressing need as the nationalist, anti-imperialist ideology gained greater currency in the Middle East. Between the creation of the Trucial States Council in 1952 and independence in 1971 the under-development of the Trucial States attracted criticism against the British from Arab organizations and independent nationalists.

Bernard Burrows, as the Political Resident in the early 1950s, acted as the primary director of British policy in the Persian Gulf. He arrived at the Trucial Coast in 1953 after serving the Foreign Office's interests from Cairo and Washington. He has been described as tall, imposing, and "unflappable," but also unpretentious and frank.[91] By the time Burrows had arrived in the Persian Gulf to serve as Political Resident, he had already faced the reality of nationalism and its impact on British strategic and economic interests in the region. Burrows had spent several years of his experience in British civil service in the United States, where he served as the Head of Chancery from 1950 before taking over as Political Resident in 1953. The nationalization of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and the ensuing political crisis in Iran occurred during his tenure in Washington. He carried this experience with him to Persian Gulf.

[91] Regarding his lack of pretention, it was noted in his obituary that he was an avid square dancer and "an adept caller," a skill he developed during his service in Washington, D.C. "Sir Bernard Burrows," *The Telegraph*, May, 14, 2002. [http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/obituaries/1394093/Sir-Bernard-Burrows.html]. Accessed April 29, 2011.

As Political Resident, Bernard Burrows and his subordinate administrators did not view nationalism as an immediate threat in the smaller Trucial States, but they were also determined to prevent it from becoming one. Kuwait and Bahrain might be under nationalist influence in the nearer future because their oil wealth had created greater opportunities for those subjects to be exposed to the political ideologies of foreign workers and through education in Arab and European capitals.[92] The remaining Trucial States, with their as yet unknown quantities of oil, were not immediately under threat of being exposed to Arab nationalism in the view of the Foreign Office. They were more likely at risk of being absorbed by Saudi expansionist policies. A small force from Saudi Arabia succeeded in occupying the Buraimi Oasis on the border of Abu Dhabi, Saudi Arabia and Oman. In order to gain support from the local populations, the Saudi Government drew attention to its ability to provide funds and support for development.[93] Burrows encouraged the use of the Trucial States Council as a means for improving the infrastructural development of the Trucial Coast for the purposes of maintaining their independence from outside regional forces.

Without the economic resources from oil in the Trucial Coast to fund local development, the states there lacked basic necessities. In 1952, the Trucial Coast only had one hospital, located in Dubai. The small hospital's finances were "precarious," employed only one British doctor, and had fewer than 20 beds. No formal schools at any

[92] H. S. Stephenson (British Middle East Office, FO) to Anthony Eden (Foreign Secretary, FO), May 20, 1952. FO 371/98333. TNA.

[93] "Funds for Trucial States Development," Minute by D.A. Greenhill (Bahrain Residency), January 22, 1953. FO 371/104332. TNA. Greenhill reported that the Saudi Government was willing to help build schools and pay for new doctors.

level had been established, either by the local Rulers of the British administration. Abu Dhabi lacked paved roads and electricity on most of the main island and in Al-ᶜAin until well into the 1950s.

Water was the greatest concern for the Trucial Rulers. Throughout the Trucial Coast the sheikhdoms lacked sufficient water wells to provide for the local populations.[94] Drinking water for inland populations in Abu Dhabi had to be shipped in from Dubai, Qatar, and Iran. Even then, however, many Emiratis had limited access to fresh water, and had to dig shallow holes for short term wells. One Emirati woman described the experience from her childhood: "It was hard work in the winter, and in the summer, when people needed more water, it was killing. And the water, it was bad, so bad-tasting that only people as thirsty as we were could force it down."[95]

The dearth of government services such as health care and schools created resentment and frustration among the populations in the Trucial States. One account from Mohammad al-Fahim of Abu Dhabi, describes the consequences of this deficiency when his sister was injured in an accidental fire at home. The closest hospital was almost 85 miles from his family's home in Al-Ain, Abu Dhabi.

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[94] "Funds for Trucial States Development," Minute by D. A. Greenhill (Bahrain Residency), January 22, 1953. FO 371/104332. TNA. Water wells became a major point of contention between Sheikh Shakhbut of Abu Dhabi and British Officials. For example, Shakhbut complained openly during a meeting of the Trucial States Council that Pirie-Gordon was waiting too long to start water surveys in the Trucial Coast: Letter, Pirie-Gordon (Political Agent, Sharjah) to Burrows (Political Resident, Bahrain). December 1, 1953. FO 371/104261. TNA.

[95] Quoted from Jane Bristol-Rhys, *Emirati Women: Generations of Change* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), 48. The quality of available water in Abu Dhabi was so bad, in fact, that today the older generation there suffers disproportionately from kidney disease caused by drinking brackish water. Bristol-Rhys, *Emirati Women* (2010), 43-45.

> My father and mother, myself and my other siblings all got into the Land Rover with my injured sister and headed across the desert from Al Ain [in Abu Dhabi] to Sharjah. Of course there was no road other than a sandy track that followed the route of the camel caravans so we got stuck many times along the way and the adults had to get out and push the vehicle. It took us two days to over a distance that can now be travelled in a couple of hours at most. By the time we arrived in Sharjah it was too late; my little sister had already died from the burns.
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> It was an unfortunate accident. But equally unfortunate and completely unforgivable, was the fact that as late as 1957 there was not a single doctor in the Sheikhdom of Abu Dhabi. Most of the rest of the world had easy access to doctors, medicine, and the latest in medical technology to treat the injured and ill. We, on the other hand, had nothing, not even the simplest and most basic medical services…it was only in 1961 that the first missionary clinic was established in Al Ain and not until 1967 that a hospital was built in Abu Dhabi.[96]

These accounts and others like them had the potential to create hostility towards the British and the Trucial Rulers who cooperated with them, especially as the Trucial States came into contact with nationalist ideologies from the rest of the Middle East.

What Fahim's narrative also demonstrates is that it was not simply the lack of services that impacted local peoples' understanding of the Emirates' standing in the world. In noting that, "Most of the rest of the world had easy access [to services]… We, on the other hand, had nothing," al-Fahim reflects a sense of injustice that other Emiratis have recalled.[97] The increasing sense of frustration came from the awareness that other people in the region and throughout the world lived better. An older Emirati woman commented that "God war merciful [in the years before oil]… Yes, merciful. We had no idea what was happening in other places; we did not know that other people took

[96] Mohammad al-Fahim, *From Rags to Riches: A Story of Abu Dhabi* (London: The London Centre of Arab Studies, 1995), 63-64. The distance between al-ʿAin and Sharjah is approximately 85 miles.
[97] Ibid.

hospitals for granted, we didn't know the whole world wasn't poor like us."[98] Awareness of the disparity between the Trucial Coast and the surrounding states grew through the 1950s and 1960s as nationalist movements in the Arab world sought to expose these conditions in the Persian Gulf. These inequalities provided nationalists with additional ammunition for their attacks on Britain's imperial presence in the region.

Nationalist movements had become a more significant threat to the British position in the Persian Gulf after 1952. The popularity of Mohammad Mossadeg's nationalization of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company had alarmed the British Government. This incident in Iran caused members within the British Middle East Office to view the Trucial States and Kuwait as vulnerable to similar nationalist episodes. One official recommended that the Foreign Office consider focusing on pre-empting future nationalist activities in the Persian Gulf, "…the more so because events in Persia and elsewhere have so clearly demonstrated the sensitivity of Great Britain and the Western Powers where oil producing areas are concerned."[99] In the same year, junior officers in Egypt overthrew King Faruq and called for redistributing the country's wealth through land reform and government programs.[100]

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[98] Quoted in Bristol-Rhys, *Emirati Women* (2010), 44.

[99] H. S. Stephenson to Anthony Eden, May 20, 1952. FO 371/98333. TNA.

[100] Joel Gordon, *Nasser's Blessed Movement: Egypt's Free Officers and the July Revolution* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992); Malcolm Kerr, *The Arab Cold War*: *Gamal Abd al-Nasser and His Rivals*, 3d ed., (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971)**;** Joel Beinin, *Workers and Peasants in the Modern Middle East* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 114-41 provides a comparative discussion of populist nationalism in the period currently under discussion. In addition to Egyptian land reform policies, he considers Iraq, Syria and Algeria. Moreover, he considers the significance of sate-led development as a central element of populist nationalism. See also Roger Owen, *State, Power and Politics in the Making of the Modern Middle East,* 3d ed., (New York: Routledge, 2004), 39-72.

Following Egypt's nationalization of the Suez Canal in 1956, Britain's once ubiquitous authority in the Middle East had diminished significantly. By 1958, the popularity of Gamal Abdel Nasser's Arab socialism and pan-Arab nationalism was widely apparent as rulers in Syria, Iraq and Jordan each attempted to demonstrate their independence from Western powers and their dedication to the cause of Arab nationalism.[101]

Burrows' service in Cairo and Washington provided him with a unique perspective on the role of nationalism in the Middle East. The Egyptian monarchy had cooperated closely with the British government in the 1940s and early 1950s in an effort to limit the power of anti-British and anti-royalist political parties. Moreover, Burrows' time in Washington had coincided with Mossadeg's election and nationalization of the Anglo-Iranian oil company.[102] He was thus an advocate of a pro-active policy that would preclude enthusiasm in the Trucial States stemming from the dissatisfaction created by poor living conditions.

The growing public interest in nationalism and the nascent anti-imperialism in the Persian Gulf reinvigorated the British Resident's efforts to press for greater development in the Trucial States. The problem of financing development projects in the Trucial Coast became a central component in the thinking of Foreign Office officials, who hoped to prevent the extension of anti-imperialist and nationalist ideologies into the Trucial Coast.

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[101] Even Nasser found, by 1958, that it was difficult to live up to his own rhetoric. Despite concerns that the project would be a failure, he agreed in 1958 to a full union with Syria in order to prevent the Syrian Communist Party from ousting the nationalist Ba'ath party. See Kerr, *Arab Cold War* (1971) and Malik Mufti, *Sovereign Creations: Pan-Arabism and Political Order in Syria and Iraq* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996).

[102] See Bernard Burrows, *Diplomat in a Changing World* (Durham, UK: Memoir Club, 2001).

To preempt criticism from the Arab League and Egypt, Bernard Burrows attempted to raise funds to improve development projects in the Trucial Coast. He approached both the British Government and the oil companies in an effort to raise funds in 1953. The oil companies refused to invest in development until they found oil in commercial quantities.[103] The Treasury authorized £10,000 to help shore up the hospital and lay the groundwork for a single elementary school in Sharjah for the 1953-54 fiscal year.[104]

The contribution towards development from the British Government provided sufficient funds to begin some small public projects on the Trucial Coast. In 1955, Sharjah opened its first elementary school.[105] The hospital remained open, but by 1955, the Political Resident requested additional funds from the Treasury to expand the ward to 18 beds, seating for a waiting area and provide electricity to the hospital.[106]

Burrows recognized that annual funds from the British Government could not sustain the level of development necessary to keep Arab organizations out of the Persian Gulf. He approached Sheikh Shakhbut in 1954 and obtained the Ruler's promise to donate four percent of Abu Dhabi's oil royalties to a development fund for the whole of the Trucial Coast once oil became available.[107] Even this promise, however, was insufficient, as he noted to the British Foreign Secretary:

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[103] Telegram, no. 1275, Foreign Office to Burrows (Political Resident, Bahrain). October 22, 1953. FO 371/104412. TNA.
[104] Ibid.
[105] "Trucial States Annual Report for 1954," Pirie-Gordon. February 1955. FO 371/114576. TNA.
[106] Letter, W. H. Adams (Commercial Secretariat, British Residency, Bahrain) to A. C. I. Samuel (Eastern Department, Foreign Office). July 22, 1955. FO 371/114656. TNA.
[107] Minute, British Residency, Bahrain to Eastern Department, November 13, 1953. FO 371/104412. TNA.

> Even if oil is discovered in Abu Dhabi this year, it will be at least three to four years before the other Trucial States start to benefit from the 4% of the annual oil revenue which Shaikh Shakhbut has promised to donate to the Trucial Council for the development of the Trucial States. If Her Majesty's Government is to maintain their position in the Trucial States in the interim period, they will have to bridge the gap between poverty of to-day and the plenty of to-morrow. If they fail to do this, Egypt, or some other Arab state, will step in and take their place.[108]

Burrows' concerns that Egypt would attempt to extend its assistance to the Persian Gulf proved valid. Between 1955 and 1965, Egypt began to approach the various rulers to offer its assistance in building schools, providing teachers and sending experts to the region. During a visit to Qatar, Anwar Sadat invited the Rulers of Sharjah and Qatar to participate in a conference on Islam. Fearing that the conference was a ruse for spreading Nasser's political ideology, Burrows discouraged the rulers from both states from sending representatives. By that time, however, it was becoming apparent that preventing contact between the Trucial Coast and the rest of the Middle East would be difficult at best.

Burrows continued to push forward with development projects within the Trucial Coast, but it was becoming increasingly apparent that what the British Government was able or willing to provide was insufficient. The Ruler of Sharjah had accepted Egyptian teachers for the new school as well as two doctors. He had additionally agreed to send five boys as students to al-Azhar University in Egypt and ten more students to attend college in Damascus. Similarly, Sheikh Rashid bin Humaid of Ajman informed Burrows

[108] Tripp (Political Agent, Dubai) to Burrows (Political Resident, Bahrain). October 25, 1955.

that he would look to Egypt for help if he did not receive support from the British.[109] When Dr. McCaully of the Dubai hospital suggested creating a dispensary in each state, Shakhbut and his brother Zayid both "expressed irritation" that they would not receive fully trained doctors.[110]

Anxiety amongst British officials increased following Nasser's nationalization of the Suez Canal in the summer of 1956. Following the Suez Crisis in 1956, animosity between the British Foreign Office and the Egyptian Government increased. On July 26 of that year, Nasser announced his decision to nationalize the Suez Canal. The canal, which had been opened in 1869, had remained under British administration even after Egypt's independence in 1924. Nasser had professed a foreign policy of non-alignment, which led to uneasy relations between Egypt and the American and British governments. When the United States and Britain refused to provide funding to build the Aswan Dam, citing Soviet-Egyptian cooperation, Nasser responded by taking over the Suez Canal. Britain cooperated with France and Israel in a failed attempt to re-capture the Canal.[111]

British involvement in the Suez debacle severely damaged the British reputation throughout the Middle East. Nasser's charisma stirred feelings of nationalism within the Trucial States that autumn. Al-Gurg recalls his feelings for Nasser's vision, saying "My friends used to tease me by saying that although my heart belonged to Gamal Abdul Nasser, my brain belonged to the British… my admiration for [British] dedication and

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[109] Ibid.

[110] "Minutes of the Eighth Meeting of the Trucial Council Held in the Political Agency of 8th November 1955," November 8, 1955. FO 371/132900. TNA.

[111] Kyle, *Suez* (1991); David Carlton, *Britain and the Suez Crisis* (New York: Blackwell, 1989). For a description of the public reaction in the Persian Gulf in the wake of the Suez Crisis, see Bernard Burrows, *Footnotes in the Sand: The Gulf in Transition, 1953-1958* (Salisbury: Michael Russell, 1990), 87-111.

efficiency did not for one instant diminish my belief in the destiny of the Arab world which Nasser seemed to have come closest to realizing."[112] Others saw Nasser's stance at Suez as inspiration to take action at home. A sixteen year-old Sultan al-Qasimi, the future ruler of Sharjah rebelled against the British presence in Sharjah. Al-Qasimi had watched British guards and planes in Sharjah during the Suez Crisis when he would visit the air base to play soccer on the British Labour Ministry team. Frustrated, he exhorted his friends to take action against the British along with him on November 7, 1956, saying: "We cheer daily for Egypt's victory and the disgrace and humiliation of the aggressors and we do nothing. Now we must do something!"[113] That evening, he and two of his friends sneaked out to the main communications station between the base and the city and set fire to it.[114]

Throughout the Trucial States, there was not much of an organized response, but traces of organized nationalist and Nasserist activities surfaced in the Persian Gulf through the next decade. Bernard Burrows, the British Resident at Bahrain, reported the discovery of several "subversive pamphlets" in 1956, which called on the people of the Gulf to

> …rise up and rebel against the enemy as other Arabs have done… [The British imperialists] stay as long as they can and will ignore the desires of the people. They take away the riches of the Gulf to their own countries. The battle is for life and death. The way to complete independence is by general strikes, co-operating together against the colonisers and their spies, demanding independence, joining

[112] Al-Gurg, *Wells of Memory* (1998), 78.
[113] Al-Qasimi, *Sard al-That* (2009), 187.
[114] Ibid., 180-87, 187-200. He and his friends also went on for the next several days to perform their acts of rebellion: they cut pipes that supplied water to the air base and set fire to a British general's car.

> with our brothers in Egypt and Saudi Arabia, in Syria, Jordan and Yemen in a strong pact to enable us to fight together.[115]

Such pamphlets continued to appear in the lower Gulf States through the 1960s and their messages were amplified by radio broadcasts from Egypt.[116]

The Political Agent at Sharjah reported that the Agency staff had increased security in Dubai and Sharjah, where rumors of possible strikes and demonstrations were circulating. Organized disruptions never materialized though there were several incidents of arson against British property and school boys from Sharjah had shouted anti-British slogans at British officers and members of the Trucial Oman Scouts. In Ras al-Khaimah, students were also suspected of defacing property, including the ruler's car.[117]

Nasser's victory in Egypt inspired and influenced individuals in the Trucial States, but it did not manifest itself in organized political activity. In spite of this, British officials in the Persian Gulf became increasingly concerned that contact with Arabs from throughout the Middle East would lead to the radicalization of the populations there. Tripp discouraged the Trucial Rulers from importing employees from Egypt and Syria

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[115] "An Awakening Call to the Arabs of the Gulf," Annex D in Letter from Bernard Burrows (British Resident, Bahrain) to Selwyn Lloyd (Foreign Minister, London). October 9, 1956. FO 371/120553. TNA. It is worth noting that a list of possible agitators in Dubai included in the same letter also names Easa al-Gurg, serving as senior Arab Assistant to the British Bank's Dubai branch, who, "…once enjoyed considerable political influence with the Regent but has been annoyed by his subsequent loss of power. It is now almost certain that he organised the strike in the Dubai customs at meetings in his house."

[116] Mohammed al-Fahim recalls listening to Radio Cairo and the "Voice of the Arabs" in the 1960s, after battery-operated radios became increasingly common. His later recollection of this experience, as compared to al-Gurg and Sheikh Sultan, likely is due to his relative youth at the time. He was only ten years old during the Suez Crisis. Al-Fahim, *Rags to Riches* (1995), 114-15. Jayanti Maitra notes that Sheikh Shakhbut, for example, had closely followed radio news bulletins through his stint as ruler. Jayanti Maitra and Afra al-Hajji, *Qasr al Hosn: The History of the Rulers of Abu Dhabi, 1793-1966* (Abu Dhabi: Centre for Documentation and Research, 2001), 237-8.

[117] "Reactions to the Anglo-French Intervention." Tripp (Political Agent, Dubai). November, 1956. FO 371/120553. TNA.

who would spread of "revolutionary ideas" at a meeting of the Trucial Council. He warned them not to, "… uncritically accept the flashy and superficially 'advanced' expatriates of other Middle East countries, who came to their States purporting to instruct them and to teach their children," and that furthermore, the Rulers, "… must be vigilant to see that their States were not undermined by the new and often revolutionary ideas which were being pumped into the Gulf by the emissaries of Egypt and Syria."[118] The fear that Nasser's ideology would eventually reach the Trucial Coast guided British policy until the withdrawal from East of Suez in 1971.

EXCLUDING THE ARAB LEAGUE

Burrows, and the Political Residents that succeeded him, continued to rely on development to preserve British influence in the Persian Gulf. Britain's economic instability in the late 1950s and 1960s made it difficult for the British Government to provide sufficient material support for development at a pace that satisfied the rulers there. Increased contact between the Trucial Coast and the rest of the Arab world exposed Britain to frequent criticism and created tension between the Trucial rulers and British officials. In an effort to deflect comments from Arab leadership, the Political Resident increased the visibility of the Trucial rulers in administrative roles, particularly in the Trucial States Council and in the creation of a development fund.

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[118] "Minutes of the Tenth Meeting of the Trucial Council Held in the Political Agency on 13th May 1957." May 13, 1957. FO 371/126900. TNA.

Greater administrative roles for the rulers did not correspond to a lesser role for British officials. The Political Resident and the Political Agents continued to be involved in shaping administrative and development policies in the Trucial Coast. Between 1962 and 1968 the Political Resident intervened directly in the internal politics of the Trucial States so that the political leadership of the Trucial Coast would remain aligned with British interests.

The discovery of large quantities of oil in Abu Dhabi in 1962 provided the basis the Development Fund, which had been established for the purpose of advancing various programs for the modernization of the Trucial Coast. Abu Dhabi's new position as the wealthiest state on the Trucial Coast gave rise to tensions between Sheikh Shakhbut and British officials in the Gulf, and also between himself and the other rulers. Shakhbut sought to exercise autonomy in his spending, which brought him into conflict with British staff in the Persian Gulf. Abu Dhabi's potential as a strong political power also aggravated rivalries within the Trucial Coast; rulers of the poorer states attempted to find alternative means of support from the Arab League and Egypt. As a consequence, the Political Residents intervened in the internal politics of the Trucial Coast in the 1960s in order to ensure that the leadership there would cooperate with British policy.

The arguments from the British Residency as to the wisdom of investing more extensively in the Trucial Coast fell on deaf ears in the Foreign Office. In 1955, Burrows submitted a five year plan for development in the Trucial States for the period of 1956-'57 through 1960-'61. The plan detailed expenditures of £428,125 over the whole of the five year period to be spent on a wide variety of projects, including agricultural

development, water surveys for fresh water, public health, police forces, courts and schools.[119] The Foreign Office had been providing only £31,000 each year and would not authorize further annual expense.

The reason for the Foreign Office's failure to authorize the expense stemmed from the British Government's failing economic health. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, the British economy lurched from crisis to crisis. The trade deficit within the Sterling Area dropped off steadily as states that had been part of the British Empire, such as Nigeria and India, gained their independence and began to invest their financial surpluses in internal development. In response to Sterling's instability, the Treasury pressed many of the departments to cut their budgets.[120]

Money for development came through alternative sources in the 1950s and 1960s. On several occasions, Burrows approached the Kuwaiti and Qatari governments for monetary gifts to provide new teachers and to improve harbor in Sharjah.[121] The Ruler of Ajman provided 2,000 Rs in 1958 as a contribution to public health and education

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[119] "Five Year Plan for Social and Economic Development in the Trucial States," Minute by Riches. June, 7, 1956. FO 371/120609. TNA; "Jordan: Trucial States," Minute by D. M. H. Riches (Eastern Affaires). March 5, 1956. FO 371/120608. TNA.

[120] Great Britain abandoned the gold standard in 1931 and pegged the Pound to sterling. Trading partners used sterling as a universally convertible currency within the sterling area. Susan Strange, *Sterling and British Policy: A Political Study of International Currency in Decline* (London: Oxford University Press, 1971); J. D. B. Miller, *Survey of Commonwealth Affairs: Problems of Expansion and Attrition 1953-1969* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1974); P. J. Cain and A. G. Hopkins, *British Imperialism, 1688-2000*, 2d ed. (New York: Longman, 2002), 619-44; Alec Cairncross and Barry Eichengreen, *Sterling in Decline: The Devaluations of 1931, 1949 and 1967* (Oxford: B. Blackwell, 1983).

[121] Letter from Malcolm Gale (Commercial Secretariat, British Residency, Bahrain) to M. H. Morgan (Eastern Department, FO). October 1, 1956. FO 371/120611; "Trucial States Development (Education)", F. B. Richards (British Residency, Bahrain) to Walmsley (Eastern Department, FO). December 11, 1956. FO 371/120612.

projects in 1958.[122] Sheikh Shakhbut also had funded several projects in Abu Dhabi, including a bridge connecting Abu Dhabi to the mainland and building public works in the form of desalination plants, a power station and a pipeline between the Buraimi oasis and Abu Dhabi town.[123] Sheikh Rashid of Dubai had been more active in implementing projects, particularly in the realm of economic and administrative development. By the end of the 1950s, Dubai enjoyed the claim of not only being the home of the only hospital in the Trucial States, but also boasted a British-style post office and a branch of The British Bank of the Middle East, as well as a functioning municipal council.[124]

The donations from the myriad sources and the annual "niggardly" sum, as Burrows described it, from the British government did improve the circumstances on the

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[122] "13th Meeting of the Trucial Council: December 1", Hawley (Political Agent, Dubai) to Sir G. Middleton (Bahrain). December 8, 1958. FO 371/132535. TNA. Hawley replaced Tripp as the Political Agent in Dubai in 1958.

[123] See Christopher Davidson, *Abu Dhabi: Oil and Beyond* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), 31-2; Maitra, *Qasr al Hosn* (2001), 242-47. Shakhbut has been largely neglected in the histories of Abu Dhabi, despite his lengthy rule (1928-66) in favor of studies of his more charismatic brother, Sheikh Zayed who succeeded him. Shakhbut's unpopularity as a historical figure is no doubt related, in part at least, by the negative depiction of him has mercurial, stubborn and backward in British documents and memoirs. Some of these views have been colored very much by Peter Lienhardt's accounts of his period as advisor to Shakhbut in the early 1950s. He was dismissed after a three month period of service to the ruler of Abu Dhabi and described Shakhbut in less than flattering terms. This theme was picked up and elaborated on in the preface by Lienhardt's student, who edited his Lienhardt's memoir after his death. See Lienhardt, *Shaikhdoms of Eastern Arabia* (2001).

Shakhbut's legacy, however, has begun to undergo revision in some of the more recent scholarship. Davidson's work provides a slightly more sympathetic depiction of Shakhbut's distrust of British advisors and concerns about the social impact of modernization. Shakhbut has also received a more generous reading from Bristol-Rhys, *Emirati Women* (2010), 46-49. Most effective, however, is Uzi Rabi, "Oil Politics and Tribal Rulers in Eastern Arabia: The Reign of Shakhbut (1928-1966," *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 33, no. 1 (2006): 37-50. Rabi argues that the British relationship with Shakhbut was largely cordial in the pre-oil period; in fact, he argues that Shakhbut was respected and even admired for his effectiveness in bringing Abu Dhabi through the economic crisis brought about by the collapse of the pearling industry.

[124] Kazim, *United Arab Emirates* (2000), 233-36. Sheikh Rashid did not become the ruler of Dubai until his father's death in 1958; he had, however, taken on substantial duties as a deputy ruler from the 1940s onward, owing to his father's age and frequent illness.

ground in the Trucial Coast in comparison to the decade before.[125] The new Political Agent at Dubai, Denis Hawley, toured the Trucial Coast and noted that the "visible evidence" of the improvements being made was small, but that there were agricultural developments in Ras al-Khaimah, as well as dispensaries in the various states and two schools in Sharjah and Abu Dhabi.

Nevertheless, Hawley expressed concern at the failure of the British presence to modernize the Trucial States after such a long relationship with the states, writing that, "There is comparatively little to show on the ground for our long association with the Trucial States and what we have been able to do, of course pales before what has been done in the oil-rich States."[126] In Kuwait and Bahrain, the cities had been transformed by the early discovery of oil; but the Trucial States lacked even the most basic services. Peter Lienhardt has described Dubai in the 1950s as the main center of trade in the lower Persian Gulf, but even this town lacked electricity with the exception of a few private electric generators, and boasted only "two shops in the whole town had glass windows."[127] Moreover, there were neither foreign newspapers nor loal newspapers in circulation; even had there been, most of the population of the Trucial Coast were still illiterate until the 1960s.[128]

Hawley also observed greater local responses to the spread of nationalism in the Middle East than his predecessor had. The region experienced further anti-imperialist

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[125] Letter, Burrows (British Residency, Bahrain) to Selwyn Lloyd (FO), April 2, 1957. FO 371/126900. TNA.
[126] "Preliminary Impressions of the Trucial States," Despatch no. 21. D. F. Hawley (Political Agent, Dubai) to Sir C. H. Middleton, (Political Resident, Bahrain). December 30, 1958. FO 371/140087. TNA.
[127] Lienhardt, *Shaikhdoms of Eastern Arabia* (2001), 123.
[128] Ibid., 10.

changes in 1958. That February, Egypt and Syria merged to create the United Arab Republic, which created a single Arab state under Nasser's leadership.[129] Six months later, junior officers in the Iraqi army overthrew the British-backed Hashemite monarchy. Though the Trucial States had been sheltered from nationalist ideology for much of the twentieth century, the developments in 1958 reached closer to home. Hawley had observed young Arabs celebrating in the *souq* in Dubai following the Iraqi revolution.[130]

When war broke out in 1962 in South Arabia between nationalist groups in Yemen and South Arabia, it confirmed for some members of the British administration in the Foreign Office and the Persian Gulf that nationalism was spreading into the Arabian Peninsula and would soon infiltrate the Persian Gulf on a heretofore unseen scale. The war escalated to a regional conflict. Nasser sent in Egyptian forces to back the nationalist forces and the Saudi government sent money and arms to support the royalist faction that had been overthrown. The war continued on through 1968 when the British were forced to withdraw from their position in Aden.[131]

Other isolated events further fed fears that anti-imperial nationalist sentiments were beginning to take root within the Trucial States in the early 1960s. The lack of educational and vocational training on the Trucial Coast created demand for foreign

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[129] Mufti, *Sovereign Creations* (1996); Kerr, *Arab Cold War* (1971).

[130] "Preliminary Impressions of the Trucial States," Despatch no. 21. Hawley (Political Agent, Dubai) to Middleton, (Political Resident, Bahrain). December 30, 1958. FO 371/140087. TNA.

[131] R. J. Gavin, *Aden Under British Rule, 1839-1967* (London: C. Hurst, 1971); Paul Dresch, *A History of Modern Yemen* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Glenn Balfour-Paul, *The End of Empire in the Middle East: Britain's Relinquishment of Power in Her Last Three Arab Dependencies* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 49-95; Jonathan Walker, *Aden Insurgency: The Savage War in South Arabia, 1962-1967* (Staplehurst: Spellmount, 2005); Clive Jones, *Britain and the Yemen Civil War, 1962-1965: Ministers, Mercenaries and Mandarins: Foreign Policy and the Limits of Covert Action* (Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 2004).

workers in virtually every new field of social and economic development. Expatriates from the Middle East arrived to serve in various capacities in the Trucial Coast. Jordanians, Egyptians and Palestinians filled positions as teachers and became the primary suspects among British Officials for the spread of nationalist ideologies in the young male populations.

Events came to a head in 1964 when the Arab League requested visas to travel to the Persian Gulf that October to discuss establishing formal relations with the Gulf States and immigration.[132] The Resident at that time, William Luce, sanctioned the visit in order to prevent drawing criticism from the Arab world despite concerns that it would open the gates to Egyptian and Iraqi nationalism. Luce viewed the visit, however, as part of an, "overt form of penetration" aimed at weakening the British position in the Persian Gulf.[133] To combat nationalist aims in the Gulf, Luce warned the rulers not to make or accept any formal overtures made by the League.[134]

He also argued in favor of a proactive strategy on the part of the Foreign Office based on creating a substantial alternative source of aid: "In order to weaken the impact of any Arab League aid which may be forthcoming we should do everything practicable

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[132] Letter, William Luce (Political Resident, Bahrain) to T. Frank Brenchley (FO). June 23, 1964. FO 371/174492. TNA. Luce served as Political Resident in Bahrain from 1961-66, following several years of service as the Governor of Aden Colony.

[133] Letter, Luce (Political Resident, Bahrain) to Stewart Crawford (Assistant Under-Secretary, FO). January 25, 1965. FO 371/179754. TNA; Luce explicitly linked "Nasserism" with the Arab League. Crawford served as the Assistant Under-Secretary of the Foreign Office from 1961-65 before taking over as the Political Resident in Bahrain from 1966-70. He returned to his position as Under-Secretary in 1970 and remained in that position until 1973.

[134] "Relations Between the Southern Gulf States and the Arab League," Minute by Brenchley (FO). October 14, 1964. FO 371/174993. TNA.

to increase aid for the northern Trucial States from other sources."[135] Additionally, Luce believed that the best way forward would be to separate development funds from the Political Agency, which oversaw the Trucial States Council.[136]

The Arab League visit in October 1964 seemed to go smoothly from the British perspective. There were no security breaches and the rulers did not make any formal agreements with the Arab League. There were, however, indications that the Arab League's tour would have important political complications. The rulers reported that the League offered to provide funds for development and the rulers of Sharjah and Ras al-Khaimah, two of the poorest states, seemed inclined to accept the League's offer of funds. When members of the Arab League asked Sheikh Saqr bin Muhammad al-Qasimi of Ras al-Khaimah about support he was interested in receiving, Saqr suggested experts in a variety of technical fields as well as £2 million for building a bridge to connect Ras al-Khaimah and Dubai.[137] Additionally, the Arab League continued to make overtures to Sheikh Saqr bin Sultan of Sharjah, who had welcomed the League's visit to the region enthusiastically.[138]

Luce followed through with his earlier recommendations and responded to the Arab League's offers of aid with the creation of the Trucial States Development Office. The Resident had for some time been looking to imbue the Trucial States Council with

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[135] Letter, Luce (Political Resident, Bahrain) to Stewart Crawford (Assistant Under-Secretary, FO). January 25, 1965. FO 371/179754. TNA.
[136] Ibid.
[137] Letter, F. D. W. Brown (Political Residency, Bahrain) to J. A. Snellgrave (Arabian Department, FO). November 4, 1964. FO 371/174493. TNA; Letter, M. A. Marshall (Political Agent, Dubai) to Luce (Political Resident, Bahrain). November 10, 1964. FO 371/174493. TNA.
[138] Letter, Luce (Political Resident, Bahrain) to Brenchley (FO). January 11, 1965. FO 371/179754. TNA.

the appearance of greater involvement on the part of the Rulers. To that end, the Political Agent at Dubai relinquished his role as chair of the Council and the position was filled instead by one of the rulers. The Council then established a deliberative committee, which created the Development Office that would oversee the administration of funds for development. The new president of the Trucial States Council presided over the Development Office.[139] These changes provided a semblance of local Arab control over the internal affairs of the Trucial States.

The reality of the British role in the Trucial Council and the Development Office was that British officials and advisors retained active roles administering and steering development projects. The administration of the Development Fund fell to Development Secretary, Bryan Kendall, but within a month Luce began talking about Arabizing the leadership of the Development Office and appointed a prominent banker from Dubai, Easa Salah al-Gurgh to the position. Kendall stayed on with the Development Office under a different title.[140] The Office expanded development in areas of agriculture and fishing, public health, public works and education. Higher positions in the Development

[139] Several scholars have briefly discussed the creation of the Trucial States Development Office in relation to the Arab League visit in 1964 and there is general agreement that this was an attempt to rebuff the Arab League's overtures: Heard-Bey, *Trucial States to United Arab Emirates* (2004), 265; Kazim, *United Arab Emirates* (2000), 282, 283-4. Al-Gurg, *Wells of Memory* (1998) is especially important as al-Gurg worked in the Development Office at its inception. These works recognize the importance of the Arab League visit in 1964 as the catalyst for a concerted effort towards development in the Trucial Coast; as I have shown, however, this process had already been underway since the 1950s, also in response to the threat of nationalism.

[140] Telegram, "Arab Aid to the Trucial States," Luce (Political Resident, Bahrain) to Crawford (Assistant Under-Secretary, FO). February 17, 1965. FO 371/179916. TNA.

Office and its subsidiary offices were staffed almost exclusively by British staff and remained that way through 1971.[141]

The Development Office had been intended to serve as a counter to the Arab League's offers of development aid. It did not serve to deter some of the rulers from continuing to work with the Arab League, though. Following the visit in 1964, the Arab League proposed setting up an office in Sharjah for funneling and distributing development funds to the Trucial States. Luce recommended quashing the idea at a Council meeting and instead to direct any monies from the Arab League through the Development Office.[142]

Sheikhs Shakhbut of Abu Dhabi and Rashid of Dubai agreed with Luce's position and Shakhbut offered to provide additional funds to the Development Fund to offset the League's offer. King Faysal of Saudi Arabia offered additional funds contingent upon the Trucial rulers' agreement to reject the Arab League. The rulers of the five smaller Trucial States refused to consent to those terms. The Political Agent at Dubai attempted to persuade the rulers of Ajman, Umm al-Qawain and Fujairah, but reported that they had rebuffed him, saying, "Nobody has helped in the development of their States hitherto and

[141] Taryam, *Establishment of the United Arab Emirates* (1987), 52-3. Taryam is perhaps the most openly critical of the British monopolization of leadership positions in the Development Office. Kazim, *United Arab Emirates* (2000), 214, 283-84, similarly views the creation of the Development Office and the new chairmanship of the Trucial Council as "…probably a cosmetic change….", p. 214.

[142] Letter, Brenchley (FO) to R. L. Sharp (Treasury, London). February 23, 1965. FO 371/179916. TNA.

now they have an offer from the Arab League of extensive, cut-and-dried development projects with funds to carry them out."[143]

Sheikh Saqr of Sharjah continued to be adamant in his support for the Arab League's offer. His acceptance of the Arab League's presence in the Trucial States threatened to undermine the British position there in the mind of the Political Resident and officials in the Foreign Office. Consequently, the Foreign Secretary authorized Luce to deny the Arab League members visas for future visits, "… and to let the Rulers know that Her Majesty's Government are ready to forbid the establishment of an Arab League Office in the Trucial States and to take the necessary action if any Ruler should refuse to accept Her Majesty's Government's advice on this point."[144] The Foreign Office was adamant that development, as a primary tool of British relations with the Trucial rulers, should remain the purview of the British officials in the Persian Gulf.

Saqr continued to pursue the Arab League's invitation, and Luce responded with equal determination to prevent the establishment of the office. A flurry of telegrams and letters between Luce and the Foreign Office elaborated on the methods at the Resident's disposal to prevent League officials from entering the Trucial States. Owing to British control of air space and immigration, Luce believed he would be able to thwart any attempts at their arrival.[145] In June 1965, Luce received consent from the Foreign Office

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[143] Telegram, Luce (Political Resident, Bahrain) to the Foreign Office. May 21, 1965. FO 371/179917. TNA. The ruler of Fujairah subsequently returned and signed the telegram to Saudi Arabia submitting to the terms of the contribution.

[144] Telegram, Crawford (FO) to Luce (Political Resident, Bahrain). May 24, 1965. FO 371/179917. TNA.

[145] Letter, Luce (Political Resident, Bahrain) to P. D. Nairne (Ministry of Defense). June 2, 1965. FO 371/179917. TNA. In the same letter, Luce debated the legality and practicality of using military force to expel Arab League officials should they succeed in arriving in the Trucial Coast.

to close the airports at Abu Dhabi, Dubai and Sharjah; he also was allowed to use his discretion in withdrawing British protection to Sharjah.[146]

The crisis gave rise to instability throughout the Trucial Coast as the rulers and the Political Resident waited to see whether a confrontation would emerge. Saqr's refusal to deny the Arab League an office in Sharjah appeared to infuse the rulers of Fujairah, Ajman, Umm al-Qawain and Ras al-Khaimah with the confidence necessary to defy British wishes. This gave rise to speculation among British officials that the rulers in those states would opt to withdraw their relations Britain.[147]

Luce's efforts to keep the Arab League officials out of the Trucial States succeeded. On June 24, 1965, technicians from the Arab League attempted to fly into Dubai through the airport in Doha, Qatar. The airport at Dubai remained closed. A subsequent attempt to gain entry through Bahrain failed when the Arab League officials were denied entry there without visas.[148]

The episode came to a close the following month when Sheikh Saqr of Sharjah was deposed and exiled. Easa Salah al-Gurgh describes the ambiguous circumstances of Saqr's removal in his autobiography:

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[146] Telegram, Luce (Political Resident, Bahrain) to Balfour-Paul (Political Agent, Dubai). June 17, 1965. FO 371/179918. TNA; Telegram, Foreign Office to Luce (Political Resident Bahrain). June 16, 1965. FO 371/179918. TNA.

[147] Telegram, Balfour-Paul (Political Agent, Dubai) to Luce (Political Resident, Bahrain). June 14, 1965. FO 371/179918. TNA.

[148] Telegram, Luce (Political Resident, Bahrain) to the Foreign Office. June 28, 1965. FO 371/179919. TNA.

> The official version was that the deposition was the decision of a family council, the result of a loss of confidence in the Ruler's fitness to continue in office. The truth, as I understood it, was rather different.
>
> The Shaikh was invited to a meeting with the Political Agent. He set out, attended by various of his retainers and two armoured cars. On his arrival at the Agency a paper was waved in front of him which was alleged to be the record of the family council's decision. The Shaikh asked to see the paper; this was refused. In fact, it bore only one signature, that of the Shaikh who was to succeed him as Ruler—and who was later to be murdered by the exiled Shaikh. He was led out of the back door of the Agency, avoiding his armed retainers at the front, driven to the airport and put on a flight to Bahrain. He was said to have wept as he saw his sheikhdom disappearing below him.[149]

The consequence of Saqr's removal was that the plan for an Arab League Office was shelved, and the British government was able to maintain its monopoly in the area of development.

ANOTHER OVERTHROW

Sheikh Shakhbut served as another obstacle to British development plans. Though the ruler of Abu Dhabi did not incline toward revolutionary ideologies, neither did he agree with British priorities on the Trucial Coast. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, his resistance to the British Residents' pressure for more rapid modernization created tension. In the mid-1960s, the Foreign Office came to view his rule as atavistic, and worse, a potential threat to the British position in the region. As long as Shakhbut refused to cooperate in British-devised development schemes, he created opportunities for

[149] Al-Gurg, *Wells of Memory* (1998), 119-20. Balfour-Paul describes the ouster in more vague terms. According to him, Saqr of Sharjah told the British Minister of State, "…that he would do as he thought fit…. A month later his family, with British encouragement, deposed him." Balfour-Paul, *End of Empire in the Middle East* (1994), 121.

nationalists to criticize the slow pace of development on the Trucial Coast. Once again, in 1966, the British reached out to a ruling family—this time that of Abu Dhabi—to encourage and support Sheikh Zayid's ouster of his brother, Shakhbut. This move eliminated the last Trucial ruler whose contentious relationship with Britain could obstruct British policy and undermine British interests in the long run.

Shakhbut's rule in Abu Dhabi began in 1928. Throughout his rule, Britain's involvement in the day-to-day affairs of the Trucial States had grown, first through the growth of the new military presence with the air base in Sharjah; then through the influx of British technical and financial advisors with the establishment of the oil concessions and exploration; and then through the creation of the Trucial States Council and the management of development projects in the 1950s. As seen in the pages above, the links between Trucial affairs and British interests intensified as Britain's hold on other areas in the Middle East, particularly Suez and Aden, began to crumble.

Britain's plans for modernization were frequently at variance with Shakhbut's concerns about the immediate welfare of the people of Abu Dhabi and his concerns for the preservation of the tribal structures and links within the populations under his authority. One example of the disagreements over the prioritization of development between the British Residency and Sheikh Shakhbut came in the form of disputes over fresh water. Abu Dhabi's pre-oil economy depended heavily on the fishing and pearling seasons, which brought men from the inland oases out to the island where the city of Abu Dhabi is situated for part of the year. Fresh water on the island was limited to one main sweetwater well located at Qasr al-Hosn. As the population in Abu Dhabi grew in the

1950s, the well became an insufficient source of water.[150] In numerous instances in the mid-1950s, Shakhbut and British officials argued over whether resources should be focused on the search for oil wells or for water wells. At one point in 1962, Shakhbut became so frustrated with British inaction that he brought in a man with a divining rod to search for water sources on the island. British officials watched and snidely criticized Shakhbut's efforts.[151]

British officials continually failed to recognize Shakhbut's concerns about the dislocation of tribal traditions that Shakhbut viewed as essential to preserve the fabric of local society. Shakhbut pressed forward with some development measures, including the establishment of a police force in 1959 and the Abu Dhabi Defense Force in 1965. He also pursued some municipal developments at the behest of his British advisors, and invited Kuwait's Director General of Social Affairs and Labor to help plan a social services proposal.[152] This concession on Shakhbut's part was a rarity, however. In general, the sheikh preferred to avoid drawing on experts from Kuwait, Bahrain, and Qatar in particular because he viewed their influence with suspicion and viewed rapid

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[150] The population in Abu Dhabi nearly tripled between 1939 and 1962, from 10,000 to 28,000. See figure 1 above.

[151] R. D. Gordon (Abu Dhabi) to R. A. M. Hendrie (Bahrain, Political Residency), September 3, 1962. *Arab Gulf Cities* v. 1, Archive Editions (1994), 179. The diviner was unsuccessful in finding water, though he apparently had some views for British Petroleum about where they might be able to dig two more oil wells.

[152] Kazim, *The United Arab Emirates* (2000), 261; Taryam, *Establishment of the United Arab Emirates* (1987) both discuss this as one example of the ways in which Shakhbut moved forward with some modernization projects, though he was generally hesitant to move as rapidly as British administrators would have liked. The Kuwaiti official sent to oversee the advisory mission was Sayyid ᶜAbd al-Aziz al-Sarᶜawi. See also Sayyid ᶜAbd al-Aziz al-Sarᶜawi, *Sittat Asaabi ᶜ fi Imaarat Abu Dhabi* (Kuwait: n.p., 1961).

modernization as an unnecessary evil.[153] Over time, the disagreements between Sheikh Shakhbut and British policy makers turned from contentious to suspicious and even fractious.

Shakhbut's growing distrust of Britain and British development policies also seems to have created dissatisfaction within the al-Nahayan family.[154] Shakhbut's reluctance to spend Abu Dhabi's revenue weakened the ruling family's ties with the tribes that had served as the support base. His brother and deputy ruler, Zayid bin Sultan al-Nahayan, met with British officials on several occasions in the 1950s and early 1960s to discuss the difficulties of Shakhbut's obstinacy and tight-fistedness and purportedly implied that his concerns were those of the whole family.[155]

Zayid, Shakhbut's youngest brother had demonstrated his leadership skills in Abu Dhabi since 1946. He served as the *wali*, or governor, of Buraimi and was also the deputy ruler of Abu Dhabi. He attended the meetings of the Trucial States Council from its inception and maintained strong ties with tribal leaders throughout the emirate even in times of territorial wars with Dubai in the 1940s and 1950s. As *wali*, he had also moved

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[153] Kazim, *The United Arab Emirates* (2000); Rabi, "Oil Politics and Tribal Ruelrs in Eastern Arabia," *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* (2006): 44-46. Shakhbut saw oil wealth as corrosive, believing that it would corrupt local values and traditions.

[154] It is difficult to be certain how true this is. As seen in the above case with the overthrow of Sheikh Saqr of Sharjah, the details of family politics have been obscured and multiple accounts and rumors of how and why Shakhbut was forced to abdicate. Official British documents are relatively silent on the events surrounding the decision to remove Shakhbut and replace him with his brother Zayed. See Davidson, *Abu Dhabi* (2009), 41-49.

[155] Ibid.; Maitra, *Qasr al-Hosn* (2004).

forward with several public service projects, including the building of the first hospital and lasting public schools in the emirate in the Buraimi oasis.[156]

In 1966, in cooperation with British forces, Sheikh Zayid participated in the forcible removal of Shakhbut from Qasr al-Hosn in Abu Dhabi town. Most sources are vague or silent on the exact details of Shakhbut's removal. It is known, though, that a contingent of soldiers, led by Colonel Edward "Tug" Wilson, took over the local state radio station, removed Shakhbut from his palace, and escorted the former ruler to the airport "to start an honourable exile."[157] From 1966 until his death in 2004, Sheikh Zayid served as the ruler of Abu Dhabi.

Between 1952 and 1968, the British government's policy toward the Trucial Coast came to depend increasingly on expanding development projects there. The lack of economic resources in the Trucial States until the mid-1960s prevented development from occurring at a rapid pace. Furthermore, Britain's reluctance, and perhaps its inability, to extend its own economic resources to the Trucial Coast development drew criticism from not only the Sheikhs of the Trucial States, but also from the wider Arab world. The rise of Arab nationalism in the Middle East during the period under study,

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[156] Shakhbut, as mentioned above, did attempt to establish schools in Abu Dhabi, but these projects were short lived, closing within two to three years of their opening. The schools in the Buraimi oasis, however, were opened and expanded in the late 1950s and 1960s under Sheikh Zayed's leadership. See Kazim, *The United Arab Emirates* (2000), 270-71.

[157] "Tug" Wilson was a British colonel loaned to the emirate of Abu Dhabi, where he founded the Abu Dhabi Defense Force after serving several years in the Trucial Oman Scouts. Following the British withdrawal, Wilson spent much of the remainder of his life living in Abu Dhabi as the guest of Sheikh Zayed. "Colonel Edward 'Tug' Wilson," *Telegraph*. February 3, 2009.

combined with increased exposure in the Trucial Coast to the ideologies of nationalism, created tensions between the British government and its protected states in the Persian Gulf.

British officials in the Persian Gulf attempted to promote British interests in the region by expanding the roles that Trucial rulers could play in the administration and development of their sheikhdoms. The Trucial State Council, and eventually the Trucial States Development Office, began as initiatives on the part of the British government to deflect criticism from the wider Arab world, and particularly from Egypt. The Trucial States' isolation from world politics could no longer be sustained. The very development that British policy makers hoped would uphold the British position in the Persian Gulf exposed the Trucial Rulers and the populations there to the changing global political atmosphere. Foreign workers from throughout the Middle East and South Asia brought with them their nationalist and anti-imperialist philosophies.

While it is difficult to quantify the degree to which the rulers subscribed to Arab nationalism, it became apparent by 1965 that nationalism at the very least provided the rulers with a powerful tool. In the mid-1960s, Britain still proved willing to use its political might to sustain its position in the Persian Gulf and promote its own interests there. Once the decision to withdraw was made in 1968, however, the largely superficial offices created for the Trucial Rulers in the Trucial Council and the Development Office grew more influential.

Chapter 4: Withdrawal, 1952-1968

On 16 January 1968 the Prime Minister, Harold Wilson, announced to Parliament that the British government would withdraw all of its troops from the Persian Gulf no later than December 31, 1971.[158] The decision came as a surprise to many in both Britain and the Persian Gulf. No one expected the British to remain in the Gulf forever, but this total withdrawal seemed precipitate. Members of the Foreign Office and British civil servants in the Trucial States had considered the mid-1970s as the earliest possible target for independence.[159] Wilson gave no indication when he took office in 1964 that he seriously considered a substantial reduction in Britain's military commitments in the Persian Gulf and Southeast Asia. Most ministers in his cabinet furthermore favored maintaining Britain's East of Suez role in order to protect economic interests and uphold

[158] Harold Wilson served as Prime Minister in the 1964-1970 Labour Government. J. B. Kelly, *Arabia, the Gulf and the West: A Critical View of the Arabs and Their Oil Policy* (New York: Basic Books, 1980) remains the most comprehensive historical account of the British withdrawal from the Gulf. In addition to Kelly's historical analysis, the work is notable for its tone of frustration at the British withdrawal from the Persian Gulf. Balfour-Paul, *End of Empire in the Middle East* (1994) is important for its use of papers from Sir William Luce who served as the Political Resident in Aden and Bahrain, and also for the author's own insights as a former British civil servant in the Arab Gulf. John Darwin, *Britain and Decolonisation: The Retreat from the Post War World* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1988) provides a particularly valuable discussion of the 1966 Defense White Paper, which demonstrated the shift in the Labour Government's will for maintaining a long term defense position East of Suez. Wm. Roger Louis, "The Withdrawal from the Gulf," *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 31, no. 1 (2003): 83 – 108, provides a succinct description of the role that Arab nationalism and economics played in the decision to withdrawal, and highlights the conflict between the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Labour ministers over British policy in the Persian Gulf. Shohei Sato, "Britain's Decision to Withdraw from the Persian Gulf, 1964-68: A Pattern and a Puzzle," *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 37, no. 1 (2009): 99-117 approaches the question of withdrawal from the perspective of domestic policy rather than in connection with the decision to leave East of Suez. This approach is useful for illuminating some of the domestic economic and political links to the Gulf withdrawal, but ultimately underestimates Britain's global aims.

[159] The Foreign Office and Commonwealth Office merged to create the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) in 1968. For the purposes of clarity and brevity, I use the term Foreign Office throughout the text.

Britain's role as a global power. Four years later, however, Harold Wilson reversed his position.

Wilson's announcement came after the convergence of two crises that forced the government to reexamine its global strategy. Following decades of economic instability, the Treasury devalued the British Pound. Since World War II, Arab oil states' investments in Britain's economy had helped to buoy the Sterling Area. Britain increased its commitment to the defense of the Persian Gulf in order to ensure the continued flow of oil money into Britain's imperial reserves. In the 1960s, however, the threat of Arab nationalism continued to encroach on British-administered territories—moving further east to Southwest Arabia and dislodging Britain from its Crown Colony in Aden in late 1967. It seemed increasingly likely that Britain's position in the Persian Gulf would come under threat next.

In January 1968, then, Wilson's decision to leave the Persian Gulf was not a withdrawal from Britain's interests there. Rather, it was the reformulation of Great Britain's relationship with the Arab Gulf States. Wilson was unwilling to invest militarily in the maintenance of Britain's military and administrative presence in the Gulf in the face of growing anti-British sentiment in the Middle East. Instead, he opted to protect the British relationship with the Trucial Rulers, and through them British economic interests, by publicly eliminating Britain's imperial profile there. This decision risked the possibility of other foreign powers gaining a share of the Arab Gulf's economic markets; but in leaving while the relationship with the Trucial Rulers remained

cordial, Wilson could hope to preserve British interests more effectively than if Britain were forced to leave as it had been in Egypt and Aden.

This chapter examines the circumstances and decision-making process that led Wilson's Labour Government to abandon its military commitment to the Trucial States in the Persian Gulf. The decision was based on the convergence of an economic crisis in England and the rise of Arab nationalism in the Arabian Peninsula, the latter of which manifested itself in the fall of Aden to nationalist forces in South Arabia. The decision to withdraw by the end of 1971 was intended to protect British interests in the Gulf by preventing future economic crises. More importantly, a withdrawal at an early date— and on British terms, would favor the continuation of Britain's presence in the Gulf in an advisory role. In this way, Great Britain would continue to exercise influence and maintain informal control on the Trucial Coast without attracting the criticism of anti-imperialists in the region.

NATIONALISM AND EAST OF SUEZ

The British Government faced pressure from anti-imperialist groups all over its empire following World War II. In Africa, Asia and the Middle East, nationalists undermined British influence in calls for independence. These movements, particularly in Egypt and Malaysia unbalanced British authority and drove up actual and future costs of maintaining the empire. Arab nationalism in Egypt in the 1950s forced Britain to shift its security policy from the Suez Canal to Aden. Even as Britain refocused its East of Suez

forces on the Arabian Peninsula it once again became the target for nationalist movements, which ultimately contributed to Harold Wilson's decision to withdraw from East of Suez by the end of 1971.

Several events had already begun to dislodge the British from their traditional spheres of influence in the Middle East.[160] British authority in the region waned following its retreat from Palestine in 1948. Britain's departure and the Arab armies' loss to the Zionists created popular frustration with the local governments throughout the Middle East. In Egypt, the defeat culminated in the ouster of King Faruq at the hands of junior officers in the army. The coup eventually brought Gamal Abd al-Nasser to power. He and his fellow junior officers cultivated popular support on the basis of Arab socialism.[161] This doctrine primarily targeted internal reforms, such as land redistribution policies that would benefit the peasants of Egypt. An important element of Arab socialism, however, called for uniting Arab states against foreign governments that undermined the sovereignty of Arab governments.

To many in the British government, this ideology smacked of Soviet influence.[162] When Nasser announced the nationalization of the Suez Canal in July 1956, it seemed to

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[160] Monroe, *Britain's Moment in the Middle East* (1981); Louis, *The British Empire in the Middle East* (1986) are the most significant works on the British mandates and the disintegration of British power in the region after World War I and World War II.

[161] Gordon, *Nasser's Blessed Movement* (1992) examines the development of the Junior Officers' ideology as one that was developed over time, rather than as the basis for the overthrow of the Egyptian monarchy, which stemmed from frustrations within the army over the loss in Palestine and was rooted in the changing composition of the Egyptian army. Kerr, *The Arab Cold War* (1971) is the seminal work on the politics of Arab socialism as espoused by Nasser.

[162] Though the United States opposed the Tripartite Aggression, American officials viewed Nasser's motives with suspicion as well. Both the United States government and the British government viewed the countries that espoused Arab socialism and, more generally, non-alignment as Soviet allies. American Secretary of State John Dulles had commented in a memorandum to President Dwight Eisenhower that

confirm British policymakers' fears. This decision brought an end to the influence Britain had enjoyed in Egypt since the occupation in 1882 and threatened the very foundations of British influence in the Middle East. Until 1956, Suez had served as the nexus of British economic and security interests. At the time of the Suez crisis in 1956, approximately 25% of Britain's total trade traveled through the Suez Canal. Moreover, oil from the Persian Gulf constituted some 65% of the total northbound traffic through the Suez Canal by 1955.[163] Nasser's decision to nationalize the canal threatened Britain's economic security; its direct route to military bases located in the Indian Ocean and beyond; and marked a significant loss to British prestige in the Middle East.

The British government, under Prime Minister Anthony Eden, responded in October with a joint military operation in cooperation with Israel and France. Combining a ground invasion and an air assault, the attack succeeded in advancing troops to the Canal Zone; international opposition, however, forced Britain, France, and Israel to retreat. Operation "Musketeer" had succeeded only in diminishing British power in the region further while increasing popular support for Nasser and his strident opposition of

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American foreign policy toward Nasser should, "…let Colonel Nasser realize that he cannot cooperate as he is doing with the Soviet Union and at the same time enjoy most-favored-nation treatment from the United States. We would want for the time being to avoid any open break which would throw Nasser irrevocably into a Soviet satellite status…." Memorandum from Secretary of State Dulles to President Eisenhower, March 28, 1956. #3.11. *Britain and Suez: The Lion's Last Roar,* ed. Scott Lucas (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996). H. W. Brands, *The Specter of Neutralism: The United States and the Emergence of the Third World, 1947- 1960* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989). Avi Shlaim and Yezid Sayigh, eds. *The Cold War and the Middle East* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997). See especially the chapter by Adeed Dawisha, "Egypt," 27-47 and "The Middle East, the Great Powers, and the Cold War," by Fred Halliday, 6-26.

[163] Alan B. Mountjoy, "The Suez Canal at Mid-Century," *Economic Geography* 34, no. 2 (1958): 155-67 provides a detailed discussion of the changes in trade through the Suez Canal from the 1930s through the nationalization of Suez. Galpern, *Money, Oil and Empire in the Middle East* (2009) provides a clear discussion of the Suez Canal's place in the economic well-being of the British Empire in the 1950s as Britain attempted to shore up the Sterling area as cornerstone of British economic policy.

the British presence in the Middle East. Most distressing for the British, however, was the loss of Suez as their nerve center in the Middle East.[164]

Aden became the new linchpin in British foreign policy following the retreat from Suez.[165] From the time of the British invasion of Aden in 1839 until the 1950s, Aden remained secondary in importance to British foreign policy. The acquisition of Aden in the nineteenth century grew out of the same interests that drove the British to form treaties with the Trucial States in the Persian Gulf: namely, the monopolization of trade and sea routes in and around India. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, Aden remained a fortified base, but its role was that of a secondary line of defense. In the interwar years, Aden took on greater significance as an air base, but not until the 1950s did Britain begin investing heavily in infrastructure there. The city expanded as a coaling station, bringing ships and increased trade through sea traffic. In 1952, as commercial oil

[164] A detailed account of the events of Suez remains outside the scope of this work, though the consequences of the nationalization cannot be overstated in regard to its impact on the British imperial will as well as the more concrete problems of security and influence in the Middle East. See Kyle, *Suez* (1991); Carlton, *Britain and the Suez Crisis* (1989). On the history of Britain in Egypt, the essential works are Ronald Robinson and John Gallagher, *Africa and the Victorians; the Official Mind of Imperialism* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1961); Juan R. Cole, *Colonialism and Revolution in the Middle East: Social and Cultural Origins of Egypt's 'Urabi Movement* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993); John Darwin, *Britain, Egypt and the Middle East* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1981).

[165] For general scholarship on the history of Aden, see Gavin, *Aden Under British Rule* (1975) and Dresch, *History of Modern Yemen* (2000), the latter of which is a succinct and useful introduction to the British in Aden and South Arabia. Gavin's chapter on the British withdrawal from Aden describes the economic developments that led to discontent among the working class in and around Aden. For an Arab viewpoint on Britain's invasion of Aden, see al-Qasimi, *Ahtilal al-Britany li Aden, 1839* (1991). As the title indicates (The British Occupation of Aden, 1839), al-Qasimi writes from the perspective of an Arab nationalist. His viewpoint is especially notable given that he is the current ruler of Sharjah in the United Arab Emirates. Roxani Eleni Margariti, *Aden and the Indian Ocean Trade: 150 Years in the Life of a Medieval Arabian Port* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2007) is a unique approach to the study of Aden's historical role and development. Of interest to the present work is her discussion of the connections between Adeni trade and its economic interdependence with hinterland tribes, pp. 66-67.

exports from the Persian Gulf grew, Aden developed an oil refinery. When the British lost Suez in 1956, they shifted their Middle East naval base 1400 miles east to Aden.[166]

The move to Aden did not alleviate the problem of growing anti-imperialism against the British. One by one, Britain was losing its toe holds in its former Arab mandates. Only months before the Suez crisis, King Hussein of Jordan limited Britain's influence there when he ejected John Glubb "Pasha" from his position as commander of the Arab Legion in Jordan in an effort to deflect criticism from rival Arab leaders.[167] In 1958, a bloody coup in Iraq overthrew the monarchy there and effectively ended Britain's relationship with its last ally in the heart of the Middle East.[168] The base at Aden and the handful of small states along the eastern side of the Arabian Peninsula had thus become the last vestiges of the British Empire in the Middle East.

British policy in the Gulf from the mid-1950s onward had focused on protecting Aden and the Persian Gulf from Arab nationalist movements, but Aden proved a less stable base than policymakers hoped. South Arabia became a regional hot spot in the 1960s

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166 "Future constitutional development in the colonies": report of the officials' committee, May 1957. CAB 134/1551. *BDEEP—The Conservative Government and the End of Empire*, #2.

167 Uriel Dann, *King Hussein and the Challenge of Arab Radicalism: Jordan 1955-1967* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989). Philip Robins, *A History of Jordan* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004). Sir John Pagot Glubb, *Arabian Adventures: Ten Years of Joyful Service* (London: Cassell, 1978). Trevor Royle, *Glubb Pasha* (London: Little, Brown and Company, 1992).

168 Two excellent essays on the 1958 coup in relation to the British Empire have recently been reissued as part of a collection of essays, see "The Middle East Crisis of 1958," and "The Origins of the Iraqi Revolution," in Wm. Roger Louis, *Ends of British Imperialism: The Scramble for Empire* (New York: I. B. Tauris, 2006), 789-875. Marion Farouk-Sluglett and Peter Sluglett, *Iraq Since 1958: From Revolution to Dictatorship* (New York: I. B. Tauris, 2001); A. I. Dawisha, *Iraq: A Political History from Independence to Occupation* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009); Juan Romero, *The Iraqi Revolution of 1958 and the Search for Security in the Middle East.* Dissertation. (University of Texas at Austin, 2008). Stephen Blackwell, *British Military Intervention and the Struggle for Jordan: King Hussein, Nasser and the Middle East Crisis* (Hoboken: Tyler & Francis, 2008). Hanna Batatu, *The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq: A Study of Iraq's Old Landed and Commercial Classes and of its Communists, Ba'athists, and Free Officers* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978).

when a local conflict for power in the area developed into a battleground for Arab nationalism.[169] British responsibilities in Aden consisted of the administration of Aden as a Crown Colony, but also maintained a treaty-based relationship with the principalities in South East Arabia. To the North, the Yemen was governed by the Zaidy Imamate.[170] Harold Macmillan had pushed for, "the highest possible measure of internal self-government," in Aden soon after taking office.[171] To that end, he supported a nascent federation of the protectorates in Southeast Arabia that bordered Aden. The government also spent approximately £1 million each year to strengthen the Federal Regular Army and Federal Guard.[172] The Conservative Prime Minister did not consider full independence in the near future, though, because Aden and the South Arabian Federation were, "…so heavily dependent economically on the British Government that it is not

[169] Gavin's chapter on Britain and the Civil War in Aden provides an excellent explanation of the various internal forces that brought events in Aden to a head. His discussion of the rise of unionism as an anti-imperial voice in Aden: Gavin, *Aden Under British Rule* (1971). Dresch, *History of Modern Yemen* (2000) has a very useful account of the British in Aden through the end of the 1960s. See especially Ch. 3-4, pp.58-119. Also of significance in understanding Britain's position in Aden is Balfour-Paul, *End of Empire in the Middle East* (1994), particularly Ch. 3, pp. 49-95.

[170] The Zaidy Imamate in Yemen was a *Shi ᶜi* dynasty. The Zaidy Imamate of the 1960s in Yemen was formally known as the Mutawakkilite Kingdom of Yemen, and ruled from 1918-1962. See Dresch, *History of Modern Yemen* (2000). For a recent work on the development of the Yemeni Zaidy Imamate and the myths that explain their origins as a political power in Yemen, see Jane Hathaway, *A Tale of Two Factions: Myth, Memory and Identity in Ottoman Egypt and Yemen* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2003).

[171] Harold Macmillan was the Conservative prime minister, 1957-1963. "Future Constitutional Development in the Colonies": report, May 1957. CAB 134/1551. *BDEEP—The Conservative Government and the End of Empire*, #2.

[172] Dresch, *Modern History of Yemen* (2000), 91.



Figure 3: Map of South Arabia

possible to forecast when [independence] will be achieved."[173] This strategy, the Foreign Office hoped, would allow the British government and local leaders to demonstrate progress toward independence to nationalists without jeopardizing oil supplies and British influence in the region.

Nationalism bled over into the Arabian Peninsula in spite of the Foreign Office's plans. Economic and demographic changes that had been taking place in the Yemen and South Arabia for decades gave rise to discontent among the Adeni populations. The population within Aden was largely immigrant merchants and laborers in the early part of the 20th century. When Britain built the new refinery and expanded the military industries magnified the immigrant labor population expanded exponentially. By the 1950s, the demographic shift created divisions between the urban and largely immigrant populations laboring in Aden and the nomadic and agricultural local populations outside the city. In Aden itself, the working population became increasingly restless over living standards and wages. Laborers organized no fewer than seventy strikes in 1956 alone. This general dissatisfaction found a voice and a cause to rally around in the person of Nasser, whose "Voice of the Arabs" radio broadcasts reached even Bedouin in the South Arabian hinterland.[174]

The push for self-rule in South Arabia began in 1957. In establishing self-rule, Macmillan hoped to diffuse the growing hostility being focused on British rule. To that end, the Colonial Office encouraged the establishment of a federation among the South

[173] **"**Future constitutional development in the UK dependent territories": CO memorandum for the US Government, October 1962. FO 371/166836. *BDEEP—The Conservative Government and the End of Empire*, #41.
[174] Dresch, *History of Modern Yemen* (2000), 77-85.

Arabian principalities. The process of federation was initially meant to proceed slowly. Over several years, the principalities would establish a federal police and military force, and sufficient stability to preserve British interests in the oil refinery and naval base once they left.

Plans for the federation accelerated in 1959 as Nasser began making overtures to leaders in Yemen, north of the principalities in South Arabia. Ahmed bin Yahya, the ruler of Yemen from 1948, grew increasingly hostile to the British presence to the south of him. He began making overtures to Nasser and the United Arab Republic and joined in a confederation with the UAR. Britain's response to Nasser's growing influence in the Arabian Peninsula was to move forward with the federation project between six of the principalities in Southwest Arabia. In 1962, Ahmed died and his son, Hamid al-Din, took over. He was a much more conservative leader than his father had been, and was inclined to work with the British as such.

Civil war broke out between Royalist forces in support of Hamid, and the republican nationalist forces that ousted him. In 1963, Nasser demonstrated his support for the Republicans by sending troops and supplies. Saudi Arabia, believing that Nasser's involvement in the Yemen was an extension of a communist threat the Saudi government, responded with arms and money to the Royalist faction supporting Hamid al-Din.

The war in Yemen quickly spilled over into South Arabia. Even as the British pushed for expanding the federation in South Arabia, the situation in and around Aden deteriorated. Egypt's support in the north inspired Republican supporters in and around

Aden to take action against the British police and Federal forces. Violence continued until Britain withdrew from Aden and South Arabia in November 1967.

Nasser's involvement in the war led British policymakers to reconsider their position in Aden. In a brief for Macmillan, the Commonwealth Office posited that, while British policy, "… is to lead the people of the Federation to sovereign independence as soon as practicable…" these plans would have to be delayed in order to maintain control of the base to protect the Trucial and Kuwaiti governments.[175] The situation in Aden disintegrated rapidly. Nasser had immediately sent 15,000 soldiers to support the republican government in northern Yemen after they had overthrown the Royalist government; three months later, their numbers had doubled. By early 1965, Nasser sent approximately 45,000 Egyptian troops to aid the Republican forces in Yemen.[176] The conflict quickly spilled over into the South Arabian Federation.[177] Support for Republican forces from within Aden and in the hinterland began to clash with the Federal Army and British police forces.

In response to Egypt's involvement in the north and growing instability in southern Arabia, the Ministry of Defense reported the need for increased commitments. British forces required additional funds and modern equipment as well as reequipping helicopters and ammunition. Additionally, military operations would have to expand to

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[175] "Remaining colonial problems": CO brief for Commonwealth Prime Ministers' meeting, June 15, 1964. CAB 148/6. *BDEEP—The Conservative Government and the End of Empire*, #50.

[176] "Relations with the United Arab Republic": memorandum by Stewart for Cabinet Defense and Oversea Policy Committee. February 18. CAB 148/20, *BDEEP—East of Suez*, #38.

[177] The Federation of South Arabia initially consisted of the Protectorate of South Arabia and fifteen other states in the southwest Arabian Peninsula. In 1963, the British in Aden pushed through the inclusion of Aden in the federation and the new state was renamed the Federation South Arabia. Dresch, *History of Modern Yemen* (2000).

approximately 75 kilometers north to the city of Radfan.[178] Following a visit to the colony, Lieutenant General Baker reported that, "The general situation, both political and military, had deteriorated markedly throughout the Federation since my last visit eleven months ago," and he argued for imposing "direct rule" in addition to expanding forces there.[179]

Only nine months later, a defense review advised Harold Wilson's cabinet that Great Britain could not expect to stay in Aden beyond 1968. Military failures in Aden joined with a balance of payments crisis in 1964 to lead the Defense and Oversea Policy Committee to speculate about the benefits of withdrawing in 1968.

> If we withdrew from Aden (this is likely to be forced on us anyway) and built up our forces in the Persian Gulf to enable us to continue to meet the Kuwait commitment and to stay in the Gulf until we have prepared the Gulf States and Iran for our withdrawal, the cost in 1969-70 would be higher by £14 Million, *i.e.*, £46 million (saving of £21 million) and there would be capital expenditure before 1970 of £22 million.[180]

It seemed possible that if the government could sustain its position in Aden through a withdrawal in 1968, Britain could leave Aden gracefully, cut back expenditure and fortify its relationship with Kuwait and the Trucial states. Wilson's advisors began drawing up

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[178] "Relations with the United Arab Republic": Ministry of Defense brief for Healey, February 1965, DEFE25/190, *BDEEP—East of Suez*, #39. Several recent works focus on the military strategies of the British government in Aden. For a detailed military history of British operations in Aden, see Walker, *Aden Insurgency* (2005); Jones, *Britain and the Yemen Civil War* (2004) looks at the use of mercenary forces and covert operations in response to international disapproval of Britain's support of Royalist forces against the Republic of Yemen.

[179] "Aden," report by Lt. Gen. Sir G. Baker, March 31, 1965. DEFE 25/191. *BDEEP—East of Suez*, #41.

[180] "Defence review": report to ministers by an Official Committee of the Cabinet Defense and Oversea Policy Committee. November 8, 1965. CAB 130/213. *BDEEP—East of Suez*, #6.

plans for a 1968 withdrawal from South Arabia while considering contingency plans for staying on longer if necessary.[181]

The retreat from Suez, and then from Aden, represented a trend of declining British power East of Suez.[182] Britain's interests in Suez and then Aden were linked directly to the goal of preserving political and economic influence in the Far East. But even as Britain tried to save its position in Aden, British military forces struggled to preserve its reach in the Far East, where they found themselves defending Singapore and Malaysia from *guerrilla* incursions originating in Indonesia.[183] The Malaysian federation

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[181] "Withdrawal from Aden": minute by F. Cooper to P. D. Nairne, January 10, 1967, DEFE 13/574, *BDEEP—East of Suez*, #50; "South Arabia": telegram M. C. G. Man to Brown, April 3, 1967. FCO 8/184. *BDEEP—East of Suez*, #63.

[182] For works on East of Suez generally, see especially Philip Darby, *British Defence Policy East of Suez, 1947-1968* (London: Oxford University Press, 1971), which is an indictment of the various arms of the British government in their approach to the East of Suez role following the withdrawal from India. Saki Dockrill, *Britain's Retreat from East of Suez: The Choice Between Europe and the World* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002) provides an important window into the re-evaluation of British foreign policy East of Suez in the 1960s in relation to the new nuclear role and political influence Britain hoped to exert through participation in NATO in Europe. Anthony Clayton, "'Deceptive Might': Imperial Defence and Security, 1900-1968," in *Oxford History of the British Empire (OHBE)—Historiography*, vol. 5 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 280-305 also provides a useful summary of Britain's diminishing military strength in the twentieth century, and places the empire's growing weakness East of Suez in the wider context of decolonization.

[183] The Indonesian confrontation began in 1963 and continued until 1966. A. J. Stockwell, "Imperialism and Nationalism in South-East Asia." *OHBE— The Twentieth Century*, vol. 4. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 464-489 serves as a useful starting point for understanding the development of the Malaysian Federation, which laid the groundwork for the conflict between Malaysia and Indonesian nationalists. Nicholas Tarling, *The Fall of Imperial Britain in South-East Asia* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993); William R. Roff, *The Origins of Malay Nationalism* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967) also focus on the formation of the Malay federation under British auspices as the British attempted to extricate themselves militarily from Southeast Asia. Matthew Jones, *Conflict and Confrontation in South East Asia, 1961-1965: Britain, the United States and the Creation of Malaysia* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002) and David Easter, *Britain and the Confrontation with Indonesia, 1960-1966* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2004) examine the wider international politics that influenced what was, initially, a local, nationalist conflict. Jones' work is particularly useful for understanding the way in which the confrontation played into American and British perceptions of communism in the context of Vietnam. Clive J. Christie, *A Modern History of Southeast Asia: Decolonization, Nationalism and Separatism* (New York, NY: Tauris Academic Studies, 1996); John Subritzky, *Confrontation Sukarno: British, American, Australian and New Zealand Diplomacy in the Malayan-Indonesian Confrontation, 1961-65* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000) argues that Indonesian

grew out of the British attempt to disentangle their military from nationalist movements there in following World War II. The new federation, however, was viewed with hostility by local Indonesian leader, President Sukarno, who tacitly encouraged Indonesian nationalists and communists in their infiltrations of Malaysia through 1966.

Operations in the Middle East and the Far East against nationalist forces led British officials to question the value of staying on East of Suez. Late in the Macmillan government, Defense officials had argued that there was, "…no clear economic interest in the Far East," and that the only reasons to hold on to the base in Singapore were to appease the American and Australian governments.[184] By late 1965, Wilson appeared to share this view, and the Cabinet concluded that the only way to promote British interests in the Far East was to push for a peace agreement with Indonesia and pressure Australia, New Zealand and the United States to make a more substantial contribution to Pacific defense.[185]

THE ECONOMICS OF EAST OF SUEZ AND THE GULF

If, as Macmillan argued, the economic benefits of staying on East of Suez were so slight, why did the British government hope to hang on to its military role East of Suez? Initially, the British Government's desire to retain its status as a world power led both

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President Sukarno was a nationalist leader whose opposition to the creation of a federated Malaysia was based on the belief that the Malaysian federation created a British satellite, rather than a sovereign Malaysian government.

184 "The implications of withdrawal from the Middle and Far East": minutes of a Cabinet (Official) Committee on Defense meeting, May 21, 1963. CAB 130/190. *BDEEP—The Conservative Government and the End of Empire*, #70.

185 "Defence Review": report to ministers by an Official Committee of the Cabinet Defense and Oversea Policy Committee, November 8, 1965. CAB 130/213. *BDEEP—East of Suez*, #6.

Macmillan and Wilson to ignore economic instability while committing the government to extensive defense roles in Europe and East of Suez. By 1967, however, the British economy could not be stretched any further and Wilson was forced to choose between an economic collapse and a limited military role.

Economic benefits served as an important consideration for maintaining Britain's role East of Suez, especially as it related to the British presence in the Persian Gulf. The military presence in the Middle East originally served as a connection to the Far East. By the 1950s, however, the British government valued the Arab states of the Persian Gulf for the growth of commercial oil production and its contributions to the British world economy as much as for its strategic location. Both the Macmillan and Wilson administrations desired direct access to "cheap oil" from the Persian Gulf.[186] More importantly, Kuwait and the Trucial States participated in the sterling area and constituted a significant portion of the foreign sterling reserves.[187]

Gulf oil provided a substantial buoy to the British economy. Britain began the process of monopolizing the potential for oil development in the Arab Gulf during the First World War. Kuwait and Bahrain signed concession agreements with Britain in 1913 and 1914; the remaining Trucial States, including Qatar, conceded in 1922. Subsidiaries of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company discovered oil in Bahrain in 1932 and began actively searching for oil in Qatar, Kuwait, Abu Dhabi and Dubai by the end of the decade.

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[186] "The implications of withdrawal from the Middle and Far East": minutes of a Cabinet (Official) Committee on Defense meeting, May 21, 1963. CAB 130/190. *BDEEP—The Conservative Government and the End of Empire*, #70.

[187] See Galpern, *Money, Oil and Empire* (2009). Chapter 4 makes explicit the connection between the significance of sterling in the Persian Gulf, and especially that of Kuwait, and defense of East of Suez.

Exploration and oil production slowed during World War II, but by the 1950s, the demand for oil from the Arab Gulf States increased.[188] Britain maintained a partnership with the Gulf Oil Company through the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, and a virtual partnership with Kuwait Oil Company through Shell.[189] As oil production expanded in Abu Dhabi, so did concern for the stability of the other Arab rulers in the Persian Gulf. Petroleum Development Trucial Coast, later Abu Dhabi Petroleum Company (ADPC), began exporting oil in 1962; a second company, Abu Dhabi Marine Areas, Ltd., (ADMA) shared ownership between British Petroleum and *Compagnie Francais des Petroles*.

Arab Gulf oil sources became the most significant source of oil to Britain and Europe in the 1950s. Beginning in 1952, Kuwait became the greatest supplier of oil from the Middle East to Europe. Until that time Britain relied heavily on oil production in Iran through the Anglo-Iranian oil company. The rise of a nationalist government headed by Muhammad Mosaddeq in 1951 created a nationalization crisis of the oil company and a subsequent boycott of crude oil from Iran. Though the Mossadeq government was overthrown in 1953, Great Britain had already begun to rely more heavily on alternative

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[188] Heard-Bey, *From Trucial States to United Arab Emirates* (2007), 294-97; Bamberg, *British Petroleum and Global Oil* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 20-30. Bamberg discusses the impact of the Iranian Oil Crisis in 1951 on the expansion of Arab Gulf oil production, especially in Kuwait. James A. Bill and Wm. Roger Louis, eds. *Musaddiq, Iranian Nationalism, and Oil* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1988) is an excellent collection of essays examining the oil crisis from American, British and Iranian nationalist perspectives; Fakhreddin Azimi, *Iran: The Crisis of Democracy, 1941-1953* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1989) examines the internal political forces that prevented the parliamentary revolution's success; Meziar Behrooz, "Tudeh Factionalism and the 1953 Coup in Iran," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 33 (2001): 363-382 focuses in large part on the impact that the fall of Mussadiq's national government on the communist Tudeh party; Sussan Siavoshi, "The Oil Nationalization Movement, 1929-53," *Iran: A Century of Revolution,* John Foran, ed., (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1994), 107-33 specifically addresses the role that British involvement in the Iranian oil industry played in transforming anti-imperialist sentiment into Iranian nationalism during the oil crisis.

[189] "The Kuwait Commitment up to 1970/1," Note by the Foreign Office for the Defense and Oversea Policy Committee. April 14, 1967. CAB 148/57. TNA.

sources for oil, particularly in Kuwait and the Trucial Coast.[190] As a consequence, defense of Kuwait remained a Foreign Office priority through the 1950s in order to maintain stability and protect British oil and sterling interests there.[191]

A by-product of oil production became more significant to British policy makers when considering the advantages of continuing the Britain's role East of Suez and in the Persian Gulf in particular. The oil-producing states in the Gulf invested their enormous profits in the Sterling Area.[192] A defense review estimated that oil from the Persian Gulf constituted £200 million of British balances for 1965.[193] Nearly all of the sterling from the region came from Kuwait. Iraq spent almost all of its oil revenues on internal development; and as was seen above, Iran's contributions to the sterling area were severely curtailed following the nationalization crisis. Kuwait's sterling holdings alone were second only to those of Australia. As Abu Dhabi's oil wealth increased the Foreign

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[190] Bamberg, *British Petroleum* (2000), 24-5, 85.

[191] Smith, *Kuwait* (1999). For a general overview of oil and state development in the Trucial States, see Heard-Bey, *From Trucial States to United Arab Emirates* (2004), 294-301. The most important and detailed study of British oil companies and oil policy in this period is Bamberg. *British Petroleum* (2000), which provides a detailed description of the rise of British oil and the ways that oil companies responded to Britain's imperial decline. Crystal, *Oil and Politics in the Gulf* (1990) discusses the impact of the shift to an oil-based economy in Kuwait and Qatar from that of a merchant-based economy.

[192] The Sterling Area was a voluntary financial association between Great Britain and many of its primary trading partners. Most were former colonies and members of the Commonwealth. Great Britain abandoned the gold standard in 1931 and pegged the Pound to sterling. Its trading partners could use sterling as a universally convertible currency within the sterling area.
For introductions to the sterling area, see Strange, *Sterling and British Policy* (1971) and Miller, *Survey of Commonwealth Affairs* (1974). See Krozewski, *Money and the End of Empire* (2001), 157. This is a useful work for understanding the role of sterling and its role in influencing British imperial policy through 1958. For the purposes of this chapter see especially Chapter 3, "Britain, the Sterling Area and the Empire: Key Economic Relationships, 1947-58," pp. 29-58. Most recently, Steven Galpern has published an extensive work on sterling and oil policy in the Middle East. His work is perhaps the most important work on the subject to date and relies heavily on primary research: Galpern, *Money, Oil and Empire* (2009).

[193] "Long-term policy in the Persian Gulf": report by the Defense Review Working Party. September 28, 1967. FCO 49/10. *BDEEP— East of Suez*, #11.

Office speculated, and hoped, that Abu Dhabi and the other Trucial States would invest their growing wealth in London.[194]

As economic crisis after crisis threatened British economic stability in the late 1950s and 1960s, the British Government became increasingly concerned about protecting its interests in the Persian Gulf. Economic instability had plagued Great Britain following World War II. The primary economic concern of post-War governments was the balance-of-payments deficit within the sterling area. In the aftermath of the war the sterling system appeared to work well. Trade within the sterling area in the 1940s constituted approximately half of British trade.

The government devalued sterling in 1949 and 1950 in order to strengthen the Pound relative to its trade deficits. Sterling reserves subsequently rebounded in the 1950s. The success of sterling in the aftermath of World War II was short lived. though. Both the Conservative Macmillan government (1957-1964) and Wilson's Labour government (1964-1970) struggled with the instability of the British economy during their tenures in office. The balance of payment ratios did not stabilize over time. Trade within the sterling area continued to diminish dramatically. Sterling area members purchased 46.7% of UK exports in 1952; this number fell steadily to only 27.5% in 1968.[195] Moreover, from 1958 onward, British sterling reserves failed to meet British debts. The government

[194] "Long-Term Policy in the Persian Gulf," Note by the Foreign Office for the Defense and Oversea Policy Committee. April 18, 1967. CAB 148/57. TNA.
[195] See Cain and Hopkins, *British Imperialism* (2002), 619-44; and Cairncross and Eichengreen, *Sterling in Decline* (1983) for discussions of the balance of trade deficits and its impact on economic policy.

increasingly depended on payments from foreign sterling reserves to make up the difference.[196]

Much of this was the consequence of the pace of decolonization of the British Empire in the 1950s. Following its independence, India redirected substantial sterling reserves to economic development projects, reducing the international sterling pool. As Nigeria, Ghana and Malaya gained independence from the Empire, they were expected to follow suit, drawing down sterling reserves at a rapid pace.[197] In the Middle East, Egypt was also expected to take over control of its more than £128 million for development projects in 1963; Iraq already spent nearly the entirety of its oil revenue on development, contributing negligible amounts to sterling reserves. This, combined with other spending projects throughout the Middle East led to a cumulative £300 million rundown of sterling after oil-producing countries expended their revenues.[198] In light of these projections, Britain depended on Kuwait's £260 million contribution to the sterling area to help fill the gap.

Sterling also suffered a crisis of confidence at times when British imperial power was threatened. Following the British invasion of Suez in 1956, several member states talked of leaving the sterling area in order to avoid open association with an imperialist power; and, in fact, the Sudan did leave in 1957, while Iraq left in 1959 following an anti-

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[196] See Cairncross and Eichengreen, *Sterling in Decline* (1983); and Catherine Schenk, "Sterling, International Monetary Reform and Britain's Applications to Join the European Economic Community in the 1960s," *Contemporary European History* 11, no. 3 (2002): 345-369.

[197] "Treasury and Bank of England report on the Sterling Area": Brief for Lennox-Boyd by A Emanuel (CO), February 19, 1957. CO 852/1677. *BDEEP—The Conservative Government and the End of Empire, 1957-1964*, #300.

[198] Galpern, *Money, Oil, and Empire* (2009), 322.

imperial nationalist coup in 1958. Open anti-imperial and Arab nationalist groups staged strikes and rallies in the Persian Gulf. The most worrying of these, for the British Government, occurred in Kuwait, where a generation of educated, young Kuwaitis had begun to welcome the aims of Nasser's nationalist agenda.[199]

Kuwait remained in the sterling area and maintained its ties to British advisors following Suez, despite burgeoning nationalist sentiment. Its loyalty to the sterling area made Britain determined to protect Kuwait from external threats. British forces in Aden remained the primary line of defense against potential attempts by the new Iraqi government, or even Saudi Arabia, to overthrow the Kuwaiti ruling family and annex the sheikhdom.

As important as Kuwait's contributions to sterling were, they were not sufficient to stabilize the sterling area as it lurched from crisis to crisis in the 1960s. The British trade deficit rose as sterling reserves dropped. Both the Conservative Macmillan government (1957-1964) and Wilson's Labour government (1964-1970) concentrated on the sterling area in order to uphold the economic well-being of Great Britain. Over time, however, they both came to view the large British defense role East of Suez as economically impracticable.

[199] There were also small strikes and demonstrations in Bahrain and Dubai, which the governments suppressed. Galpern, *Money, Oil and Empire* (2009), 323, describes the reaction to the Suez nationalization and crisis in Kuwait. As he points out, this was at a time when British-Kuwaiti relations were strained over oil shares and British controls over Kuwaiti sterling investments (see pp. 308-12).

COINCIDING CRISES

When Macmillan took office, his government faced grim economic news. The Treasury commented in a brief to the Colonial Secretary in 1957 that sterling liabilities that year were exceptionally high at "over £4,000 million" while Great Britain only held reserves of approximately £700 million.[200] Two years later, the Treasury reported that diminishing sterling reserves still posed, "…the most notable economic threat… [which] could have far graver consequences in the sixties than in the forties."[201] Macmillan believed the sterling system could stabilize if the government cut expenses. In 1957, defense expenditure constituted 10% of the national budget and seemed the likeliest place to retrench. Macmillan made it his goal to defense to only 7% of the budget.[202]

Macmillan could not expect to reign in defense expenditures without reducing forces in Europe or East of Suez.[203] This proved difficult in the post-War world. Britain had given up large swathes of its empire in the 1950s, only to obtain a substantial role in defending Western Europe from communist expansion.[204] Halfway through Macmillan's

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[200] "Treasury and Bank of England report on the Sterling Area": brief for Lennox-Boyd by A Emanuel (CO), February 19, 1957. CO 852/1677. *BDEEP—The Conservative Government and the End of Empire,* #300.

[201] "The Commonwealth, 1960-1970": Draft Cabinet memorandum by CRO for Future Policy Study Working Group. July 30, 1959. CAB 134/1935. *BDEEP—The Conservative Government and the End of Empire, 1957-1964*, #11. The Government devalued the pound by 30 percent in 1949. See Krozewski, *Money and the End of Empire* (2001), 30.

[202] "The implications of withdrawal from the Middle and Far East": Minutes of a Cabinet (Official) Committee on Defence meeting, May 21, 1963. CAB 130/190. *BDEEP— The Conservative Government and the End of Empire,* #70.

[203] "Future defence policy": Cabinet Defense Committee meeting minutes. February 9, 1963. CAB 131/28. *BDEEP—The Conservative Government and the End of Empire,* #69.

[204] Dockrill, *Britain's Retreat from East of Suez* (2002). Between 1947 and 1964, Britain lost almost all of its colonies in Africa as well as the former Indian Raj, Cyprus, Western Samoa, Malaysia, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago.

tenure, the Treasury warned that Britain's traditional role as an international force was entwined with sterling's well-being:

> Of all the major Powers, the United Kingdom has the most vulnerable economy… The gold reserves are less than one-third of the sterling liabilities to other countries—precarious backing for an international currency that by its nature must take the strain of political and financial pressures throughout the world.[205]

Despite the warning, Macmillan proved unable to turn the economy around. In 1962, the Government estimated that defense expenditure would still outstrip its allotment by more than £50 million for the 1965-66 budget.[206] Cutting corners in the Department of Defense proved ineffective in reversing the increasing sterling liabilities-to-reserves ratio.[207] The Conservative Government fell in 1964 without having made headway in restoring sterling reserves and reducing British liabilities.

Harold Wilson's first priority as Prime Minister in 1964 was to review the economic situation. It appeared bleak. The Secretary of the Treasury noted that the government would need to raise taxes, improve industry and cut corners in, "…resources now devoted to non-economic purposes, especially defence and 'prestige' projects…" to reduce the budget deficit and prevent the devaluation of sterling.[208]

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[205] "Future Policy Study, 1960-1970": Cabinet memorandum, report of officials' committee (chairman, Sir N Brook), February 24, 1960, CAB 129/100. *BDEEP—The Conservative Government and the End of Empire*, #17.

[206] "British strategy in the 1960s": minutes of Cabinet Defense Committee meeting, January 12, 1962. CAB 131/27, *The Conservative Government and the End of Empire*, #67.

[207] "British strategy in the 1960s": minutes of Cabinet Defense Committee meeting, January 12, 1962. CAB 131/27, *The Conservative Government and the End of Empire*, #67.

[208] Minute by Sir W Armstrong (Treasury) in preparation for a meeting between Mr Wilson, Mr Brown and Mr Callaghan. October 16, 1964, PREM 13/32. *BDEEP—East of Suez*, #1. The most significant of the prestige projects was that of the Concorde, which the British government had contracted with France to develop. Plans to delay this project, however, ultimately had to be scrapped when the French government refused to agree on the postponement. New taxes in the next year's budget furthermore increased to £475 million and "drastic" cuts in public expenditure. See Philip Ziegler, *Wilson: The Authorised Life of Lord*

The dwindling economic power of the British government furthered Wilson's reliance on Britain's traditional role as a global military force. He looked to the British naval presence East of Suez as an important diplomatic tool vis-à-vis the United States, which depended on Britain to support American operations in Vietnam. It also helped cement Britain's relationship with Australia and New Zealand.[209]

Wilson came to office with ambitious goals for Britain's role in international affairs.[210] He wrote to the American President, Lyndon Johnson, with an assessment of the impending economic crisis, stating that the deficit for 1964 could come to £800 million and would continue to rise without extensive budget cuts. In that letter, he failed to mention any possibility of reducing defense commitments as part of his economic plan.[211] Wilson also confided to Dean Rusk in the spring of 1965 that he had, "a prejudice for the maintenance of the British role East of Suez."[212] Wilson had no intention of making substantive defense cuts at the risk of losing international influence. Instead, he

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Wilson of Rievaux (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1993), 192-3, 204. Richard Crossman. *The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister*, v. 1, *Minister of Housing* (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1976), 287. Crossman specified some of these public expenditure cuts as limits on building programs, delayed road projects, and no new housing, hospitals, or schools.

[209] Dockrill, *Britain's Retreat From Suez* (2002).

[210] Regarding Wilson's interests in British foreign policy, his biographer wrote: "Even if they intended at the start, however, few Prime Ministers have been able to resist playing a large part in al the most important international problems. Wilson never even intended to." Ziegler, *Wilson* (1993), 218.

[211] Outward telegram from FO to Washington transmitting a message from Harold Wilson to Lyndon Johnson. October 23, 1964. PREM 13/32. *BDEEP—East of Suez*, #3. The initial plans Wilson relayed to Johnson included reducing imports and increasing imports, consulting with industry, improving worker mobility and speeding up development in under-employed areas of the economy and cut low priority spending.

[212] "Defence": record by J O Wright of a conversation Harold Wilson and Dean Rusk. May 14, 1965. PREM 13/1890. *BDEEP—East of Suez*, #4. Dean Rusk served as US Secretary of State.

hoped to secure financial support from the American Government in exchange for continuing the British defense role east of Suez.[213]

In order to maintain both an international defense role while preventing an economic collapse, Harold Wilson began trimming the domestic and foreign budgets. Even as he pursued a foreign policy that over-stretched military commitments across the globe, members of Wilson's government began to rebel. The Minister of Housing, Richard Crossman noted with frustration in January 1965: "So far [Wilson] has shown a singular failing in dealing with general economic policy."[214]

Throughout 1965 and 1966 resentment within the Labour government grew. Crossman forfeited funds for domestic building programs, which delayed road projects and stopped progress on new housing, hospitals and schools.[215] Wilson also demanded cuts of £100 million from the Foreign Office budget in 1966 without any corresponding changes in British foreign policy.[216]

Tensions mounted over cuts, especially as defense costs grew on all fronts. Between 1959 and 1964, east of Suez expenditures nearly doubled from £76 million to £133 million, especially as the crisis in Malaya came to a head. In the Persian Gulf, costs began creeping up as the conflict in Yemen expanded. According to one estimate,

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[213] Richard Crossman, the Minister of Housing in Harold Wilson's cabinet, commented on his frustration with Wilson's commitment to the East of Suez defense position, as well as general dissatisfaction within the cabinet over the difficulty of economic cuts. On January 23, 1965, he noted in his diary that, "I think [Wilson] has been extremely successful on his visit to Washington in convincing the Americans that Britain is a loyal junior partner… he has convinced himself at least that we can get through without devaluation of the pound because we are now built into the American system." Richard Crossman, *Diaries* v.2 (1978), 116-17.

[214] Ibid., 117.

[215] Ibid., 287.

[216] Ibid., 578. In addition to Crossman's diaries, Ziegler's biography of Harold Wilson describes the tense climate within the Wilson government between 1965 and 1967: Ziegler, *Wilson* (1993).

expenses in 1964 had more than doubled in the Persian Gulf by 1964, reaching £38 million.[217] In Aden, defense costs sky-rocketed because of the civil war there. The maintenance of the Aden naval base in 1962-1963 had totaled £7.93 million; in 1964-1965, costs swelled to £14.64 million.[218]

Macmillan officials in 1964 were concerned that, "…the greater danger lay in oversea theaters," but that due to cuts being made in the defense budget, "The small size of [British] forces east of Suez cast some doubt on the extent of the influence which they could exercise."[219] Wilson's continued commitment to an East of Suez presence while simultaneously cutting budgets to keep sterling afloat gave rise to concerns that Britain's position as a world leader would be damaged.[220]

Members of the military branches began to complain openly. Without extensive defense cuts, there was little improvement in the deficit. Without a substantial reduction in defense commitments, the military could not perform effectively. In August 1965 the Minister for the Navy, Christopher Mayhew, complained to Defense Secretary Denis Healey that the Navy was stretched thin; officers and soldiers were underpaid and the ships were "too old." If Healey failed to correct the situation, said Mayhew, "…we

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[217] Hugh Hannig, "Britain East of Suez Facts and Figures," *International Affaires* 42, no. 4 (1966): 253-60.
[218] "Policy in Aden and the Protectorate of South Arabia": memorandum by Greenwood for Cabinet Defense and Oversea Policy Committee. December 30, 1964. CAB 148/17. *BDEEP—East of Suez*, #36.
[219] "Defence policy": minutes of a meeting of ministers, service chiefs and senior officials at Chequers on Britain's three defense roles. November 21, 1964. CAB 130/213. *BDEEP—East of Suez*, #3.
[220] In reflections on his conversations with Defense Secretary Denis Healey and Secretary of State George Brown, Crossman again gave vent to his concerns about the ways in which Britain's international reputation was at risk: "How can anyone build up Britain now as a great power east of Suez when we can't even maintain the sterling area…?" See Crossman, *Diaries* (1978), 540.

should have a first-class showdown."[221] With the Indonesian Crisis and the conflict in Aden in 1966 and 1967, the balance between sterling and East of Suez became indefensible.

By late 1965, Wilson's ministers began to reconsider the British role east of Suez in order to bring foreign policy in line with the economic realities. Under the Macmillan government, some members of the Foreign Office and the business community had argued that a military withdrawal from the Persian Gulf in particular could lead to increased stability in British relations with the rulers there. The President of the Board of Trade believed that the British government should eliminate the, "imperialist traditions and associations," in the Gulf and work towards a relationship, "…based primarily on a mutually advantageous and straight-forward commercial relationship."[222] Wilson's own ministers took up this line of reasoning and expanded it, arguing: "Indeed our presence might even be disadvantageous to our interests by providing an irritant and a focus for Arab nationalist pressures." [223]

Less than a year later, Wilson and his defense advisors seemed to have taken this advice seriously and began reorganizing British defense priorities. In response to the 1965 defense review and subsequent White Paper, the Prime Minister laid out plans to cut British forces from east of Suez by half and from the Middle East by one third. This

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[221] "Defence": Minute by Mayhew to Healey criticizing the defense review for its failure so far to recommend cuts in commitments, August 6, 1965, DEFE 13/114, no 24/1. *BDEEP—East of Suez*, #5.
[222] "Review of Middle East policy, objectives and strategy": Memorandum by Sir R Stevens to Sir H Caccia. July 19, 1963. FO 371/170165. *BDEEP—The Conservative Government and the End of Empire*, #71. The president of the Board was Mr F. Erroll.
[223] "Defence policy": record of a meeting at 10 Downing Street of ministers, service chiefs, and senior officials. November 13, 1965. 130/213, MISC 17/8, *BDEEP—East of Suez*, #7.

	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964
Persian Gulf and East Africa	17	24	33	35	35	38
Far East (excluding Hong Kong)	44	46	52	52	64	77
Hong Kong	8	8	10	9	9	10
Australia	7	12	8	12	10	8
Totals	76	90	103	108	118	133

Table 2: Defense Expenditures for East of Suez, 1959-1964 (given in £ millions)[224]

included arrangements for leaving Aden when the Arabian Federation became independent in 1968. This also incorporated an eventual withdrawal from the Persian Gulf.[225] The withdrawal from Aden would not, however, mean the end of the British presence in the Gulf. Britain would abandon the base at Aden only to temporarily increase the forces in the Persian Gulf to two battalions, two ground squadrons and a long-range maritime patrol.[226] This would allow the British government time to stabilize the Gulf and help "modernize" the rulers of the Trucial States, which the Foreign Office estimated would continue into the mid-1970s at the earliest.[227]

[224] Hannig, *International Affaires*, 42, no. 4 (1966): 254-55.
[225] "The United Kingdom defence review": draft aide memoire by HMG for discussion in Washington and Canberra. January 1966. DEFE 13/477. *BDEEP—East of Suez*, #10.
[226] "The United Kingdom defence review": draft aide memoire by HMG for discussion in Washington and Canberra. January 1966. DEFE 13/477. *BDEEP—East of Suez*, #10.
[227] "Persian Gulf and Iran": Report by Roberts to Brown on his visit to the Persian Gulf and Iran. October 21 to November 12, 1967. November 17, 1967. FCO 8/31. *BDEEP—East of Suez*, #27. The Government originally expected to withdraw from the Persian Gulf no earlier than the mid-1970s. See "Public

The decision was met with skepticism in parliament. Why would the government incur more expenditure to shift the military forces from Aden to the Persian Gulf, if the ultimate goal was to leave the Gulf altogether?[228] Denis Healey responded with Labour's new rationalization:

> The point is to ensure the continued stability of the Gulf until countries in the area are capable of maintaining stability on their own. We do not regard the base in Aden as being necessary for that purpose. But consequent on leaving Aden, we feel it necessary to make a small increase in our forces in the Persian Gulf to maintain our obligations.[229]

The expense of such an increase continued to be a point of contention, even within the Labour party through the year.

Even as the Foreign Office laid plans for a tidy withdrawal and handover to the South Arabian Federation, events there spiraled out of control. Following the 1966 decision to leave, violence in Aden increased. Local security forces in the Federation proved loyal to the National Liberation Front based out of Yemen. In June 1967, federal police revolted in an area of Sheikh Uthman, just a few miles north of Aden. The nationalists within the police force seized an arms cache, attacked a British truck carrying nineteen soldiers and later managed to take over the armory. By the end of the day, the National Liberation Front controlled the area.[230]

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expenditure: post-devaluation measures": Cabinet conclusions on withdrawal from East of Suez. January 4, 1968. CAB 128/43. *BDEEP—East of Suez*, #28.

228 Sato, "Britain's Decision to Withdraw from the Persian Gulf," *JICH* (2009), goes into detailed discussion of the divisions within the Labour Party at this time. Back benchers openly opposed Wilson's plans for the Gulf and some even shifted from the Labour party to the Liberal party following the withdrawal.

229 Hansard, Parliamentary Debates, v. 739, oral answers, 402-4. Comment by Mr. Healey in response to Mr. Hooley in the House of Commons.

230 Walker, *Aden Insurgency* (2005), 240-44.

British forces succeeded in reoccupying the area by July 5th. They failed, however, to provide sufficient support to the federal army in the months following the rioting. Between August and September, the states comprising the federation melted away. The National Liberation Front took over eight states by August 28; three days later they consolidated control over four more.[231] By September 13, British forces handed control of Little Aden to the South Arabian Army, and withdrew behind its lines in Aden. Military command of the Persian Gulf forces was handed over to the commander at Bahrain in October. In late November, the federal army in Aden proper fell to the National Liberation Front. On November 29th, the last British soldier evacuated South Arabia. In a matter of a few short months nationalist forces had unceremoniously expelled a British presence that had been there for more than one hundred years.

The crisis in Aden coincided with the nadir of the economic crisis. On November 18, the Treasury took the steps Harold Wilson had hoped to avoid since coming to office. It devalued sterling from $2.80 to $2.40.[232] The savings measures had failed to prevent an economic collapse. An atmosphere of despair took hold of the government in the aftermath.

[231] Julian Paget, *Last Post: Aden, 1964-67* (London: Faber & Faber, 1969), 234.
[232] See Dockrill, *Britain's Retreat from East of Suez* (2002) for a thorough discussion of the devaluation crisis.

THE DECISION

The devaluation measures meant that the Government would have to make an immediate decision about its defense role. The growing presence of Arab nationalism in the Gulf and the forced withdrawal from Aden convinced the Foreign Office that staying on in the Gulf as a visible imperial power would reduce its influence and jeopardize British interests. Wilson's Cabinet pushed for an earlier withdrawal from the Persian Gulf in an effort to bring expenditure in line with the realities of Britain's economic limitations.[233] The day before his announcement to parliament, Harold Wilson wrote to President Johnson. He soberly summed up his hopes for the future of British influence in the international arena:

> If there is any lesson to be learned from the somber way we have found ourselves obliged to lurch from one defence review to another in recent years, it is that we must now take certain major foreign policy decisions as the pre-requisite of economics in our defence expenditure. Put simply, this only amounts to saying that we have to come to terms with our role in the world. And we are confident that if we fully assert our economic strength, we can by realistic priorities strengthen this country's real influence and power for peace in the world.[234]

The days of exerting British will through fire power had drawn to a close. All that was left, then, was to execute a clean withdrawal from the Far East and the Persian Gulf.

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[233] "Public expenditure: post-devaluation measures": Cabinet conclusions on withdrawal from East of Suez. January 4, 1968. CAB 128/43. *BDEEP—East of Suez*, #28.

[234] "Defence review": outward FO telegram no 554 to Washington transmitting the text of Mr. Wilson's reply to Lyndon Johnson. *BDEEP—East of Suez*, #33.

Chapter 5: Federation, 1968-1971

Harold Wilson's announcement that Britain would retreat from its military role East of Suez alarmed both the rulers of the Trucial Coast and British officials there. Britain's intention to withdraw created the potential for instability in a variety of ways. Great Britain had been the primary protector since 1820s. Britain's very presence served as a deterrent against regional powers' ambitions to dominate the Gulf States and preserved a corner of the Middle East for British interests. The Trucial States, moreover, lacked the administrative infrastructures of the modern nation state. They also lacked sufficient indigenous security forces for both policing the state and protecting the Coast from potential attacks by regional powers.

In leaving the Persian Gulf, the Foreign Office hoped not to give up Britain's privileged role as ally and advisor to the Trucial States. Rather, the Trucial States would continue to rely on Britain and preserve the economic ties that bound them together. A federation of the Trucial States provided a possible answer to the vacuum that the British withdrawal would leave in 1971.

Such was the hope of British officials. For the Trucial Rulers, however, British withdrawal presented a serious dilemma. The individual rulers in the Persian Gulf feared the effects of a new political order. Britain's presence had not only secured the rulers' positions, but British officials also mediated disagreements among the rulers, preserved internal security, and helped to prevent the infiltration of Nasserists and Arab nationalists in the Arab Gulf. Britain had also provided important economic opportunities. The

military bases at Bahrain and Sharjah had provided important revenues to both of those states. To confess these fears about the British withdrawal publicly, however, would subject the rulers to harsh criticism from anti-imperialists in the Gulf and throughout the region.

This chapter considers the three-year period in which the rulers on the Trucial Coast and the British Government worked toward the establishment of a federation. Both British officials and Trucial Rulers viewed the establishment of a federation as the best method for maintaining the political balance in the Persian Gulf and safeguarding the interests of all parties. The following pages examine British expectations for a federation in the context of decolonization as well as in relation to the immediate circumstances of the Gulf States. This is followed by an analysis of the impact of nationalist and anti-imperialist sentiment in the Gulf States in persuading Trucial rulers to cooperate in the process of federation. Federation had the potential to affirm the rulers' commitment to Arab nationalist ideals through reuniting a land that Arabs viewed as having been divided by British interests. For the Persian Gulf rulers, federation also allowed for sharing resources and responsibility in state building and internal security. Despite these advantages the rulers were required to overcome a number of obstacles. The success of the new state would require the cooperation not only of the nine protected states, but also that of the regional powers: Saudi Arabia and Iran.

THE ORIGINS OF FEDERATION: THE BRITISH PERSPECTIVE

The move toward a federation of emirates in the Persian Gulf was initiated subsequent to the British government's surprise decision in January 1968 to end its defense role East of Suez no later than December 1971. British officials believed that the best way to protect British interests in the Persian Gulf would be through the establishment of a federation of the Trucial States. A federation, ideally, would create a strong government that would prevent conflict among the various rulers and would allow for the sharing of resources for economic strength. Through the 1950s and 1960s, British administrators in the Persian Gulf encouraged cooperation among the rulers of the Trucial sheikhs to ease their own duties. It became increasingly apparent that the British would be forced by economic and political necessity to withdraw from East of Suez eventually, though, and administrators began placing greater emphasis on inter-state cooperation to prepare the way for future independence.

Federations became a relatively common aspect of state formation and decolonization in the mid-twentieth century.[235] The Colonial Office had created

[235] The issue of federations as a subject of study within the field of British Imperial history is surprisingly lacking, particularly in terms of comparative studies. Tony Smith. "A Comparative Study of French and British Decolonization," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 20, no. 1 (1978): 70-102, makes oblique comparisons between French and British federations, but does not study federations as a form of decolonization specifically. Donald Rothchild, "African Federations and the Diplomacy of Decolonization," *The Journal of Developing Areas* 4, no. 4 (1970): 509-24 looks specifically at the question of federation in Africa in decolonization and aptly notes that "…whereas [colonial authorities] were motivated by the goal of administrative efficiency, [African nationalists] sought national self-fulfillment in all its aspects." This could be said of many of the federal projects of decolonization, including Malaya and the West Indies, for example. It is slightly less apt in the case of the United Arab Emirates where popular nationalist sentiment was not strong in the much of the Persian Gulf States; the rulers of the Emirates, however, were aware of the power of nationalist ideology elsewhere in the Middle East and were concerned with containing and outmaneuvering nationalists through the process of

federations among colonized ethnic, religious and political groupings throughout the empire in order to form larger states that officials believed would be more viable economically than if there gained independence singly. Federation as a solution to the perceived problem of unevenly developed and small "micro states", however, had not been a successful aspect of decolonization elsewhere in the British Empire.

In considering options for the future of the Trucial States, members of the Foreign Office reflected on the Colonial Office's long record of federation failures: "For what it's worth, recent British experience elsewhere suggests that political association between reluctant units is an unsatisfactory feature of the decolonization process. The West Indies, Nigeria, Central Africa and South Arabia are not the most encouraging precedents."[236] Each of the federations organized by the British Colonial Office failed to last long after Britain had granted the states independence. In 1958, the Colonial Office had created a federation between twenty-four primary islands and a number of smaller islands in the region; the federation collapsed four years later as a result of tensions among the several provinces over representation and the division of local and federal powers.[237] Nigeria's federation of the 1950s led to a series of coups in the 1960s, instability, and finally civil war in 1967.[238] The Central African federation, established in 1953, unraveled ten years

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federation. See also Robert Pearce, "The Colonial Office and Planned Decolonization in Africa," *African Affairs* 83, no. 330 (1984): 77-93 and John Flint, "Planned Decolonization and its Failure in British Africa," *African Affairs* 82, no. 328 (1983): 389-411.

[236] "Long-Term Policy in the Persian Gulf," Note by the Foreign Office, April 1967. CAB 148/57, TNA.

[237] Ryan D. Selwyn, *Eric Williams: The Myth and the Man* (Kingston, Jamaica: University of the West Indies Press, 2009); Amanda Sives, "Dwelling Separately: The Federation of the West Indies and the Challenge of Insularity," *Defunct Federalisms: Critical Perspectives on Federal Failure*, Emilian Kavalski and Magdalena Zolkos, eds. (Farnham: Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., 2008), 18-30.

[238] Toyin Falola and Matthew M. Heaton, *A History of Nigeria* (Leiden: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 137-80 serves as a useful introduction to the history of Nigeria in the inter-war years through the

later as the constituent states broke apart into three independent states.[239] By 1967, both the South Arabian Federation and the Malayan federations had both collapsed as well.[240]

These failures did not rule out the necessity of a federation when Foreign Office officials considered the circumstances on the Trucial Coast. It seemed that the sheikhdoms could not continue individually after the British withdrawal. There was little in the way of administrative infrastructure. What did exist was unevenly distributed between the nine sheikhdoms relative to their wealth. Bahrain, for example, had benefitted from oil discovery and exportation before World War II and had built and equipped schools, provided primary and vocational education to members of its population, and had begun to establish a sector of the populace capable of filling administrative and government functions. Abu Dhabi, though it had proved oil reserves by 1968, had only been exporting oil since 1966; until that time development of administrative offices and public services had been minimal. Other emirates, such as

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Civil War. The history of Nigeria, the federation and the civil war are extensively documented. For some of the most important works, see: Robert Heussler, *Yesterday's Rulers: The Making of the British Colonial Service* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1963); Margery Perham's, *The Colonial Reckoning: The End of Imperial Rule in Africa in the Light of British Experience* (New York: Knopf, 1982) and Perham, "Reflections on the Nigerian Civil War," *International Affairs* 46, no. 2 (1970): 231-46 comments that the federation of Nigeria was engineered with the help of Nigerian leaders, but did not have sufficient support following independence to hold the federation together in the absence of British military and administrative aid; Uma O. Eleazu, *Federalism and Nation-Building: The Nigerian Experience, 1954-64* (Ilfracombe, UK: Arthur H. Stockwell, 1977).

[239] For some of the principle works on the Central African federation, see Matthew Hughes, *The Central African Federation, Katanga and the Congo Crisis, 1958-65* (Salford: European Studies Research Institute, University of Salford, 2003); Lawrence Vambe, *From Rhodesia to Zimbabwe* (Pittsburg: University of Pittsburg Press,1976); Ruth Weiss, *Sir Garfield Todd and the Making of Zimbabwe* (London: British Academic Press, 1999).

[240] Significant works on the Malayan Union include: Albert Lau, *The Malayan Union Controversy 1942-1948* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), Anthony Reid, *Imperial Alchemy: Nationalism and Political Identity in Southeast Asia* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010); David Easter, *Britain and the Confrontation with Indonesia, 1960-1966* (New York: Tauris Academic Press, 2004); Richard Aldrich, et. al., eds. *The Clandestine Cold War in Asia, 1945-65: Western Intelligence, Propaganda and Special Operations* (Portland: Frank Cass, 2000).

Ajman and Ras al-Khaimah, were impoverished and depended almost entirely on financial contributions from Abu Dhabi, Kuwait, and Great Britain, and could not afford to establish independent municipal offices and government agencies.

The Foreign Secretary contextualized the federal concept in comments for the Overseas Development Committee in a note in 1967, saying:

> Indeed, now that the main work of decolonisation is complete, the majority of those [remaining] territories are small, scattered islands or 'grains of dust' for which no other solution [except permanent dependence] seems feasible, even if formal colonialism is in some cases replaced by 'free association' or integration. But we have never supposed that the Protected States of the Gulf will fall into this category. They may be small enough to qualify in theory. But they are neither remote enough geographically (cf. the Pacific Islands) nor British enough in character (cf. the smaller West Indies) to qualify in practice.[241]

The Trucial States were too small for independence as they were, but neither did they qualify for a continuation of their quasi-colonial status under special treaty relations.

The Foreign Office suspected that a federation could not succeed. Seeing no alternative, they pushed ahead. Between 1968 and December 1971, British officials expressed doubts about the possibility that a federation of any kind could be achieved; and should it be achieved, they believed it would likely fail in the long term. While expressing private doubts amongst themselves, officials chose to, "…give the impression that we assume it will [work]," in the hopes that the rulers of the Trucial States would continue working toward a union.[242]

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[241] "Long-Term Policy in the Persian Gulf," Note by the Foreign Office, April 1967. CAB 148/57, TNA.
[242] Minute from D. J. McCarthy (Arabian Department, FO) to R. I. Hallows (Bank of England), December 19, 1968. FCO 8/966, TNA.

In preparation for a forthcoming withdrawal, the Foreign Office posited several potential federal systems in 1967. These included a "two-tier system" in which the Northern Trucial States (Dubai and the five smallest Emirates) federated and maintained a confederated relationship with Abu Dhabi, Bahrain and Qatar, with each larger unit enjoying greater independence. Alternatively, Saudi Arabia might win a territorial dispute with Abu Dhabi, thus leaving Abu Dhabi small and sufficiently weak to be absorbed by Dubai; or Bahrain and Qatar might seek a loose confederation with Saudi Arabia for protection. The Foreign Office also theorized that a four-state solution could be created with Abu Dhabi and Dubai dividing the four smaller Trucial States between themselves, establishing Qatar, Bahrain, greater Abu Dhabi and greater Dubai.[243]

By the time the United Arab Emirates came into existence in December 1971, Agency and Residency staff in the Gulf and members of the Foreign Office had speculated further about federations of nine; federations of eight if Bahrain or Qatar dropped out; federations of seven if Qatar and Dubai left the Union; federations of seven if Bahrain and Qatar both left. The British Government looked for a federation of some kind as the only plausible approach to establishing the stability necessary to safeguard British interests in the area.

[243] "Long-term Policy in the Persian Gulf," Note by the Foreign Office, April 18, 1967. CAB 148/57, TNA.

ARAB NATIONALISM AND FEDERATION

Popular Emirati accounts of the origins of the United Arab Emirates describe its formation as a movement toward unity borne out of a historic meeting between Sheikh Zayid bin Sultan Al-Nahyan, of Abu Dhabi, and Sheikh Rashid bin Saqr Al-Maktoum of Dubai. On February 19, 1968—only a month after Harold Wilson's sudden announcement— these two great rulers met near the border of their respective emirates. They came as rivals, but left as co-architects of a future union that would combine the Trucial States of the Arab coast into one federal unit that would provide stability, continuity, and prosperity for its population.[244]

The great meeting of the rulers of Abu Dhabi and Dubai did take place in February 1968 in response to the British announcement to withdraw its forces from East of Suez, and in particular, from the Persian Gulf. The Rulers of the Trucial Coast, however, initially were not enthusiastic about Harold Wilson's decision to end Britain's special treaty relations and withdraw Britain's military from the Persian Gulf. Several of

[244] See Jane Bristol-Rhys, "Emirati Historical Narratives," *History and Anthropology* 20, no. 2 (2009): 107-121 isolates four trends in Emiratis' historical narratives as they relate to the British presence in the Trucial States. Two trends specifically address the elevated position that Sheikhs Zayid and Rashid enjoy in Emirati national mythologies on the basis of the Dubai Agreement (sometimes called the Bipartite Agreement) in 1968. The agreement is highlighted in the many biographies of Sheikh Zayed produced and published by research centers in the UAE. See Hamdan Rashid ᶜAli Al-Darᶜaiy, *Zayid: Sirat Al-Amjad wa Fakhr Al-Ittihad: Qiraᶜa fi Al-Watha'iq Al-Britaniya Wa Wasa'il Al-ᶜIlam Al-ᶜArabiya wa Al-Ajnabiya, 1968-1971* (Al-ᶜAyn: Markaz Zayid lil Turath wa Al-Tarikh, 2005), 43-51; *Dawlat Al-Imarat Al-ᶜArabiya Al-Muttahida: Khamsa ᶜAshira ᶜAaman ᶜAla Tariq Al-Bina' wa Al-Taqqadum, 1392-1407 H (1971-1986 M)*, (Al-Imarat Al-ᶜArabiya Al-Muttahida: [s.n., 1986]), especially pp. 10-15, which describe Sheikh Zayid as a "Man of Union" (*rajul al-ittihad*), "Man of Unity" (*rajul al-wahda*), "Man of Solidarity" (*rajul al-tadhamin*) for his recurring role as a unifier in the history of the Gulf region, first as the author of the Dubai Agreement, throughout the period of federation of the Emirates, and also in his capacity as a regional leader during the Iran-Iraq war; Andrew Wheatcroft, *With United Strength: H.H. Shaikh Zayid Bin Sultan Al-Nahyan, the Leader and the Nation*. (Abu Dhabi: Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research, 2004).

the Trucial Rulers offered to subsidize the British military presence if Wilson would reconsider his decision. The Ruler of Fujairah went so far as to suggest to the Political Agent in Dubai that he would consider forfeiting his sovereignty and allow the British government to rule the emirate as a protectorate.[245]

British Conservative leadership exploited Labour's decision to withdraw, and Trucial Rulers' fears of the decision. Edward Heath, the leader of the Conservative opposition, campaigned on a platform that included overturning Labour's withdrawal and in 1969 even toured the Persian Gulf states in order to discuss the possibility of reversal the British position if the Conservatives won the election in 1970.[246] Some of the Gulf sheikhs expressed hope that a Conservative win would postpone or even prevent the withdrawal.[247]

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[245] "The Future of the Trucial States," D. A. Roberts (Political Agent, Dubai) to A. J. D. Stirling (Arabian Department, FO). February 7, 1968. FO 1016/855. TNA. The other rulers of the smaller states were equally dismayed. The ruler of Sharjah was concerned at the loss of the income the state derived from British military installations there, "… but he is also concerned to cultivate the image of a Ruler in close touch with his people and if were popular opposition to the idea he would hardly fight against it publicly." See "British Withdrawal from the Persian Gulf, Local Views," Minute by D. J. McCarthy to Arthur, Arabian Department. June 11, 1969. FCO 8/979. TNA.

[246] "East of Suez," Minute from D. J. McCarthy (Arabian Department, FO) to M. S. Weir (Political Resident, Bahrain). FCO 8/979. TNA. McCarthy describes a pamphlet from the Conservative Research Department stating that, "…it is firm Conservative policy to maintain a military presence both the Gulf and South Asia after 1971 if we are still wanted there on the return to power of a Conservative government…."; For a consideration of Heath and the development of his policies, see Andrew Roth, *Heath and the Heathmen* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1972), which describes the conflict between Heath's public expressions of support for a European-focused foreign policy and his focus on reversing Harold Wilson's East of Suez withdrawal. Also see, John Campbell, *Edward Heath: A Biography* (London: Cape, 1993).

[247] Sheikh Isa, the ruler of Bahrain, told one British official that he had expressed to Edward Heath that continued British military support would be "most welcome." "Bahrain and the British Military Withdrawal," Letter from A. J. D. Stirling to Stewart Crawford. April 1969. FCO 8/973. TNA; Sheikh Khalid al-Qasimi, the Ruler of Sharjah, expressed misgivings about British withdrawal, fearing the move would result in an Iranian take-over of the Persian Gulf. "Mr. Heath's Visit," Letter from J. L. Bullard (Political Agent, Dubai) to M. S. Weir (Political Resident, Bahrain). April 5, 1969. FCO 8/973. TNA.

Even as the rulers hoped for a continued relationship with the British government, they also recognized that the political climate within the emirates and the Middle East had shifted. Support for Arab nationalism had been growing in the Persian Gulf at an increasing rate since the Nasser's nationalization of the Suez Canal. The civil war in Yemen brought the Arab nationalist cause to the Arabian Peninsula for the first time. When the war broke out between the monarchy and the republican factions in North Yemen in 1962, Nasser quickly moved to support the republican forces with arms and soldiers. The conflict then spread into the British protected territories in South Arabia and then east into the Sultanate of Oman.[248]

The instability in Yemen and South Arabia encouraged emigration. The Gulf States were an obvious destination, particularly for those who had worked in industries connected with the oil refinery at Aden. The Trucial States were especially enticing. The discovery of oil in Abu Dhabi and Dubai in the early 1960s generated demand for more labor than the small populations of the Persian Gulf states could provide. During the 1960s and early 1970s, more than half of working male population of North Yemen left to find work in Persian Gulf oil states.[249] Arabs from other states also flowed into the

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[248] For a recent history of Oman, see Francis Outram, *A Modern History of Oman: Formation of the State Since 1920* (New York: I. B. Tauris, 2004). An older, but very helpful work is John E. Peterson, *Oman in the Twentieth Century: Political Foundations of an Emerging State* (London: Croom Helm, 1978); also Zahlan, *Making of the Modern Gulf States* (1998), 125-34. For a detailed diplomatic history of Oman and Britain through the 1950s, see Miriam Joyce, *The Sultanate of Oman: A Twentieth Century History* (Westport: Praeger, 1995).

The nationalist movement underwent a number of reorganizations and name changes early on. Initially, it was the Dhofar Liberation Front, a localized movement in southern Oman. The movement allied itself with Arab nationalist movements and began armed resistance as the People's Front for the Liberation of Oman in 1965. Three years later, the organization broadened its message to include the northern Gulf States when it became the People's Front for the Liberation of the Occupied Arab Gulf.

[249] Fred Halliday, "Labor Migration in the Middle East," *MERIP Reports*, no. 59 (1977): 3-17, 3.

Trucial States, including expatriates from Egypt, Jordan, and Iraq, as well as Palestinian refugees. By 1968, the population of the Trucial States had reached 180,000; approximately 74,250 of those were foreign workers.[250]

In addition to their skills in the oil industry, foreign workers brought their political ideologies to the Gulf States. Through the 1960s, British intelligence reports from the Trucial States noted an increased number of anti-imperialist political activities and organizations. In Ras al-Khaimah, the Trucial Oman Scouts kept a close watch on seventy-one foreign nationals from several Arab states, who they believed were tied to the rise of youth groups. These youth groups and soccer clubs included groups such as *Nadi al-Itihad* (The Union Club), *Nadi al-Bahri* (The Marine Club), and *Nady al-Ahaly al-Watany* (Club for the National Peoples).[251] Officers in the local police forces, which consisted mainly of non-Gulf Arabs, were suspected of holding "subversive meetings".[252]

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[250] Ibid., 3-17. Detailed information on the populations of the Gulf States is difficult to assemble, especially for this time period. A census was performed by the British administration with the cooperation of Trucial rulers in the Trucial States in 1968. The population growth in the Gulf States, and especially the Trucial States, continued to grow rapidly as the oil industry expanded well into the 1970s. Later surveys in the Trucial States did not identify the foreign populations by individual nationalities. Halliday also noted that there were incentives for states to misrepresent population figures. Saudi Arabia, for example, was suspected of exaggerating the numbers of Saudi subjects to minimize the preponderance of foreign nationals. In the Trucial States, annual budgetary funds were dispersed based on population, creating incentives for rulers of the poorer states to inflate overall numbers.

[251] "Desert Intelligence Office's Reports," March 15, 1966. WO 337/14. TNA; "Desert Intelligence Office's Reports," August 1966. WO 337/14. TNA. The list included Iraqis, Syrians, Yemenis, Omanis, Jordanians, Palestinians, and Lebanese.

Abu-Lughod has commented on the impact of the Palestinian diaspora and the spread of political activity in the post-1948 period. He has argued that, on one hand, Palestinian refugees sought stable lives and pursued economic achievement within their adopted homelands, but, "simultaneously they pursued political activities within each Arab state which tended to be revisionist and radical in character." Abu-Lughod's observation of these activities is focused primarily on the Levant states and Egypt, but is also connected to the Palestinian populations in the Gulf States. See Ibrahim Abu-Lughod, "Altered Realities: The Palestinians Since 1967," *International Journal* 28, no. 4 (1973): 648-69, 652.

[252] "Desert Intelligence Office's Reports," October 3, 1966. WO 337/14. TNA.

The rulers in the lower Gulf States remained vigilant during this period, acting swiftly and, occasionally, even recklessly to prevent the spread of nationalist movements in their emirates. They especially feared Jordanian and Palestinian teachers who they believed would bring their nationalist ideologies to the Persian Gulf and indoctrinate young minds.[253] In several cases in Dubai and Abu Dhabi, teachers sparked demonstrations among young school children.[254]

Fears of nationalist activities were not limited only to Palestinians and Jordanians. In 1967, Abu Dhabi's Sheikh Zayid pressed for the deportation of a Somali employee working for the British Consular section. Following the discovery of a fire in Abu Dhabi on March 23, 1967, the local police arrested Mohammed Adam Liban, who worked as an assistant passport clerk.[255] There had been a similar incident of arson in Dubai several months before and the Abu Dhabi police responded quickly. They arrested Liban because he had been in the proximity of the fire, though there was no clear evidence implicating him. Liban remained in custody until he was tried in court and found not guilty.[256]

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[253] "Trucial States Diary No. 10: Review of Events Diary October," from J. P. Tripp, (Political Agent, Dubai) to the Foreign Office, November 13, 1958. TNA. Zayid criticized British officials for allowing the employment of Egyptian teachers at a school in Sharjah. Maitra, *Qasr Al Hosn* (2001), 243. The rulers of Abu Dhabi and Dubai were more wary of non-Gulf Arab teachers than the rulers of Sharjah, Ras al-Khaimah, and Fujairah, whose relationships with the British were historically more antagonistic.

[254] "Desert Intelligence Officer's Reports," July 2, 1965. WO 337/14. TNA. There was a demonstration involving foreign school teachers who made verbal attacks on British soldiers. See also, Davidson, *Dubai* (2008), 39-54. Davidson notes that there were rumors that Egyptian intelligence officers were sent to Dubai to "infiltrate" the schools. Aqil Kazim has an excellent discussion of the various strains of nationalist organizations in Trucial Oman. See Kazim, *The United Arab Emirates* (2000), 314-20.

[255] "Agency Staff- Abu Dhabi", Letter from A. T. Lamb (Political Agent, Abu Dhabi) to H. G. Balfour-Paul (Political Resident, Bahrain). March 25, 1967. FCO 8/900. TNA.

[256] "Agency Staff- Abu Dhabi", Letter from A. T. Lamb (Political Agent, Abu Dhabi) to H. G. Balfour-Paul (Political Resident, Bahrain). March 26, 1967. FCO 8/900. TNA; "Penal Case No. 41/67", Abu Dhabi Government: Department of Justice (translation), Abu Dhabi, March 28, 1967. FCO 8/900. TNA; Enclosure to "Agency Staff-Abu Dhabi," Letter from A. T. Lamb to H. G. Balfour. April 8, 1967. FCO 8/900. TNA.

Despite the outcome of the court case, the Abu Dhabi government requested the British Resident to transfer him out of Abu Dhabi.[257]

Such incidents led the governments of the emirates to issue laws to aid in managing immigration and employment standards. In Abu Dhabi, for example, between 1966 and 1969, several laws were decreed and elaborated on to clearly define nationality and labor status. Citizenship within Abu Dhabi required the subject to be a descendent of one of the major clans that had historically constituted the base of Abu Dhabi's tribal support; without those ties, citizenship could only be granted through royal decree by the ruler himself.[258] Other laws, dealing specifically with workers, created direct government oversight of non-national employees. The Labor Law of 1966 and the Trade Permit Law of 1969 both required foreign workers to apply to the Abu Dhabi government for permits.[259] Workers, under these laws, were restricted to the specific work for the company or business under which they had applied for the license and prevented workers from changing work or traveling for work in other emirates without the express permission of the Labor Administration.[260]

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[257] "Agency Staff-Abu Dhabi," letter from A. T. Lamb to H. G. Balfour-Paul. April 8, 1967. FCO 8/900. TNA.

[258] "Nationality Law of 1967," (Arabic), in *al-Jareeda al-Rasmiya*. April 1968. Hakumat Abu Dhabi. Those eligible were descendents of the Bani Yas, Dhuwahir or Munasir. Women could achieve citizenship through marriage to a "national"; citizenship could be withdrawn at the Ruler's whim.

[259] "Trade Permit Law of 1969," (Arabic) in *al-Jareeda al-Rasmiya*. March 1969. Hakumat Abu Dhabi; "Labor Law of 1966," (Arabic) in *al-Jareeda al-Rasmiyya*. May 1968. Hakumat Abu Dhabi.

[260] Labor permits continue to serve as a system of internal policing over the foreign worker population in the United Arab Emirates. In all of the Emirates of the UAE today, foreign workers are required to have an Emirati partner in order to open a new business, for example. Foreign laborers under contract are required to surrender their passports to the companies for which they work. The company then becomes responsible for restricting and monitoring workers' movements. See Christopher Davidson, "The Impact of Economic Reform on Dubai," in *Reform in the Middle East Oil Monarchies*, Anoushiravan Ehteshami and Steven Wright, eds., (Reading: Ithaca Press, 2008), 153-77, especially pp. 167-74.

Rulers in the Trucial States in 1968, then, saw Arab nationalism as a potential threat to the internal stability of their states; but they also recognized that they could not be seen to undermine the goals of Arab nationalism without undermining their own authority and legitimacy as rulers. When the initial shock of the British announcement had passed, the Rulers began to consider ways to maintain their political and economic ties with Britain while simultaneously working to create a new *modus operendi* that would support the emirates' sovereignty and legitimacy.

THE DUBAI AGREEMENT, FEBRUARY 1968

The Dubai Agreement created by Sheikh Zayid of Abu Dhabi and Sheikh Rashid of Dubai established a working framework for the negotiations that would take place for the ensuing three years. The pact was made at the initiative of the two Trucial Rulers of their own impetus, and it explicitly stated that the rulers would work toward the establishment of a federation that would include all nine of the emirates if they chose to participate. All nine rulers signed on to the initial agreement, but within months, the agreement became irrelevant under their mutual suspicions and ambitions.[261]

The rulers, in publicly taking initiative toward federation, placed themselves in a position of independence from British initiatives, and demonstrated a movement toward the process of uniting Arab states that had been divided by British imperialism. Arab

[261] Muhammad Husn, al-ᶜAidrus, *al-Tatawurat al-Siyasiya fi al-Imarat al-cArabiya, 1932-1971* (Dubai: Dar al-Kitab al-Hadith, 2002), 377-79. Rashid and Zayid met on February 18, 1968, and signed the Dubai Agreement on February 20. The remaining states signed the agreement February 25, 1968. Al-ᶜAidrus reproduces the text of the February 18 agreement. p. 373-74.

news outlets, including Cairo's Voice of the Arabs heralded the announcement as a victory that would produce progress in achieving the regional goals of independence from Western imperialism. As the process of federation continued through 1971, the rulers of the emirates would use this popular encouragement to exercise greater authority in transforming the administrative departments that had been built and administered by the British government into Emirati spheres of government.

At the invitation of Sheikh Zayid, he and Sheikh Rashid met at al-Samih in Dubai near the Abu Dhabi border to discuss the post-withdrawal future. The meeting concluded with the Dubai Agreement, which affirmed the two leaders' commitment to the creation of a union that would establish inter-emirate cooperation in four matters:

> … Sheikh Zayid bin Sultan al-Nahyan, the Ruler of the Emirate of Abu Dhabi, with his brother Sheikh Rashid bin Saeed al-Maktoum, the Ruler of the Emirate of Dubai, in pursuit of their search for the best future for their people, and in order to achieve the aspirations of the people of the region and meet their desires, have satisfactorily agreed to the following, praise God:
>
> The formation of a union comprising the two countries under one flag and entrusted with the following issues:
>
> Foreign affairs.
> Defense and security in case of necessity.
> Services such as health and education.
> And citizenship and immigration.[262]

[262] "Dubai Agreement," (Arabic) reprinted in Muhammad Husn, al-ᶜAidrus, *al-Tatawuraat al-Siyasiya fi al-Imarat al-ᶜArabiya* (2002), 373-74.

This accord also determined that any of the other seven protected emirates would be welcome to join the union. Two weeks later, all seven of the other states accepted the agreement, which came into effect on March 30, 1967.

The agreement, which seemed to begin with optimism and enthusiasm, quickly disintegrated under the weight of the numerous problems not addressed in the relatively vague articles of the initial agreement. The internal dynamics of the Trucial States and their links to the major powers in the region, stymied the federation. In late May, the leaders of the nine emirates met to begin clarifying negotiating details of power sharing among the states, representation, and the location of a future capital. The following day, the meeting ended without any progress and a public announcement postponing future discussions:

> Between 25 and 26 May 1968, the first meeting of the Supreme Council of the Federation of Arab Emirates was convened in Abu Dhabi. Rulers of the (aforesaid) emirates exchanged consultations about the best methods to implement the Dubai Accord for the realization of the noble objectives stipulated in this accord. From the consultations it transpired that there is a certain divergence regarding such methods. The conferees were of the opinion that this meeting be adjourned, and that another meeting of the Supreme Council be convened in Abu Dhabi on 1 July 1968, so that they can exchange more consultations with the aim of reaching an agreement which should guarantee at the soonest possible time commencement in taking necessary steps for the sound implementation of the Dubai Agreement.[263]

From May 1968 until December 1971, the question of whether or not the Federation would come into being at all.

[263] Text of joint communiqué issued by meeting of the rulers' council convened on 25-26 May 1968, Abu Dhabi, May 26, 1968, quoted from A. O. Taryam, *The Establishment of the United Arab Emirates 1950-85* (London: Croom Helm, 1987), 100.

The agreement between Dubai and Abu Dhabi had been tentative from the outset. The effort exerted on Zayid's behalf to bring about Rashid's cooperation created suspicion among Trucial Rulers regarding Zayid's ambitions for his role in the future state. A closer examination helps to demonstrate the complexity of the dynamics among the Trucial Rulers that overshadowed the federation process for the next three years.

As part of the agreement between Sheikh Zayid and Sheikh Rashid, Zayid ceded approximately ten miles of Abu Dhabi's seabed to Dubai and also paid Rashid £3 million.[264]

The relationship between Abu Dhabi and Dubai had been characterized by tension since the 1830s. Both ruling families were branches of the Bani Yas and had been allied until the Al Bu Falasa, of which the Maktoum were descended, broke away from the confederation and migrated to the area of modern Dubai. The relationship between the two ruling families remained strained as Abu Dhabi attempted to regain control.[265] Throughout the nineteenth century, the two competing powers shifted their alliances back and forth, drawing in the al-Qawasim family into their power plays.[266] In the early part of the twentieth century, the competition between the two emirates broke out into a series of

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[264] "Offshore Boundary Agreement Between Abu Dhabi and Dubai, 18 February 1968," http://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/TREATIES/ARE1968OB.PDF (accessed July 18, 2010); "Draft Report" in "Tour of the Gulf, 18 April-6 May, 1968," G. 11, Papers of Sir William Luce, Special Collections, University of Exeter. See also, Taryam, *Establishment of the United Arab Emirates* (1987), 89-91.

[265] Maitra, *Qasr al-Hosn* (2001), 78-79.

[266] Ibid., 78-82. Maitra notes that at various times, the Bu Falasah sought an alliance with the Qawasim based in Sharjah to counter Abu Dhabi's attempts to re-absorb them. But she also notes that when Sheikh Makhtum appeared to overstep his bounds by interfering in the affairs of Sharjah, the Qawasim changed their alliances to side with Abu Dhabi and Umm al-Qaiwain in 1840. These alliances remained fluid into the twentieth century.

skirmishes over territory.[267] In securing the agreement with Dubai through his sea bed agreement, he raised concerns among some of the rulers that he was using Abu Dhabi's oil wealth in order to buy influence.

The move, seen as an effort to enlarge Zayid's power, aggravated Sheikh Ahmad of Qatar who complained that he saw the move as a "first step" by Zayid to taking over the whole of the Trucial Coast.[268] Qatari's rulers had remained suspicious of Bani Yas expansionism at least since the mid-nineteenth century, when the two states had been at war. Conflict between the two states had revived again in the 1880s.[269] Now in the mid-twentieth century, in the proposed federation, Qatar stood to lose a great deal of autonomy to its old rival. Until 1965, Qatar had the highest level of oil production among the Trucial States, including Bahrain. Oil production on the Trucial Coast had sky-rocketed between 1964 and 1965. Qatar's production in 1964 amounted to 77,885,000 barrels, whereas production in the Trucial Coast was only 67,465,000. The following year, the Trucial Coast outstripped Qatar's production at 102,804,000 barrels-- nearly 20 million barrels more than Qatar produced. The gap in oil production between Qatar and the smaller Trucial States continued to grow exponentially, making it clear that Abu Dhabi's oil wealth and influence in the region would continue to grow.[270] The apparent purchase of an alliance between Abu Dhabi and Dubai confirmed that Qatar's sway was waning.

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[267] Maitra, *Qasr al-Hosn* (2001).
[268] "Draft Report" in "Tour of the Gulf, 18 April-6 May, 1968," Papers of Sir William Luce, Special Collections, University of Exeter.
[269] Maitra, *Qasr al-Hosn* (2001), 140-42, 171-74.
[270] "Arab Gulf States: Annual Oil Production, 1947-90," in Roger Owen and Sevket Pamuk, *A History of Middle East Economies in the Twentieth Century* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998), 265.

Sheikh Ahmad signed the accord and agreed to participate in the initial meeting, but his subsequent actions belied his uneasiness. Before the meeting in late May had even taken place, Ahmad seemed to be putting pressure on Sheikh Rashid to slow any progress toward implementing the Dubai Agreement. The result was that before the May 25 meeting, one British observer noted that the relationship between Dubai and Abu Dhabi was, "as bad as they have ever been."[271] Relations between the rulers continued to deteriorate when Qatar forwarded several proposals to be included in the meeting's agenda. These included the election of a union president; the establishment of a capital; the creation of a union council and its functions; and the discussion and creation of several ministries for the administration of the Union.[272]

The move on Qatar's part seems to have been an attempt to force the talks to collapse by placing the remaining states in the position of taking the blame for Qatar leaving. This became more apparent as the states' delegates and advisors prepared for the May 25 meeting. The Trucial Rulers voted to exclude Qatar's proposals for the agenda of the first meeting. Ahmad nevertheless continued to press for the proposals' inclusion and publicly claimed that the move was "an open violation of the agreement," and, "[conflicted] totally with the higher interests of the federation."[273]

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[271] "Draft Report" in "Tour of the Gulf, 18 April-6 May, 1968," G. 11, Papers of Sir William Luce, Special Collections, University of Exeter.
[272] "Minutes of meeting of representatives and advisers of the rulers of the Gulf emirates, convened in Abu Dhabi on Saturday, 18 May and Sunday, 19 May 1968," cited in Taryam, *Establishment of the United Arab Emirates* (1987), 96-97.
[273] Ibid., 98.

	Bahrain	Qatar	Trucial Coast (UAE)
1962	16,446	67,9111	5,976
1963	16,503	70,123	17,571
1964	18,000	77,885	67,465
1965	20,788	84,215	102,804
1966	22,521	105,945	131,279
1967	25,370	118,428	140,117
1968	27,598	124,266	181,756
1969	27,774	129,746	222,598
1970	27,973	132,456	283,500
1971	27,346	156,882	386,665
1972	25,508	176,545	440,132

Table 3: Annual Oil Production in the Trucial States, 1962-72 ('000s of barrels)[274]

Ahmad's bid for leadership or independence from the federation was not the only source of conflict within the emirates. As already indicated, cooperation between Dubai and Abu Dhabi was only tentative in the beginning and suspicions between the two rulers continued to plague the negotiations until the union was finally formed in December

[274] Ibid., 265. Owen and Pamuk list the production for the UAE, but not for the individual emirates. Oil production in Sharjah and Dubai, however, was only a small percentage of the oil production on the Trucial Coast. For more on details about the discovery and production of oil in Dubai, Ras al-Khaimah, and Sharjah see Butt, "Oil and Gas in the UAE," *United Arab Emirates* (2001), 231-248. Oil production in Dubai did not begin until 1966, while the remaining emirates began production only after the establishment of the United Arab Emirates, and in much smaller quantities than Abu Dhabi was able to produce.

1971. Among the poorer Trucial States, Zayid's financial gifts were always viewed with suspicion. In one instance, Abu Dhabi provided funds and police officers to the Sheikh Muhammad of Fujairah for the purpose of training a Fujairah police force. Both Qatar and Dubai commented that the Abu Dhabi officers in Fujairah wore Abu Dhabi uniforms, and that this could amount to an attempt to eliminate Muhammad through the police force and take over Fujairah.[275] Bahrain's Sheikh 'Isa intimated to a former Political Resident that he felt alienated and unwelcome in the federation by the other Trucial rulers.[276]

The disunity between the nine rulers in the Trucial States continued to bog down the federation process through 1971. For the year following the failure of the May 25-26 gathering, the rulers met intermittently in order to regain the momentum they had lost. Subsequent discussions in October and November failed to produce any substantial developments.

MAINTAINING THE REGIONAL *STATUS QUO*

Any federation plans were further complicated by regional and international interests in the developments in the Persian Gulf. Britain's military and political presence in the Persian Gulf in the twentieth century had established a kind of neutral zone on the Trucial Coast that prevented both Iran and Saudi Arabia from monopolizing the region. Sustaining that buffer between Saudi Arabia and Iran benefited British aims for a post-

[275] "Abu Dhabi and Fujairah," Letter from Julian L. Bullard (Political Agent, Dubai) to M. S. Weir (Political Resident, Bahrain). June 3, 1969. FCO 8/1218. TNA.
[276] "Note on Federation," by William Luce, G.15.a, Papers of Sir William Luce, Special Collections, University of Exeter.

withdrawal Persian Gulf. The British Foreign Office sought to establish a stable federation that would secure the supply of oil from the Persian Gulf and continue to rely on long-standing economic and political ties with the British Government. The military withdrawal in 1971 would reduce British expenditure, but British officials planned to continue playing an active role in the commercial growth of the Persian Gulf states.

Britain and the Trucial States required the endorsement and active support of both Iran and Saudi Arabia if the federation were to succeed. Both countries had ambitions to dominate the region, and both countries had territorial, political, and economic ties to the Trucial States. Saudi Arabia viewed the whole of the Arabian Peninsula as its own sphere of influence and hoped to extend that influence into the Gulf via a federation that would include Qatar and Bahrain.[277] The Saudi Government had also attempted on several occasions to extend its rule into territory held by Abu Dhabi, especially across its boundary near the Buraimi Oasis. At the same time, Iran had an historical claim to the island of Bahrain and argued that a number of the mid-Gulf Islands were its sovereign territory, bringing it into conflict with Sharjah and Ras al-Khaimeh, the latter of which

[277] For a general introduction to the history of Saudi Arabia, see Madawi al-Rasheed, *A History of Saudi Arabia* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002). Also see Naif bin Hethlain, *Saudi Arabia and the US since 1962: Allies in Conflict* (St. Paul, MN: Saqi, 2010), 31-86, which is a recent work on American-Saudi relations also serves to provide greater context for understanding the extent to which the United States viewed Saudi Arabia as essential for containing Arab Nationalism and Communism in the Middle East. Surprisingly, however, there is no mention of the British withdrawal from the Persian Gulf, or a discussion of how American and Saudi governments viewed this event. For more on Saudi Arabia's foreign policy and its search for stability through leadership in the Arab world, see the controversial book by Nadav Safran, *Saudi Arabia: The Ceaseless Quest for Security* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985).

actually refused to join the UAE until February 1972 in part because of the dispute over those islands.[278]

When Britain had announced that it would abandon its military role in the Gulf, the question of securing the stability of the region was in the forefront of the Gulf Rulers' minds. In addition to asking Britain to reconsider, a number of leaders turned to the United States to guarantee their security. In many ways, the American government seemed a likely alternative. The United States did not have the history of colonial occupation as was the case with Britain. American influence in the region had also been growing, particularly in the Persian Gulf area, through its ties to Saudi Arabia and Iran.

Saudi Arabia and the United States shared a close political and economic relationship almost since the monarchy's inception. The Saudi state, which was formed in the wake of World War I, exercised its independence from Britain by selling oil exploration rights to an American company, rather than to a British one. This company that owned those rights, which came to be the Arabian American Oil Company

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[278] There is a wide array of literature relating to international law and border disputes for off-shore claims. Most of these are related to oil exploration and exploitation. For a useful study of the legal aspects of off-shore claims in relative to the geography of the Persian Gulf, see Will D. Swearingen, "Sources of Conflict Over Oil in the Persian/Arabian Gulf," *Middle East Journal* 35, no. 3 (1981): 314-330. He specifically addresses the Abu Musa and Tunbs island problem briefly on pp. 326-27. A scholar has used recently declassified documents to construct a detailed study of the British perspective on the islands dispute. Richard A. Mobley, "The Tunbs and Abu Musa Islands: Britain's Perspective," in *Middle East Journal* 57, no. 4 (2003): 627-45. For Iranian perspectives on the Abu Musa/Tunbs dispute, see: Farhang Mehr, *A Colonial Legacy: The Dispute over the Islands of Abu Musa, and the Greater and Lesser Tunbs* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1997); Kourosh Ahmadi, *Islands and International Politics in the Persian Gulf: The Abu Musa and Tunbs in Strategic Context* (Hoboken: Taylor & Francis, 2008).

The questions surrounding boundaries on the Arab Peninsula are addressed by Wilkinson, *Arabia's Frontiers* (1991), who correctly argues that oil was the driving force behind the British position on various boundary disputes between Saudi Arabia and other Arab Gulf states, including the most forcefully disputed territory surrounding the Buraimi Oasis. The political official in charge of delimiting the boundaries recorded his experience in: Julian Walker, *Tyro on the Trucial Coast* (Durham: The Memoir Club, 1999).

(ARAMCO), began exploring oil in 1933 and discovered oil in 1938. The American economic and political investment in ARAMCO and the development of the Saudi oil company created extended links between the two governments in the areas of politics and technical and economic advising.[279]

Ties between the American government and the Shah in Iran had a shorter history, but cooperation between the two had deepened following the 1952 nationalization crisis. The American CIA helped finance and organize the overthrow of Prime Minister Mohammed Mosaddeq and restore Mohammed-Reza Shah's rule.[280] The United States in 1953, in the midst of the Cold War, feared any hint of instability in a western-aligned state on the Soviet border. Following the coup, Dwight Eisenhower and succeeding presidents continued to provide economic and political aid and encouraged development and increased independence. When Britain announced its decision to withdraw from the Persian Gulf, American relations with Iran were, "close and cooperative."[281]

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[279] For a brief discussion of the development of ARAMCO and Saudi-American relations, see Clement M. Henry and Robert Springborg, *Globalization and the Politics of Development in the Middle East* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001) pp. 168-71, 178-87. For a succinct discussion of the trajectory of the American-Saudi relationship and Gulf security, also see Steven M. Wright, "US Foreign Policy and the Changed Definition of Gulf Security," in *Reform in the Middle East Oil Monarchies*, Anoushiravan Ehteshami and Steven Wright, eds., (Reading: Ithaca Press, 2008). A recent study by Robert Vitalis documents the personal and political relationships that developed through the shared interest in ARAMCO, and more importantly, the cultural and social impact in Saudi Arabian oil compounds from borrowing the American mining models. Robert Vitalis, *America's Kingdom: Mythmaking on the Saudi Oil Frontier* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007).

[280] For a comprehensive history of modern Iran, see Nikki R. Keddie. *Modern Iran: Roots and Results of Revolution* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003). On the Mosaddeq crisis, see pp., 123-31. Also see, Bill and Louis, eds. *Musaddiq, Iranian Nationalism, and Oil* (1988); Stephen Kinzer, *All the Shah's Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror* (Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons, 2003) is a popular and readable history of the coup. For more on the expansion of American influence following the nationalization crisis in Iran, see Mark J. Gasiorowski. *U.S. Foreign Policy and the Shah: Building a Client State in Iran* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991).

[281] "Visit of Amir Abbas Hoveyda, Prime Minister of Iran, December 5-6, 1968, Scope Paper," NSF Country File #138, Iran. LBJL.

These circumstances made the United States an obvious alternative provider of security in the Persian Gulf after Britain could not be prevailed upon to continue the military role of its treaty relations with the Gulf States. During the negotiations in the Gulf for the creation of an Arab union of emirates, rulers from the Gulf— notably Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Iran—questioned American officials about their vision for future involvement and security in the Gulf. During Amir Sabah of Kuwait's visit to the United States in December 1968, he pressed Johnson to articulate the United States' vision for its role in the Gulf after the British withdrawal. The President deferred to Parker Hart from the State Department who responded with the administration's answer to similar inquiries from other rulers:

> Gulf affairs would continue to be of great interest to the United States. The US has no plans to take the unique place the British once held. The British position developed under circumstances that do not exist today….[282]

The Johnson administration, harried by the escalating war in Vietnam and its other global security concerns, had no wish to become directly involved in state formation and security in the Persian Gulf.[283] Instead, they sought to leave that responsibility with the British Government.

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[282] Memorandum of Conversation, "US/Kuwaiti Relations," Sheikh Sabah al-Salim al-Sabah, Sheikh Sabah al-Ahmed al-Jabir, Abd al-Rahman Salem al-Ateeqi, Talat al-Ghoussein, LBJ, Howard R. Cottam, Parker T. Hart, Harold Saunders, Dec. 11, 1968; NSF Country File, Middle East, "Kuwait: Cables and Memos," LBJL.

[283] Jeffrey R. Macris, *The Politics and Security of the Gulf: Anglo-American Hegemony and the Shaping of a Region* (New York: Routledge, 2010) has argued that the American government had no interest in playing a role in the Persian Gulf; this is only partially true. Instead, the United States hoped to project its interests through the British government, which itself planned to sustain a scaled-back military security.

Because of the United States' influence with Iran and Saudi Arabia, Britain remained in close contact with the American State Department on the two major points of regional conflict in the federation plans. The first of these problems was a conflict between Saudi Arabia and Iran over the median line in the Persian Gulf. The second was conflicting claims between Iran and the Trucial States over the sovereignty of the Tunbs and Abu Musa islands. Until these two issues could be resolved, virtually no significant progress could be made on the creation of the federation.

Bahrain lay at the epicenter of the first of these disagreements. The Saudi Government pushed for a nine-state federation that would include both Bahrain and Qatar in the hopes that Riyaadh would be able to then bring all nine states into the Saudi sphere of influence. From the outset of the federation process, the Saudi government insisted that any federation must include all nine states and placed the greatest emphasis on Bahrain's inclusion in the federation. Following the initial collapse of discussions in May 1968, the Saudi government co-sponsored several diplomatic missions with Kuwait and Jordan to encourage and mediated negotiations with the Trucial States.[284]

Iran, however, had an openly defiant attitude towards the federation and its inclusion of Bahrain. The Shah based his objection on Iran's historical claims to Bahrain, which included its location on the median line of the Persian Gulf, as well as the large

[284] A Saudi/Kuwaiti mission was sent out in the summer 1968, but made little progress. See FCO 8/981 "The Qatari Plan?" This was succeeded by several further missions, including one in January 1971: "Kuwait/Saudi Mission," Telegram from Winchester (Jeddah) to FCO. January 13, 1971. FCO 8/1552. TNA.

Shi'i population located on the island.[285] In discussions with British administrators, the Shah maintained through mid-1971 that he would obstruct any attempts by a union to gain membership in the United Nations if Bahrain were included.[286] To the Americans, however, he confided that he was not interested in beginning a war to regain Bahrain, but it would be too unpopular domestically for him to simply relinquish the area.[287]

Iran also used the same argument to dispute a federation that would recognize Arab claims to the mid-Gulf islands. The islands were an issue which the Shah would not give up access to easily. Geographically, Abu Musa lay on the Arab side of the median line in the Persian Gulf near Sharjah, and the Tunbs islands lay ten miles off the coast of Iran. The islands themselves had few inhabitants, according to British intelligence. The combined population of the Greater and Lesser Tunbs was about 150 Arabs; Abu Musa's inhabitants numbered 800.[288] Their location near the Straits of Hormuz established them as an important strategic location for Iran. Sovereignty over the islands, particularly the Greater and Lesser Tunbs, would allow Iran to control traffic coming in and out of the Persian Gulf.

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[285] Iran's historic claims stated that Bahrain had been ruled by Iran since the pre-Islamic period with the exception of brief periods of occupation by the Portugal, and that Britain's negotiations with the al-Khalifah, which had recognized Bahrain's status as a sovereign state under the al-Khalifah had subverted Bahrain's subordinate position as part of the Iran's territory. See Roham Alvandi, "Muhammad Reza Pahlavi and the Bahrain Question, 1968-1970," *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 37, no. 2 (2010): 159-77, 162.

[286] FCO 8/1561.

[287] Telegram, Dean Rusk to Amembassy Iran, "Shah-Secretary June 12 talk on Persian Gulf," June 12, 1968. NSF Country File, Middle East #137, Iran. Visit of Shah of Iran, 6/11-12/68. LBJL. This belief on the part of the Shah, has been examined in detail by Alvandi. He argues that the Shah's caution on the question of Bahrain was part of his attempts in the 1960s to demonstrate an "Independent National Policy" and thus making policy decisions on the basis of Iranian concerns rather than those of Britain, the Soviets, or the United States. Alvandi, *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 37, no. 2 (2010): 159-77.

[288] Richard A. Mobley, "The Tunbs and Abu Musa Islands: Britain's Perspective," *Middle East Journal* 57, no. 4 (2003): 627-45, 628.



Figure 4: The Strait of Hormuz and the Locations of the Abu Musa and Tunbs Islands[289]

The island dispute was perhaps the most potentially explosive issue in the creation of the federation. Britain viewed the islands as "intrinsically worthless," but the Arab

[289] Central Intelligence Agency, *Strait of Hormuz (Political)* (1980), http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/hormuz_80.jpg (accessed April 10, 2011)

states with claims were unwilling to give them up.[290] From the nationalist perspective, giving over the islands was a sign of weakness and could be construed by other states as another sign that western powers were constructing the federation for their own interests. More pressing, and more concretely, Ras al-Khaimah, hoped that an oil discovery on the Tunbs could bring him greater influence among the Trucial States and Sheikh Zayid's substantial oil wealth.[291] Britain could not force the Arab states to give up the disputed territories.

Without a concession from Saqr or the Shah, the federation was at great risk, as was Britain's ability to leave the Persian Gulf without incurring further loss of prestige and expense.[292] Iran's apparent impatience to have the island question resolved forced the British Foreign Office to consider the possibility that the Shah would take preemptive action and take the islands by force before Britain withdrew. Britain's protective treaties with the Trucial States required Britain to defend the islands as long as the treaties remained in place.

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[290] Ibid.

[291] Mobley suggests that oil did not play a substantive role in the islands dispute. On Iran's side, the question of oil does not seem to have factored into the decision. Sharjah and Um al-Qaiwain both relinquished their claims to the disputed islands in order to participate in the Union. Sheikh Saqr al-Qasimi of Ras al-Khaimah, however, held out until after the British withdrawal in the hopes that a last minute discovery would be made. Mobley, "The Tunbs and Abu Musa Islands: Britain's Perspective," *Middle East Journal* 57, no. 4 (2003): 627-45. One historian and former British official has also commented that Sheikh Saqr, "…privately resigned himself to losing them. He refused, however, to take any action indicating foreknowledge of Iranian intentions," to seize the islands by force. Balfour-Paul, *The End of Empire in the Middle East* (1994), 133.

[292] Sheikh Saqr bin Muhammad al-Qasimi became the ruler of Ras al-Khaimah in 1948 and continues as the ruler there today; he should not be confused with Sheikh Saqr bin Sultan al-Qasimi, who was the ruler of Sharjah from 1951 until he was forcefully deposted in 1965, as was discussed in chapter two.

Both Britain and the United States consulted about the various ways to broker a solution. The Johnson administration was pleased to offer suggestions to the Foreign Office to prevent a military confrontation. The British ambassador to the United States discussed the possibility of pursuing a "package" that would give the mid-Gulf Islands to Iran in exchange for an agreement on the median line and relinquishing Bahrain.[293] As it became increasingly apparent that Britain would not be able to convince the Trucial Rulers to trade the islands for Bahrain, American officials began suggesting alternatives.

Walter Annenberg, in his capacity as the American ambassador to Britain, recommended to Foreign Secretary Douglas-Home that the British take a more active role to bring an end to the island dispute. Annenberg pressed for Douglas-Home to resolve the issue in Iran's favor, arguing that

> …an Iranian civil presence, perhaps of a technical or developmental kind, should be introduced onto the islands before British military withdrawal (with no more than formal protests from the rulers concerned), in return for withdrawal of Iranian objection of a Union, and generous aid and technical assistance for the rulers concerned from Iran… The Shah had told him he had assurances from Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Abu Dhabi and Dubai that they would not… make trouble over Iranian possession of the islands.[294]

The problem remained, however, that Sheikh Saqr would not withdraw his "formal protest" and ease Britain's withdrawal. His opposition to Iran's claims over the islands continued until more than a month after Britain's withdrawal and the formation of the United Arab Emirates in December 1971.

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[293] Telegram, "Persian Gulf" Meyer to Secretary of State, May 18, 1968. NSF Country File, Middle East, #136, Iran cables vol. 2, 1/66-1/69. LBJL.

[294] Telegram, Douglas-Home (London, FO) to Morris (Jeddah, British Ambassador), "The Gulf Islands and the Union of Arab Emirates," March 19, 1971. FCO 8/1554. TNA.

A Federation of Seven

The establishment of a federation occurred despite the difficulties of internal rivalries and regional pressures, though not in the form originally planned. In December 1971, only Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Ajman, Umm al-Qaiwan and Fujairah finally agreed to establish a federation. Bahrain and Qatar both defied Saudi Arabian pressure to join the federation and pressed for separate independence, while Ras al-Khaimah stayed outside of the Union until February 1972.

The Foreign Office enlisted the help of William Luce, a former Resident in the Persian Gulf who seems to have enjoyed a close relationship with the Rulers.[295] Throughout 1970 and 1971, Luce traveled throughout the Persian Gulf to facilitate negotiations. Even with his efforts and those of Sheikh Zayid and other regional leaders, until the last months of Britain's treaty relationship with the Gulf States, neither the Foreign Office nor the Arab states were certain that a federation would be in place by Britain's withdrawal date.

Progress toward federation had begun to take on momentum in 1970 when the British government secured agreement with the Shah to hold a United Nations referendum on the status of Bahrain. A plebiscite "…ascertaining the true wishes of the people of Bahrain with respect to the status of the islands…" determined that the subjects of Bahrain, "…wish to gain recognition of their identity in a fully independent and

[295] Balfour-Paul, *End of Empire in the Middle East* (1994) focuses on Luce's work in bringing the Union to fruition.

sovereign State free to decide for itself its relations with other States."[296] Iran rescinded its claim to Bahrain and the pathway to Bahrain's membership in the future federation of Emirates seemed smoothed by the end of 1970.[297]

Bahrain's new independent status created a wholly new dilemma. The ruler seemed more hesitant to join the Union than before, inclining more toward total independence. Sheikh Isa confessed to Luce that his, "…own inclination was for separate independence," but that he was willing to "make compromises" to ensure the Union's success.[298] The idea of independence in Bahrain had taken hold in the minds of both the ruler and the population, while the idea prospect of sharing sovereignty with Sheikh Zayid Abu Dhabi and Sheikh Ahmed of Qatar became less attractive.[299]

In spite of both Isa's and Ahmed's reluctance to make a firm commitment to the Union, Saudi Arabia continued to press for their inclusion in the Union. At the end of 1970 they sent another mission to encourage a nine-state agreement, but deadlock remained. As a consequence, Gulf rulers questioned William Luce in January and February 1971 as to what Britain's actions would be if the federation failed to

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[296] U.N. Doc. S/9726, at pt. 2 as cited in Edward Gordon, "Resolution of the Bahrain Dispute," *The American Journal of International Law* 65, no. 3 (1971): 560-80, 563; Bahrain Report, at p. 13 as cited in Edward Gordon, "Resolution of the Bahrain Dispute," *The American Journal of International Law* 65, no. 3 (1971): 560-80, 563.

[297] Rosemarie Said Zahlan notes that the Shah unilaterally called for the referendum, but that documents regarding his position on Bahrain were sealed until after his death because of Iranians' potentially negative reception. See Zahlan, *Making of the Modern Gulf States* (1989).

[298] "Record of Conversation in Bahrain on Sunday 7 February 1971," 8 February 1971. G.15.a. Papers of Sir Wm Luce, Special Collections University of Exeter.

[299] "Constitutional Development of the UAE" 11 August 1970. Richard Holmes Collection. Middle East Archive, St. Antony's College, Oxford.

materialize. Luce responded that the decision to withdraw "remained firm" whatever the outcome.[300]

With Britain's insistence on withdrawal, and Bahrain's determination to be independent becoming increasingly evident, Saudi Arabia capitulated. In May 1971, Bahrain decided to send an emissary to ask for King Faisal's permission to leave the Union.[301] As late as June, Faisal continued to insist to Luce that a Gulf Union must include Bahrain.[302] As the date for British withdrawal neared, it appeared that the creation of a Union would be no more likely than it had been 3 years before when Britain announced its plans. Luce persisted and finally received confirmation from Sheikh Sabah of Kuwait that the "Saudis and Kuwaitis should be prepared to contemplate a smaller arrangement."[303] In August 1971, Bahrain finally declared its independence. Three weeks later, Qatar followed suit.

In many ways, this decision by Bahrain and Qatar tied Faisal's hands. Were he to object openly to the establishment of a subsequent union on the basis of Qatar and Bahrain's independence, he risked being seen as the cause of a union's failure. This would have been in direct opposition to what he had initially stated as his reasons for supporting a union of nine: that he did not believe a union would succeed, and this his support for a union of nine would prevent Saudi Arabia for being blamed for what he

[300] "Record of Conversation in Kuwait on 10 February, 1971," G.20 Gulf Tour, Jan/Feb. 1971: (b) records of conversation, etc. Papers of Sir Wm Luce, Special Collections, University of Exeter.
[301] "Record of Conversation in Bahrain on Wednesday 19 May, 1971," May 20, 1971. Papers of Sir Wm Luce, Special Collections, University of Exeter.
[302] "Record of Meeting in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Cairo on Friday 28 May, 1971," June 1, 1971. G.22. Papers of Sir Wm. Luce, Special Collections, University of Exeter.
[303] "Record of Meeting in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Kuwait on Thursday 20 May, 1971," May 20, 1971. G.22. Papers of Sir Wm. Luce, Special Collections, University of Exeter.

considered to be the likely failure of the union after its establishment.[304] Only the seven smaller emirates, then, remained to establish a union.

The remaining Trucial States had, by that time reconciled themselves to a Union and as the British withdrawal date seemed to be closing in, they chose unity over insecure individual independence. On December 3, 1971 six of the remaining emirates ended their special treaty relations with Britain and established the United Arab Emirates. Only Ras al-Khaimah resisted. But Sheikh Saqr's resolution to maintain his independence until the Abu Musa and Tunbs island dispute was resolved faltered when Iran established new facts on the ground. Iran invaded the islands with military force and Ras al-Khaimah could not defend its own claims. Nearly two months later, Saqr signed the constitution and joined the United Arab Emirates.

In truth, the groundwork had been created decades before. Britain's establishment of the Trucial Council and the cooperation between the seven smaller emirates through the Trucial States Development Office had established basic shared government apparatuses and shared economic dependence on Abu Dhabi. Bahrain and Qatar, though linked with the other emirates via the British Residency, had never been fully incorporated into the power-sharing structures Britain had created in order to mitigate Arab nationalist incursions. Ultimately, all parties—Britain, the Trucial States, Saudi Arabia, and Iran decided that none of them could risk being responsible for the

[304] "Note by HM Ambassador Jedda of his call with PA Doha on Shaikh Ahmad on 19 March," W. Morris (Ambassador to Saudi Arabia). March 19, 1970. TNA.

failure of a federation, either for reasons of prestige and Arab nationalist pride, or for the security of the region.

Chapter 6: Security, 1951-1976

Britain's withdrawal from the Gulf left a significant question unanswered regarding the future of the Trucial States. Without Britain's strong military presence to safeguard their territories, who would fill the role as the guarantor of their sovereignty? From the beginning of its treaty-based relationship with the Arab Gulf rulers, Britain had demonstrated its commitment to maintaining the rulers' independence in pursuit of the British Empire's own interests in stability in the Persian Gulf. Initially, this policy protected British trade routes with India, and later protected Britain's economic and defense interests in the Persian Gulf and East of Suez. The Trucial sheikhs were not ready to take up their own defense on the scale required to protect themselves. Even with a unified defense agreement, they did not have sufficient populations to build up a force capable of defending or even deterring attacks; furthermore, their indigenous military institutions were new, untested, and not yet fully organized. The most obvious Western power capable of taking up the role was the United States, but the American government had declared that it had no intention of stepping in to take over British commitments.[305]

The surprising solution came in the form of the two regional powers that posed the greatest threat to the Trucial States: Saudi Arabia and Iran. Both states had been at odds with several of the Trucial rulers over territorial disputes, and both the Shah and the

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[305] Memorandum of Conversation, "US/Kuwaiti Relations," Dec. 11, 1968. NSF Country File: "Kuwait: Cables and Memos." LBJL. A member of the State Department told the visiting Kuwaiti amir that, "The US has no plans to take the unique place the British once held. The British position developed under circumstances that do not exist today…."

Saudi king sought to establish their own states as the unchallenged military and political force in the region. From the outset, the Foreign Office was determined to bring Saudi Arabia and Iran into the negotiation process and obtain their support for the future Union. This policy eventually evolved to include military and financial support from Western governments to support the two states as the local guardians and "twin pillars" of the Persian Gulf.

Such a policy allowed for the regionalization of responsibility for the Persian Gulf. It also helped to resolve some of the potential hazards that would have been created by a continuing Western military presence. As was the case in other areas of British withdrawal and Union building in the Trucial States, Arab nationalism continued to be in the forefront of the minds of the Trucial Sheikhs, and particularly of Sheikh Zayid, who would highlight the difficulties that Arab nationalism posed to his sheikhdom and the future of the Union whenever conflict between himself and the Foreign Office arose on the question of security.

When the Foreign Office proposed that the local security could be assumed by a reorganized version of the British-formulated and officered Trucial Oman Scouts, Zayid vehemently opposed the idea. He believed that such a move would leave the Union open to criticism and attack from nationalists. Instead, he preferred to take a longer view, which emphasized the need for the Emirates' Union forces to be established under solely Union auspices, thereby eliminating a potential point of vulnerability and criticism from both outside and within the Emirates.

Zayid's arguments won the day, and on December 3, 1971, the Union Defense Force existed as a separate force from that of the Trucial Oman Scouts. The Scouts were only absorbed into the Union Defense Force in 1976, well after the Union had demonstrated its ability to be a viable state. Such a decision had been made possible by the change of Saudi Arabian and Iranian policy toward the Emirates over the course of 1968-71. For both Iran and Saudi Arabia, they had to grapple with the problem of nationalism in determining their stances towards the new Union. King Faisal of Saudi Arabia had to determine whether or not giving up his territorial and political claims to parts of Abu Dhabi outweighed the risk of being seen as a contributor to the failure of the Union. For the Shah, he had to consider whether he could risk giving up some of Iran's claims to islands in the Persian Gulf, including that of Bahrain, in exchange for financial support from Western powers to strengthen his own military. In the end, both Saudi Arabia and Iran would determine that it was in their best interests to support the Union.

The current chapter looks at the development of the security policy that allowed for the creation of the United Arab Emirates in 1971 in light of the withdrawal of British military commitments. It begins with an overview of the British forces in the Persian Gulf prior to withdrawal and particularly focuses on the creation and jurisdiction of the most important security force in the Trucial States during the time: the Trucial Oman Scouts. This is followed with an examination of the tension created by the Foreign Office's desire to quickly establish a local security force before Britain's scheduled evacuation from the Gulf, and the local rulers' hesitation to link its security forces directly with a British institution. The plan from the Foreign Office consisted of

reconstituting the Trucial Oman Scouts as the cornerstone of the new Union's defense forces. From the perspectives of the Trucial Sheikhs, and especially that of Sheikh Zayid in Abu Dhabi, such an initiative would undermine the very security the new state sought by inviting criticism from the very Arab states' whose support the Union would need if it were going to be seen as a legitimate, independent, Arab nation. Finally, the chapter traces the evolution of the shift from Iran and Saudi Arabia as rivals for influence in the Gulf to partners sharing the custodianship of Gulf stability.

THE BRITISH MILITARY PRESENCE IN THE ARAB GULF

In the nineteenth century Britain's primary military presence came in the form of the Persian Gulf Squadron, when it began patrolling and stationing there in 1821. The Squadron was established in 1821 at the behest of the Political Resident under the Government of Bombay. The main focus of its duties was to patrol with an eye to protecting British ships and trade in the vicinity of India and the Persian Gulf. Over the course of the nineteenth century, as British and Arab Gulf rulers' interests began increasingly to overlap, and particularly as Arab rulers sought British intervention on their behalf in inter-emirate rivalries.[306] The squadron was headquartered at various

[306] See especially James Onley, "Britain and the Gulf Shaikhdoms, 1820-1971: The Politics of Protection," *Occasional Paper, no. 4* (Georgetown Center for International and Regional Studies, 2009), 1-44. Onley argues that the British naval squadron in the Persian Gulf was there in part at the invitation of the Gulf rulers themselves who sought British intervention and mediation in internal rivalries. While this is true, it has also been demonstrated in multiple volumes that the naval squadron was used to enforce British interests and policies that were in opposition to Arab rulers' wishes. For examples of this, see Heard-Bey, *From Trucial States to United Arab Emirates* (2007), 297-99; Kazim, *United Arab Emirates* (2000); and Kelly, *Britain and the Persian Gulf* (1968).

locations in the Persian Gulf as the British role there shifted from one focused on Indian trade in the nineteenth century, to one of protecting British strategic and oil interests in the Arab states in the twentieth century. In 1935, the squadron's base shifted to the Ras al-Jufair in Bahrain, where it remained until the British withdrawal from the Persian Gulf in December 1971.[307]

As long as Britain's chief interests in the Persian Gulf revolved around the stability of its trade with India, the naval squadron served as the main enforcer of British power within the Gulf as well as the chief deterrent to prospective belligerent regional powers. The discovery of oil in several of the Gulf states and the expansion of British reliance on its air force in the 1930s, however, shifted British military strategy in the Persian Gulf to one focused on the territorial integrity of its Arab client states.[308] The early discoveries of oil in Kuwait and Bahrain, in 1931 and 1938, and the belief that significant wells would be found in the other emirates, increased Britain's need for a stronger military presence on the Arab side of the Gulf.

British officials became increasingly convinced that the security of the Gulf emirates was integral to British economic interests. Development of internal

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[307] Onley, *Occasional Paper, no. 4* (2009): 5. Previously, as Onley notes, the squadron was located at Qishm Island and Henjam Island previous to being stationed in Bahrain. From 1949 onward, the United States also headquartered three ships from its Middle East naval force at Jufair and leased office space from the British Naval Command there. See Anthony H. Cordesman, *Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates: Challenges of Security* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997), 38.

[308] Zahlan, *Origins of the United Arab Emirates* (1978), 92-106 describe the creation of the air-route and the establishment of an air base at Sharjah. The Sharjah air base was first a key stop over for both the Royal Air Force and the commercial "Imperial Airways" line, though it eventually became solely an RAF base. Anthony H. Cordesman, *The Gulf and the Search for Strategic Stability: Saudi Arabia, the Military Balance in the Gulf, and Trends in the Arab-Israeli Military Balance* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1984), 415. Colonel Tom Walcott, "The Trucial Oman Scouts, 1955 to 1971: An Overview," *Asian Affairs* 37, no. 1 (2006): 17-30, 18. Walcott served in the Trucial Oman Scouts in the Persian Gulf in 1962-64 as an Intelligence Officer.

infrastructure and social services of the Arab Gulf states served as one part of the Foreign Office's strategy to encourage stability in the area. The financial contributions from the Emirati governments, which paid for these projects, came largely from the royalties paid to them through their concessionary agreements with petroleum companies there.[309] Concession agreements and payments made for exploration were based on the rulers' ability to maintain their legal claims to the territories under exploration.

The link between economic wealth and territorial boundaries created numerous points of contention along the border lines throughout the emirates. The most significant of these involved the Buraimi Oases, to which the Omani, Saudi, and Abu Dhabi governments all laid claim.[310] The region of Buraimi oasis consisted of a collection of villages located on the northern edge of Oman at the border of Abu Dhabi. Saudi Arabia's own claims to Buraimi were based on tribal alliances between the Saudi Arabian government and the Buraimi population and Saudi's historical exercise of authority and patronage in the region.[311] When it appeared likely that substantial quantities of oil would be discovered in Buraimi in 1951, all three governments asserted their claims to the area with force.

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309 Footnote from previous chapters re: financing and rental agreements.

310 Kelly, *International Affairs* 32, no. 3 (1956): 318-26.; Petersen, *International History Review* 14, no. 1 (1992): 71-91.

311 Kelly, *Arabia, the Gulf, and the West* (1980), 64-87 gives extensive detail about the history of the claims to Buraimi and negotiations between Britain, Saudi, and Abu Dhabi; Kelly, *International Affairs* 32, no. 3 (1956): 319-20.



Map 4: The Buraimi Oasis[312]

Britain viewed the hostilities as a threat to both the economic stability of the Trucial States as well as a threat to Britain's role as the foremost Western power in the region. While Britain viewed Buraimi as the shared territory of Oman and Abu Dhabi, the Eisenhower government "tacitly" approved ARAMCO's support and encouragement of the Saudi claims that potentially would have increased the American oil production in the Middle East.[313] The expansion of Saudi Arabia's sovereignty would thus impact not only the purse strings of the British government, but also Britain's prestige.

[312] Kelly, *International Affairs* 32, no. 4 (1956): 319.
[313] Petersen, *International History Review* 14, no. 1 (1992): 71-2.

To protect the boundaries of Abu Dhabi and Oman, the Foreign Office established a local, ground-based military force in 1951. The Trucial Oman Levies drew soldiers largely from Omani tribes and staffed officers from Jordan's Arab Legion under a British Commander. Though the force began small, with only sixty-five men in 1951, it rapidly increased to a force of more than 500 by 1954.[314] Following clashes between the Levies and Saudi forces at Buraimi in 1955, the force was reconstituted the Trucial Oman Scouts, an all voluntary army with officers and senior ranking soldiers from the British army. The Scouts continued to expand into the 1960s to incorporate as many as five rifle squadrons, a headquarter squadron, and various subsidiary troops to operate services such as a small hospital, training schools, and transport. By the mid-1960s, the Trucial Oman Scouts numbered approximately 1,400 in total, and worked frequently in cooperation with Oman's Armed forces and elements of the British regulars.[315]

The role of the Trucial Oman Scouts expanded from its work as a force defending Omani and Abu Dhabi claims to Buraimi to include the maintenance of general internal security throughout the Trucial Coast and also to prevent armed incursions and infiltration by adjacent states.[316] To the latter end, squadrons were headquartered at Sharjah. They were also stationed at Manama in Bahrain, at a fort in Buraimi and the Omani frontier, and another at Mirfa, near the Tarif oil field in Abu Dhabi. They also

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[314] Walcott, *Asian Affairs* 37, no. 1 (2006): 17-30, 19.

[315] Ibid., 19-20. The exact non-British composition of the Trucial Oman Scouts in May 1960 consisted of approximately: 600 soldiers from Muscat and Oman, 450 from the Trucial States and 100 of Pakistani, Adeni, Somali, and Baluchi origin, for a total of 1,150 soldiers. "Composition of Trucial Oman Scouts," Minute by J. F. Walker, May 25, 1960. FO 370/149048. TNA.

[316] This new internal role was made possible by the relative peace over the question of Buraimi following Scout successes against Saudi forces in 1956. "Trucial Oman Scouts: Legal Framework of T.O.S.," Minute by the Foreign Office, July 8, 1959. FO 371/140184. TNA.

included a coastal patrol, which inspected sea vessels that might carry arms smuggled from Saudi Arabia and Qatar into the Omani frontier.[317]

All combined, the Trucial Oman Scouts formed the bulk of the military force in the Trucial Coast. It provided internal protection in cooperation with local forces. But it also served as a detterant to any outside powers—not only because of its size, but also because it was a British force. Any conflict with the Oman Scouts had the potential to draw in the full political and military weight of the British Empire.

LOCAL AND IMPERIAL FORCES

Britain's presence as a military power and protector created tensions within the Trucial States from their inception. Britain's treaty relations with the local rulers gave Britain extensive rights in the foreign affairs of the Arab Gulf states, but their ability to operate within the Trucial States' territories was limited, at least in theory, to the express permission of the local rulers. The Trucial Oman Scouts, though providing a valuable service to the rulers in terms of boundary disputes and general policing efforts, came to become a point of contention toward the end of Britain's tenure in the Persian Gulf. By then, the spread of Arab nationalism and the Rulers' need to demonstrate their sovereignty and independent strength in light of Britain's forthcoming withdrawal led to greater conflict about what the future role of the Trucial Oman Scouts would be.

[317] Colonel Tom Wolcott, "The Trucial Oman Scouts, 1955 to 1971: An Overview," *Asian Affairs* 37, no. 1 (2006): 17-30, 21-23.

Relations between the Trucial rulers and the Trucial Oman Scouts were largely cordial and cooperative throughout the Scouts' existence. In 1956, the Trucial Scouts successfully defended Abu Dhabi and Oman's claims to Buraimi against Saudi forces. In subsequent years, the Scouts continued to patrol the area in order to prevent instability in Oman from spilling into Abu Dhabi.[318] In other cases, the Trucial Oman Scouts provided valuable internal support to the local police forces, and the ruler of Dubai even offered to finance the expansion of the Scouts' police force.[319] The police forces of the Emirates were all too small to effectively police large demonstrations and gatherings. The police force in Dubai, for example, only consisted of approximately 300 policemen as late as 1967; that of Sharjah included only 57 men.[320] Ras al-Khaimah had developed a force of 157 policemen, but the smaller emirates could not boast of any substantial police force in the late 'sixties; in fact, Fujairah, Umm al Qaiwain, and Ajman only began training small police forces with support from Abu Dhabi in 1968-69.[321] Much of the time, the Trucial Oman Scouts served the interests of both the Arab rulers and those of Britain.

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[318] The Sultan of Oman's rule was threatened by a rebel named Imam Ghalib ibn ᶜAli, who sought to break away from Omani rule. He received support from Saudi Arabia, who sought to encourage instability near Buraimi and re-gain control over the Omani side of the oasis. See Wolcott, "The Trucial Oman Scouts," *Asian Affairs* (2006): 19; and Anthony H. Cordesman, *Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, and the UAE: Challenges of Security* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997), 124-25.

[319] Letter from M. Man (Political Resident, Bahrain) to A. R. Walmsley, (Arabian Department, FO). March 10, 1962. FO 371/163045. TNA. When the War Office refused to provide additional funds for the purposes of expanding the Trucial Oman Scouts' police branch, the ruler of Dubai offered to finance the difference in cost, as policing was "…a primary function of the force."

[320] "Trucial States Intelligence Report No. 024," June 26, 1967. FCO 8/901. TNA; "Extracts from Mr. L. A. Hicks, Deputy Overseas Police Adviser, Foreign Office/Commonwealth Office's Report of Visit to Bahrain, Qatar and the Trucial States," FO 8/905. TNA.

[321] "Extracts from Mr. L. A. Hicks," FO 8/905. TNA; "Abu Dhabi and Fujairah," Letter from J. L. Bullard (Political Agent, Dubai) to M. S. Weir (Political Resident, Bahrain). June 3, 1969. FCO 8/1218. TNA.

Occasionally, though, the Scouts' exercise of power could create difficult and potentially explosive situations between the British Residency and the Rulers. At the simplest level, conflict arose out of questions surrounding the jurisdictional divisions of labor between the Rulers' personal forces and police forces and those of the Trucial Oman Scouts. The problem of cooperation and jurisdiction ranged from speculation about potential traffic and crime problems in the Buraimi Oasis to more serious questions of murder and deportation of criminals.[322] In one case, an Adeni man was accused of murder and had been arrested by the Trucial Oman Scouts. Upon his arrest, the Political Agent determined that the man was most likely mentally unstable and possibly unfit to plea. He wished to transport the man to an asylum, but needed to confer with Sheikh Zayid over whether or not the ruler of Abu Dhabi at the time, Sheikh Shakhbut, would allow for such an action given his generally suspicious attitude toward the exercise of British power.[323] Usually these problems were resolved quickly, though they required careful handling by the Political Agents and Resident.

Other encounters between the Trucial Oman Scouts and the rulers proved much more explosive. On August 27, 1960, Scouts stopped a vehicle during a road block and security checkpoint exercise. The car contained the Sheikh Rashid al-Nuaimi, the ruler of Ajman. Soldiers proceeded to hold him at gun point while they searched his vehicle and

[322] Letter, E. F. Henderson (Dubai, Political Agent) to M. C. Man (Bahrain, Political Resident). April 9, 1960. FO 371/149049. TNA. Henderson expressed concern that the rising amount of traffic at both Buraimi and Tarif would lead to potential accidents and wished for clarification on how to broach the question with Sheikh Zayid about the issue.

[323] See Minute, E. F. Henderson (Political Agent, Dubai) to J. A. Ford (Political Residency, Bahrain). November 22, 1960. FO 371/149053. TNA.

then searched his person. In summarizing the events, Political Agent Dubai Donald Hawley reflected on the danger of similar future encounters:

> …I am disturbed that, when our whole position in the Trucial States depends on our treaties with the Rulers, some of the officers are adopting so narrowly military an approach that incidents like this one are even possible. It is fortunately unprecedented; this sort of incident, however, especially, if it were to be repeated in Abu Dhabi, is likely to lead to a shortening of our period of tenure in the Trucial States.[324]

The incident was smoothed over with a sincere apology from the Scouts' commander and the Political Agent. But it was clear that the British force's presence in the Trucial States created potential for conflict.

The underlying tension that defined the relationship of the British military and the local rulers became significantly more pronounced with the rise of Arab nationalism and the British withdrawal. Arab nationalism had crept into the Persian Gulf beginning in the 1930s and was increasingly apparent in the region following the hey-day of pan-Arab nationalism in the 1950s and early 1960s.[325] As discussed in previous chapters, awareness of Arab nationalist ideology, and support for it from within the Arab Gulf states, grew in waves, following Gamal Abdel Nasser's nationalization of the Suez Canal in 1956, and his support for Republican forces in South Arabia. In 1967, the Arab-Israeli War, which ended in a resounding defeat for the Arab states and for Nasser's political career, weakened the value of Pan-Arabism as a workable political ideology. But it also strengthened anti-Western sentiment in the Arab populations throughout the Middle East.

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[324] "Complaint by Ruler of Ajman that he was held up at gun point, by a party of T.O.S., during and exercise on August 24," Minute by D. F. Hawley (Political Agent, Dubai) to G. H. Middleton (Political Resident, Bahrain). September 5, 1960. FO 371/149051. TNA.

[325] Kerr, *The Arab Cold War* (1971); Zahlan, *Palestine and the Gulf States* (2009).

The British defeat in Aden in November 1967 drove the reality of this sentiment home. Britain had been embroiled in a civil war in Yemen that had spilled over into the South Arabian federation and Britain's crown colony at Aden since 1962. As nationalist Republican forces gained the upper hand there, Britain planned a withdrawal from Aden in 1968. British troops were forced to evacuate on November 30, 1967.[326] Arab nationalism appeared to be moving closer and closer to the Arab Gulf.

While Britain's announcement only a month and a half later was based in large part on British economic problems, the threat of Arab nationalism and its potential for creating instability in the Trucial States most certainly shaped the way British policy makers envisioned their post-withdrawal role there. The Foreign Office's goal remained the long term independence and stability of the region. For Britain, the establishment of a strong and effective Union Defense Force to serve as a military deterrent to aggressive neighboring states would best be constituted through the restructuring of the Trucial Oman Scouts. Some of the Arab rulers, however, saw the Trucial Oman Scouts as too British an institution to provide the core of the Union's defense.

For years, the Political Residency staff had been concerned that the Scouts should be seen as a local force. In 1960, the Political Agent at Dubai, Donald Hawley, began pressing to increase the number of Arab officers in the Scouts and sending them to be trained in Britain, which he viewed as, "…a matter of some political importance…."[327]

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[326] For the foregoing, see: Dresch, *History of Modern Yemen* (2000); Gavin, *Aden under British Rule* (1975); Jones, *Britain and the Yemen Civil War* (2004); Walker, *Aden Insurgency* (2005).

[327] Letter from D. F. Hawley (Political Agent, Dubai) to G. H. Middleton (Bahrain, Political Resident) May 14, 1960. FO 371/149048. TNA.

At that time, British soldiers and personnel made up approximately ten percent of the total force. He stressed the need to begin the process of a future "Arabisation" of the Scouts.[328] The following Political Resident agreed, arguing that, "It has all along been our thesis that we should try to build up the [Trucial Oman Scouts] as a local force capable of winning the loyalty of the inhabitants of the Trucial States."[329]

This was the line that most British officials took when discussing the future organization of the Gulf military forces with the Sheikhs. Among themselves they were more candid about the perception of the Trucial Oman Scouts in the region and potentially the rest of the Middle East. The Political Agent at Dubai in 1969, Julian Bullard, in talking about the future of Britain's military presence after the withdrawal admitted that the Scouts would be, "…the one conspicuous British legacy after 150 years as the paramount power in the Trucial States."[330] He nevertheless believed that the Trucial Oman Scouts should continue to provide its services to the Gulf Union once it came into being.

Some of the local sheikhs were more cautious in their approach to British and British-organized forces in the area after 1971. Even when asking Britain to consider continuing its defense role in the Gulf after the withdrawal, Sheikh Isa of Bahrain insisted that though, "…a continued British military presence would be most welcome," he believed such an arrangement would be difficult in the face of Bahraini and general Arab

[328] Ibid.
[329] Letter from Morgen Man (Political Resident, Bahrain) to R. A. Beaumont (FO), June 28, 1960. FO 371/149049. TNA.
[330] "British Economic Aid to the Trucial States," Letter from Bullard (Political Agent, Dubai) to Weir (Political Resident, Bahrain). June 3, 1969. FCO 8/1218. TNA.

opinion.[331] The Bahraini government continued to resist open, permanent military arrangements with both Great Britain, and later, the United States well into the 1980s, rather than risk criticism for connections with Western powers.[332] While they valued the protection outside military forces could provide, the Arab rulers were acutely aware of the danger of appearing to rely too closely on Western protection.

The British withdrawal and the future of the Trucial Oman Scouts remained unresolved well into 1969, just two years before Britain was scheduled to leave the Persian Gulf. In a report prepared by Major-General John Willoughby, the British government proposed the establishment of a Union Defense Force based on the Trucial Oman Scouts, with the addition of a small eighteen-plane air force and a twelve patrol boats for a naval branch.[333] To the Foreign Office, such a plan provided a quick and efficient solution to the problem of establishing a nascent military force capable of providing a deterrent to external aggressors and shore up internal policing. Stewart Crawford summarized this view in a report to his Political Agent at Abu Dhabi, Julian Bullard, saying: "It is fairly obvious that, in the short time scale ahead, the Scouts would

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[331] "Bahrain and the British Military Withdrawal," Letter from A. J. D. Stirling (Political Residency, Bahrain) to Stewart Crawford (Political Resident, Bahrain). FCO 8/979. TNA.

[332] Cordesman, *Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, and the UAE* (1997), 38. Cordesman notes that tensions existed between Bahrain and the US over maintaining formal agreements with the US Navy stationed at Manama. Agreements were made unofficial in the late 1970s. For more on the post-withdrawal dilemma of the Gulf States, as they tried to balance their need for outside security forces and the potential danger of being too closely tied to the Western states that provided that security, also see Cordesman, *The Gulf and the Search for Strategic Stability* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1986), especially pp. 59-61.

[333] Philip Darby, "Beyond East of Suez," *International Affairs* 46, no. 4 (1970):655-69, 660.

have to be one of the main sources [for the first Union battalion] at least for the senior personnel."[334]

Sheikh Zayid viewed such a move as politically dangerous. The ruler of Abu Dhabi insisted that the Trucial Oman Scouts could not be seen as the core institution of the future Union Defense Force. In his discussions with Bullard, he stressed that if a Scouts were incorporated in the first Union Defense Force battalion, it would, "involve the Union force, in its first stages in being too closely associated with British military institutions and that use of TOS facilities could attract political criticism from other Arab countries… and so compromise the political future of the Union."[335] Instead, he proposed that the Union should create the first battalion using only Union resources, giving it the outward appearance of being "wholly independent" of Britain.[336]

For Crawford and members in the Foreign Office, this argument did not hold water. They saw Zayid's attempts to draw personnel from the Scouts for separate Union facilities as a dangerous move that would "weaken the TOS" and leave the Emirates without a "viable Union force" at the time when such a force would be necessary for defending the emerging Union.[337] Drawing on arguments the Residency had used before, Crawford urged Bullard to remind Zayid that the Scouts had been undergoing Arabization over the last decade, with increasing numbers of non-commissioned and

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[334] Attachment to "The Union Defence Force and the TOS," Letter from Stewart Crawford (Political Resident, Bahrain) to Julian Bullard (Political Agent, Dubai), April 28, 1969. FCO 8/983. TNA.
[335] "Points to be made concerning HMG's attitude towards Union Defence Force and TOS," Draft by Stewart Crawford (Political Resident, Bahrain). FCO 8/983 TNA.
[336] Ibid.
[337] "Points to be made concerning HMG's attitude towards Union defence force and TOS," Draft by Stewart Crawford (Political Resident, Bahrain). FCO 8/983. TNA.

commissioned officers from the Trucial States. Furthermore, the administrative and financial burden of the Trucial Oman Scouts had been shared by the rulers of the Trucial States. For these reasons, the Scouts were, to Crawford's mind, a "local force".[338]

Zayid remained unconvinced. Arab nationalism remained a specter hanging over the formation of the Emirates, and was a greater immediate threat to the Union than other potential adversaries. If the Union did not create a military force seen as a legitimate, "native growth", at least in the beginning, then the future Union would be at risk from propaganda. In a meeting with the Secretary of State, Zayid persisted in his contention that the Union needed to build its first battalion with its own resources and integrate the Trucial Oman Scouts at a later date.[339]

For much of the time between 1968 and 1971, both perspectives had a ring of truth. The pragmatic approach that concerned British officials was, in many ways, a tactic designed to preserve the British legacy as they left. While a lasting Union in the Persian Gulf would be ideal, the fact remained that Britain's withdrawal from East of Suez marked a retreat from British responsibility for the Trucial States beyond December 1971. For Zayid, however, the Union's stability and future success was essential for his own political future. His own legitimacy, and that of the Union as an Arab state, depended on the acceptance of the Union as independent and unfettered by British institutions and trappings.

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[338] Ibid. As mentioned above, the rulers had helped to finance the Trucial Oman Scouts throughout their existence and had even paid additional funds in times of economic necessity. Crawford also noted that the Commandant of the Scouts reported to the Trucial Council, which had been chaired by the rulers since 1958.

[339] Telegram, Crawford (Political Resident, Bahrain) to FCO. May 6, 1969. FCO 8/983. TNA.

FROM AGGRESSORS TO "TWIN PILLARS"

The problem of balancing public perception and the need for expediency in creating the Union Defense Force remained unresolved until Britain and the Union overcame the two greatest obstacles to the Union's success. The Trucial Oman Scouts' very reason for existence had rested on the need to protect the Trucial States from aggression by Saudi Arabia and deter any efforts by Iran to extend power to the Arab coast. Support for the Union from both sides had been given on contingencies. For Saudi Arabia, the Union's formation required the inclusion of both Bahrain and Qatar in order to balance the strength of Zayid's position as an economic power in the Union. Iran required recognition of its claims to Bahrain and the Gulf islands also claimed by Sharjah and Ras al-Khaimah. These issues weighed heavily on the progress of the negotiations for a union and gained increasing urgency in the last two years of Britain's term in the Persian Gulf.

The deadlock between Britain and Zayid remained a significant roadblock to the future of the Union until it gained the recognition and support of both Saudi Arabia and Iran, which was only granted in 1971. By that time, the new strategic defense of the Persian Gulf had been determined and would rely heavily on the strategy of the "twin pillars" of Saudi Arabia and Iran as guarantors of the region.[340]

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[340] Several works have dealt with the issue of the "twin pillars" as an extension of the Nixon Doctrine, which gave *carte blanche* to Saudi Arabia and Iran as the two guarantors of Western interests in the Persian Gulf. See Cordesman, *Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, and the UAE* (1997); Cordesman, *The Gulf and the Search for Strategic Stability* (1986); J. E. Peterson, *Defending Arabia* (London: Croom Helm, 1986), which is more concerned with the problems created in the Gulf by the fall of the Shah in 1978 and the changes since the Carter administration, but provides a useful analysis of the development of the "twin pillar" strategy.

The British Foreign Office had begun to deliberate on the necessity of cooperation from Saudi Arabia and Iran well before Harold Wilson announced a date for British withdrawal from the Persian Gulf. Even in April 1967, policymakers consider the two regional powers as significant determinants in the success or failure of a union or federation among the Trucial States. British policy in support of a union among the Trucial States, in whatever form, would

> …depend for its chances of success on the Saudis and Iranians developing a minimum understanding both towards ourselves and each other. Saudi Arabia and Iran are the two powers most directly concerned in the future of the Protected States; they are also the two best placed to bring force to bear in the area, the Saudis by virtue of their commanding geographical position and the Iranians through their growing naval supremacy in the Gulf. If they were at loggerheads with each other, local stability would be unlikely to survive our departure. Conversely, if they were to act in concert, or at least with mutual understanding, they could do much to ensure a peaceful transition to whatever new system follows our withdrawal. It will therefore be essential for us to secure Saudi cooperation and at least Iranian acquiescence as our policy evolves; and to bring

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Also of great value is Faisal bin Salman al-Saud, *Iran, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf: Power Politics in Transition, 1968-1971* (New York: I. B. Tauris, 2003) which examines the "twin pillars" in the context of local and regional pressures.

Other works are largely concerned not with the creation of the Twin Pillar strategy, but rather the problems created by the strategy in 1973 when oil prices sky-rocketed due to the Arab oil embargo. The embargo was put in place in response to American and European support for Israel in the October 1973 war with Egypt and Syria. Following independence, the Trucial States joined OPEC to gain greater control over the pricing and production of oil. During the embargo, oil production in the Arab Gulf declined by approximately five percent, which set off an energy crisis that lasted through the 1970s and created a sense of disillusionment among those who viewed this as the natural consequence of the British withdrawal from the region. For more on the oil embargo and its impact on the world economy, see Yergin, *The Prize* (1991). Bin Hethlain, *Saudi Arabia and the US Since 1962* (2010) is one example of a work that ignores the creation of the "twin pillar" policy, despite the significance of its evolution in the period covered in the first third of his study. Similarly, Howard Teicher and Gayle Radley Teicher, *Twin Pillars to Desert Strom: America's Flawed Vision in the Middle East from Nixon to Bush* (New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1993) spends almost no time discussing the development of the policy, saying simply that "the Nixon administration formulated a strategy that became known as the Twin Pillars policy, whereby Iran and Saudi Arabia were anointed as the protectors of U.S. interests in the Gulf," pp. 23. This is not only overly brief, but fairly inaccurate. Finally, Kelly, *Arabia, the Gulf, and the West* (1980), writing in the wake of the energy crisis as well as the Iranian revolution reflects the frustration of those who believed Britain should have stayed on to maintain more effective control in the region.

> home to them how important their relations with each other are going to be, for their own interest as well as for ours and our present protégés.[341]

The entire future of the Trucial States rested on the cooperation of two rivals for regional supremacy.

The Trucial Sheikhs themselves recognized the potential danger of either state becoming too powerful along the Trucial Coast. In reporting on the rulers' opinions about the British withdrawal, a British Intelligence Officer from the Trucial Oman Scouts stated that their reactions indicated that, "under no circumstances," would they accept Iran in a role as Britain's replacement.[342] Similarly, Saudi Arabia would be less unacceptable, but was not a desirable solution.[343]

Both the Shah and the King had the potential to destroy the stability and sovereignty of the Trucial Sheikhs in their views. Between Saudi Arabia and the Trucial rulers, especially Sheikh Zayid, the main problem remained that of disputed boundaries. Buraimi had been the main flashpoint for disagreements between Saudi Arabia and the emirates; but there were also disagreements over the oil well at Tarif.

The dispute over Buraimi had reached something of a stasis by 1966. At that time, the British government issued a formal warning to Saudi Arabia against taking further action at Buraimi. From that point onward, the Buraimi dispute took place in negotiations between British policymakers and King Faysal and Sheikh Zayid. No substantial

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[341] "Long-Term Policy in the Persian Gulf," Note by the Foreign Office. April 18, 1967. CAB 148/57. TNA.
[342] "Trucial States Intelligence Report No. 2 of 17 January, 1968." FCO 9/901. TNA.
[343] Ibid.

agreements were made, except to establish a neutral zone near Buraimi that limited Abu Dhabi's drilling for oil.

Once the British withdrawal became an imminent reality, King Faisal became increasingly adamant that the boundary disputes were resolved. In 1970, Faysal invited Zayid to Saudi Arabia to open direct discussions on a variety of issues, including Buraimi. Faysal demanded that the Abu Dhabi Petroleum Company end all drilling near Zarrara, an area within the disputed areas that Saudi claimed for itself, but which Britain recognized as unquestionably Abu Dhabi's own territory.[344] The talks ended without the rulers reaching any satisfactory compromise.

Faysal remained upset about boundaries and the extent of Zayid's power in the future union. During the course of a meeting with the British Ambassador to Saudi Arabia and the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Faysal complained that Zayid was still drilling in the disputed "no-man's land."[345] When Ambassador Morris suggested Faysal give up boundary dispute for the sake of regional stability, Faysal responded that if a solution did not materialize, Saudi Arabia was willing to use force to, "recover the occupied areas."[346]

In the following year, the Foreign Office changed its tactics in order to align Faysal's interests more closely with the success of the Union. Faisal agreed to give up portions of his claim to the areas around Buraimi in exchange for coastal territory that would give the Kingdom access to the lower Gulf. When Zayid balked, the Foreign

[344] Kelly, *Britain, Arabia and the West* (1980), 75-77.
[345] "Record of conversation between the King of Saudi Arabia and the Parliamentary Under-Secretary [Luard] at Riyadh on 4 May, 1970," May 11, 1970. FCO 1016/740. TNA.
[346] Ibid.

Office began to press him to make concessions to Faysal.[347] Zayid could no more be seen to prevent the establishment of a Union than Faysal could. Ultimately, he agreed to pause drilling in the disputed territories. With this promise secured, Saudi Arabia withdrew its demands for immediate resolution to the boundary dispute, making it possible for the Foreign Office and the Trucial States to concern themselves with negotiations over constitutional aspects of the future Union.

Iran presented another significant obstacle for Britain. The Shah had begun using Iran's oil wealth in the 1960s to build up its forces and establish itself as the foremost military power in the Gulf.[348] By 1968, the Shah had developed sufficient naval power to demonstrate its primacy in the Persian Gulf, but it required the islands of Abu Musa and the Tunbs to secure the entrance through the Straits of Hormuz. The islands, however, were also claimed by Ras al-Khaimah and Sharjah, and Britain's treaty relations with the Trucial States committed the Great Britain to protect the emirates' territorial integrity. Without the consent of the Trucial Rulers, Britain could not transfer the territory to Iran.

Iran had gained the goodwill of the British government by 1970, when the Shah quietly assented to an international resolution to its other outstanding claim over Bahrain. Iran had long-standing ties to Bahrain through trade and territorial occupation prior to the nineteenth century. Disagreement about the sovereignty of Bahrain was settled by Britain when they backed the al-Khalifah family as the legitimate rulers of the island in 1820.

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[347] Kelly, *Arabia, the Gulf and the West* (1980), 85-87.

[348] Iran had long viewed Britain's negotiations with the ruling family of Bahrain, the al-Khalifah, as illegitimate because it superceded their own claims to the island, which they argued had been part of Iranian territory for centuries. Alvandi, "Muhammad Reza Pahlavi and the Bahrain Question," *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* (2010): 159-77.

When Wilson announced the British withdrawal in 1968, the Shah stated that he would withhold his support for the Union unless and until the island disputes were settled. Following several talks between the Foreign Office and Mohammad Reza Shah, he quietly agreed to forego his rights to Bahrain if a United Nations-administered plebiscite determined that Bahrain preferred independence. The vote secured Bahrain's independence from Iran in 1970, and in August 1971, Bahrain became a sovereign nation.

The Shah was less cooperative on the question of the remaining islands. Britain warned the rulers of Sharjah and Ras al-Khaimah that without an agreement between them and Iran before the withdrawal date, they would be on their own to defend their claims. Sharjah relinquished its claims in exchange for an agreement that would allow Sharjah and Umm al-Qaiwain to receive a sum of money and a percentage of oil profits if oil were discovered.[349] Sheikh Saqr of Ras al-Khaimah, however, refused to heed Britain's suggestion.

Both the United States State Department and the British Foreign Office considered options for forcing an early solution to the Iran-islands dispute. Even in early discussions about Bahrain and the islands, US officials had been pressing Britain to find a way to establish Bahrain as an exchange for the Tunbs and Abu Musa. Without doing so, the State Department argued, the British were, "…[ignoring] the unignorable, i.e., Bahrein [*sic.*] as well as Tunb and Abu Musa islands. As we see it, only way the Shah can save face re: Bahrein would be via British decision that Tunb and Abu Musa belong

[349] Cordesman, *The Gulf and the Search for Strategic Stability* (1984), 417. Sharjah received nine annual payments of $3.5 million; when oil was found in 1972, Sharjah and Umm al-Qaiwain began to receive additional money.

to Iran…."[350] Such an argument failed to recognize the variety of opinions of the nine sheikhs in the Persian Gulf. Nevertheless, it proved to be the workable solution.

On November 30, only two days before Britain abrogated its treaties with the Trucial States, Iran occupied the islands by force. Britain did not take action to re-secure the islands, instead leaving Ras al-Khaimah to choose its own course of action. On December 2, the United Arab Emirates came into being; but Saqr refused to join in protest of Iran's actions and Britain's refusal to support Ras al-Khaimah's claim. For Britain, however, Iran's seizing of the islands was a small price to pay for Iran's cooperation in the security of the United Arab Emirates and the Persian Gulf.

[350] Telegram, Meyer to Secretary of State, March 15, 1968, NSF Country File Middle East, #136, Iran cables vol. 2, 1/66-1/69. LBJL.

Chapter 7: Conclusion

On December 2, 1971, Britain ended its treaty-based relationship with the last seven Trucial States remaining in the Persian Gulf. The following day, Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Fujairah, Ajman, and Umm al-Qaiwain all came together to officially for the United Arab Emirates. Though Ras al-Khaimah refused to join the Union at that time, it was clear to most that this would be a short-lived singular existence. When it became clear that no solution between Iran and Ras al-Khaimah would be forthcoming, Sheikh Saqr accepted his fate and signed onto the Union constitution, only two months later.

Britain's policy throughout its one hundred fifty year rule in the Persian Gulf had been the extension and preservation of its dominant position there. This was also Britain's aim when it left in 1971. In creating the United Arab Emirates, the British Government had certainly relinquished its stronghold over Trucial States. Legally, the rulers of the United Arab Emirates could make treaties and establish commercial ties with any other power, something which they had not been able to pursue before 1971 without explicit permission from the Political Resident. The defense of the United Arab Emirates and the other Gulf States, which had been entirely the purview of British naval, air, and land forces, was left in the hands Saudi Arabia and Iran, and to a lesser extent the Emirates themselves.

The act of withdrawal had been implemented with the goal of protecting British interests by staving off the rising tide of Arab nationalism that had risen in the wake of

Britain's imperial "moment" in the Arab world. As Britain had been forced to withdraw its presence from Palestine, Jordan, Egypt, and Iraq, it began to rely more heavily on the handful of sheikhdoms on the Arab coast of the Persian Gulf. The export of oil from the Persian Gulf, and Britain's visible military presence drew the Trucial States out into the regional politics of the region—and drew attention from other Arab states to the political and social circumstances in the Trucial States. The British military and advisory presence in the Trucial Coast created an opening for criticism from Arab leaders looking to expand their influence there. As early as the 1950s, Britain's very presence in the Persian Gulf had begun to create in the Trucial States many of the same problems there as it had elsewhere in the Arab world. By the end of the 1960s, it became apparent to policy makers that they could leave, or they could be forced out at potentially great expense.

The duality of Britain's situation in the Trucial States— the need to physically protect British interests, and the insecurity created by Britain's presence—became too precarious. The populations of the Emirates grew more aware of Arab nationalism. In Bahrain and Dubai, demonstrations against local economic and political difficulties came to take on outwardly anti-imperialist overtones. In other parts of the Trucial Coast, anti-British and anti-imperialist sentiment largely remained less organized, but nevertheless threatened on several occasions to rise to the surface.

The United Arab Emirates were formed in the years following the greatest activity of Arab nationalism in the wider Middle East. Its establishment nevertheless was shaped by the legacy of the Arab nationalist movement and its potential for revival in the face of continued British interference. The Trucial rulers, particularly Sheikhs Ahmed of Qatar,

Khalifah of Bahrain, and Zayid of Abu Dhabi, came to embrace Arab nationalisms potential for instability as a means for increasing their power in a post-Britain Gulf. For them, Arab nationalism provided a pivotal and persuasive argument in their negotiations with British officials. Once Bahrain was recognized by its own populations and the United Nations as an independent and sovereign state in 1970, there was sufficient evidence for the Khalifah to muster against British and Saudi Arabian pressure to join the Union. Denying the Bahraini people their right of self-determination in the face of overwhelming internal support and enthusiasm provided sufficient support for Khalifah's decision to forego the Union without open opposition from either Britain or Saudi Arabia. This also meant that Khalifah did not have to share his power within Bahrain with his rivals in Qatar and Abu Dhabi. Sheikh Ahmad was then able to use Bahrain's example to achieve the same goals for Qatar.

Sheikh Zayid utilized similar arguments throughout the Union negotiations in order to ensure his own position as the leading power among the Trucial States. This was most evident in his discussions with Britain on the future of the Trucial Oman Scouts vis-à-vis the Union Defense Forces. When the immediate threat of Saudi Arabia's and Iran's goals for domination of the Union fell to the wayside in favor of greater Gulf unity, Zayid achieved his goals for the creation of a Defense Force with Union resources, rather than drawing its strength from the British-created Scouts. The more immediate threat became the question of the Union's recognition as an Arab state in the wider Middle East, rather than one of territorial integrity. The Union Defense Force began, then, as a military force paid for and trained under Union auspices. Significantly, most of those resources came

from Abu Dhabi, the richest of the seven emirates. And the Trucial Oman Scouts remained a separate entity until they were finally absorbed in 1976—several years after the Union had become independent and had proven its ability to weather regional crises, at least in the short term.

The United Arab Emirates' formation and its subsequent perseverance was a surprise to many of the British officials who had worked towards its creation. Indeed, it may have even surprised some of the ruling sheikhs themselves, though they would have been unable to say so publicly.

Appendix A: The Provisional Constitution of the United Arab Emirates (English)

We, the Rulers of the Emirates of Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Ajman, Umm Al Qawain and Fujairah (1):

Whereas it is our desire and the desire of the people of our Emirates to establish a Union between these Emirates, to promote a better life, more enduring stability and a higher international status for the Emirates and their people;

Desiring to create closer links between the Arab Emirates in the form of an independent, sovereign, federal state, capable of protecting its existence and the existence of its members, in co-operation with the sister Arab states and with all other friendly states which are members of the United Nations Organisation and of the family of nations in general, on a basis of mutual respect and reciprocal interests and benefits;

Desiring also to lay the foundation for federal rule in the coming years on a sound basis, corresponding to the realities and the capacities of the Emirates at the present time, enabling the Union, so far as possible, freely to achieve its goals, sustaining the identity of its members providing that this is not inconsistent with those goals and preparing the people of the Union at the same time for a dignified and free constitutional life, and progressing by steps towards a comprehensive, representative, democratic regime in an Islamic and Arab society free from fear and anxiety;

And whereas the realization of the foregoing was our dearest desire, towards which we have bent our strongest resolution, being desirous of advancing our country and our people to the status of qualifying them to take appropriate place among civilized states and nations;

For all these reasons and until the preparation of the permanent Constitution for the Union may be completed, we proclaim before the Surpeme and Omnipotent Creator, and before all the peoples, our agreement to this provisional Constitution, to which our signatures were appended, which shall be implemented during the transitional period indicated in it;

May Allah, our Protector and Defender, grant us success.

Part One
The Union, Its Fundamental Constituents and Aims

Article 1

The United Arab Emirates is an independent, sovereign, federal state and is referred to hereafter in this Constitution as the Union. The Union shall consist of the following Emirates:-

Abu Dhabi – Dubai – Sharjah – Ajman – Umm al Qawain – Fujairah – Ras al-Khaimah.[351]

Any other independent Arab country may join the Union, provided that the Supreme Council agrees unanimously to this.

Article 2

The Union shall exercise [sovereignty] in matters assigned to it in accordance with this Constitution over all territory and territorial waters lying within the international boundaries of the member Emirates.

Article 3

The member Emirates shall exercise [sovereignty] over their own territories and territorial waters in all matters which are not within the jurisdiction of the Union as assigned in this Constitution.

Article 4

The Union may not cede its [sovereignty] or relinquish any part of its territories or waters.

Article 5

The Union shall have a Flag, an Emblem and a National Anthem. The Flag and the Emblem shall be prescribed by Law. Each Emirate shall retain its own flag for use within its territories.

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351 The original signatories of the Constitution did not include Ras al Khaimah, which adhered to the Union on 10 February, 1962. A new paragraph was added by a Declaration of Constitutional Amendment No. 1 (1972) which reads as follows:

> "In the event of the acceptance of a new member joining the Union, the Supreme Council of the Union shall determine the number of seats which will be allocated to that member in the National Assembly of the Union, being in addition to the number stipulated in Article 68 of this Constitution."

Article 6

The Union is a part of the Great Arab Nation, to which it is bound by the ties of religion, language, history and common destiny.

The people of the Union are one people, and one part of the Arab Nation.

Article 7

Islam is the official religion of the Union. The Islamic Shari'ah shall be a main source of legislation in the Union. The official language of the Union is Arabic.

Article 8

The citizens of the Union shall have a single nationality which shall be prescribed by law. When abroad, they shall enjoy the protection of the Union Government in accordance with accepted international principals.

No citizen of the Union may be deprived of his nationality nor may his nationality be withdrawn save in exceptional circumstances which shall be defined by Law.

Article 9

1. The Capital of the Union shall be established in an area allotted to the Union by the Emirates of Abu Dhabi and Dubai on the borders between them and it shall be given the name "Al Karama".
2. There shall be allocated in the Union budget for the first year the amount necessary to cover the expenses of technical studies and planning for the construction of the Capital. However, construction work shall begin as soon as possible and shall be completed in not more than seven years from the date of entry into force of this Constitution.
3. Until the construction of the Union Capital is complete, Abu Dhabi shall be the provisional headquarters of the Union.

Article 10

The aims of the Union shall be the maintenance of its independence and sovereignty, the [safeguard] of its security and stability, the defence against any aggression upon its existence of the existence of its member states, the protection of the rights and liabilities of the people of the Union, the achievement of close co-operation between the Emirates for their common benefit in realizing these aims and in promoting their prosperity and progress in all fields, the provision of a better life for all citizens together with respect by each Emirate for the independence and sovereignty of the other Emirates in their internal affairs within the framework of this Constitution.

Article 11

1. The Emirates of the Union shall form an economic and customs entity. Union Laws shall regulate the progressive stages appropriate to the achievement of this entity.

2. The free movement of all capital and goods between the Emirates of the Union is guaranteed and may not be restricted except by a Union Law.
3. All taxes, fees, duties and tolls imposed on the movement of goods from one member Emirate to the other shall be abolished.

Article 12

The foreign policy of the Union shall be directed towards support for Arab and Islamic causes and interests and towards the consolidation of the bonds of friendship and co-operation with all nations and peoples on the basis of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and ideal international standards.

Part Two
The Fundamental Social and Economic Basis of the Union

Article 13

The Union and the member Emirates shall co-operate, within the limits of their jurisdiction and abilities, in executing the provisions of this Part.

Article 14

Equality, social justice, ensuring safety and security and equality of opportunity for all citizens shall be the pillars of the Society. Co-operation and mutual mercy shall be a firm bond between them.

Article 15

The family is the basis of society. It is founded on morality, religion, ethics and patriotism. The law shall guarantee its existence, safeguard and protect it from corruption.

Article 16

Society shall be responsible for protecting childhood and motherhood and shall protect minors and others unable to look after themselves for any reason, such as illness or incapacity or old age or forced unemployment. It shall be responsible for assisting them and enabling them to help themselves for their own benefit and that of the community.

Such matters shall be regulated by welfare and social security legislations.

Article 17

Education shall be a fundamental factor for the progress of society. It shall by [compulsory] in its primary stage and free of charge at all stages, within the Union. The law shall prescribe the necessary plans for the propagation and spread of education at various levels and for the eradication of illiteracy.

Article 18

Private schools may be established by individuals and organisations in accordance with the provisions of the law, provided that such schools shall be subject to the supervision of the competent public authorities and to their directives.

Article 19

Medical care and means of prevention and treatment of diseases and epidemics shall be ensured by the community for all citizens.

The community shall promote the establishment of public and private hospitals, dispensaries and cure-houses.

Article 20

Society shall esteem work as a corner-stone of its development. It shall endeavour to ensure that employment is available for citizens and to train them so that they are prepared for it. It shall furnish the appropriate facilities for that by providing legislations protecting the rights of the employees and the interests of the employers in the light of developing international labour regulations.

Article 21

Private property shall be protected. Conditions relating thereto shall be laid down by Law. No one shall be deprived of his private property except in circumstances dictated by the public benefit in accordance with the provisions of the Law and on payment of a just compensation.

Article 22

Public property shall be inviolable. The protection of public property shall be the duty of every citizen. The Law shall define the cases in which penalties shall be imposed for the contravention of that duty.

Article 23

The natural resources and wealth in each Emirate shall be considered to be the public property of that Emirate. Society shall be responsible for the protection and proper exploitation of such natural resources and wealth for the benefit of the national economy.

Article 24

The basis of the national economy shall be social justice. It is founded on sincere co-operation between public and private activities. Its aim shall be the achievement of economic development, increase of productivity, raising the standards of living and the achievement of prosperity for citizens, all within the limits of Law.

The Union shall encourage co-operation and savings.

Part Three
Freedom, Rights and Public Duties

Article 25

All persons are equal before the law, without distinction between citizens of the union in regard to race, nationality, religious belief or social structures.

Article 26

Personal liberty is guaranteed to all citizens. No person may be arrested, searched, detained or imprisoned except in accordance with the provisions of law.

No person shall be subjected to torture or to degrading treatment.

Article 27

Crimes and punishments shall be defined by the law. No penalty shall be imposed for any act of commission or omission committed before the relevant law has been promulgated.

Article 28

Penalty is personal. An accused shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty in a legal and fair trial. The accused shall have the right to appoint the person who is capable to conduct his defence during the trial. The law shall prescribe the cases in which the presence of a counsel for defence shall be assigned.

Physical and moral abuse of an accused person is prohibited.

Article 29

Freedom of movement and residence shall be guaranteed to citizens within the limits of law.

Article 30

Freedom of opinion and expressing it verbally, in writing or by other means of expression shall be guaranteed within the limits of the law.

Article 31

Freedom of communication by post, telegraph or other means of communication and the secrecy thereof shall be guaranteed in accordance with law.

Article 32

Freedom to exercise religious worship shall be guaranteed in accordance with established customs, provided that it does not conflict with public policy or violate public morals.

Article 33

Freedom of assembly and establishing associations shall be granted within the limits of law.

Article 34

Every citizen shall be free to choose his occupation, trade or profession within the limits of law. Due consideration being given to regulations organising some of such professions and trades. No person may be subjected to forced labour except in exceptional circumstances provided for by the law and in return for compensation.

No person may be enslaved.

Article 35

Public office shall be open to all citizens on a basis of equality and opportunity in accordance with the provisions of law. Public office shall be a national service entrusted to those who hold it. The public servant shall aim, in the execution of his duties, at the public interest alone.

Article 36

Habitations shall be inviolable. They may not be entered without the permission of their inhabitants except in accordance with the provisions of the law and in the circumstances laid down therein.

Article 37

Citizens may not be deported or banished from the Union.

Article 38

Extradition of citizens and of Political refugees is prohibited.

Article 39

General confiscation of property shall be prohibited. Confiscation of an individual's possessions as a penalty may not be inflicted except by a court judgment in the circumstances specified by law.

Article 40

Foreigners shall enjoy, within the Union, the rights and freedom stipulated in international charters which are in force or in treaties and agreements to which the Union is party. They shall be subject to the corresponding obligations.

Article 41

Every person shall have the right to submit complaints to the competent authorities, including the judicial authorities, concerning the abuse or infringement of the rights and freedom stipulated in this Part.

Article 42

Payment of taxes and public charges determined by law is a duty of every citizen.

Article 43

Defence of the Union is a sacred duty of every citizen and military service [is] an honour for citizens which shall be regulated by law.

Article 44

Respect of the Constitution, laws and orders issued by public authorities in execution thereof, observance of public order and respect of public [morality] are duties incumbent upon all inhabitants of the Union.

Part Four
The Union Authorities

Article 45

The Union authorities shall consist of:

1. The Supreme Council of the Union.
2. The President of the Union and his Deputy.
3. The Council of Ministers of the Union.
4. The National Assembly of the Union.
5. The Judiciary of the Union.

Chapter I—The Supreme Council of the Union

Article 46

The Supreme Council of the Union shall be the highest authority in the Union. It shall consist of the Rulers of all the Emirates composing the Union, or of those who deputise for the Rulers in their Emirates in the event of their absence or if they have been excused from attending.

Each Emirate shall have a single vote in the deliberations of the Council.

Article 47

The Supreme Council of the Union shall exercise the following matters:-

1. Formulation of general policy in all matters invested in the Union by this Constitution and consideration of all matters which leads to the achievement of te goals of the Union and the common interest of the member Emirates.
2. Sanction of various Union laws before their promulgation, including the Laws of the Annual General Budget and the Final Accounts.

3. Sanction of decrees relating to matters which by virtue of the provisions of this Constitution are subject to the ratification or agreement of the Supreme Council. Such sanction shall take place before the promulgation of these decrees by the President of the Union.
4. Ratification of treaties and international agreements. Such ratification shall be accomplished by decree.
5. Approval of the appointment of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Union, acceptance of his resignation and his removal from office upon a proposal from the President of the Union.
6. Approval of the appointment of the President and Judges of the Supreme Court of the Union, acceptance of their resignations and their dismissal in the circumstances stipulated by this Constitution. Such acts shall be accomplished by decrees.
7. Supreme Control over the affairs of the Union in general.
8. Any other relevant matters stipulated in this Constitution or in the Union laws.

Article 48

1. The Supreme Council shall lay down its own bye-laws which shall include its procedure for the conduct of business and the procedure for voting on its decisions. The deliberations of the Council shall be secret.
2. The Supreme Council shall establish a general Secretariat which shall consist of an adequate number of officials to assist it in the execution of its duties.

Article 49

Decision of the Supreme Council on substantive matters shall be by a majority of five of its members provided that this majority includes the votes of the Emirates of Abu Dhabi and Dubai. The minority shall be bound by the view of the said majority.

But, decisions of the Council on procedural matters shall be by a majority vote. Such matters shall be defined in the bye-laws of the Council.

Article 50

Sessions of the Supreme Council shall be held in the Union capital. Sessions may be held in any other place agreed upon beforehand.

Chapter II—The President of the Union and His Deputy

Article 51

The Supreme Council of the Union shall elect from among its members a President and a Vice President of the Union. The Vice President of the Union shall exercise all the powers of the President in the event of his absence for any reason.

Article 52

The term of office of the President and the Vice President shall be five Gregorian years. They are eligible for re-election to the same offices.

Each of them shall, on assuming office, take the following oath before the Supreme Council:

> "I swear by Almighty God that I will be faithful to the United Arab Emirates; that I will respect its Constitution and its laws; that I will protect the interests of te people of the Union; that I will discharge my duties faithfully and loyally and that I will safeguard the independence of the Union and its territorial integrity."

Article 53

Upon vacancy of the office of the President or his Deputy for death or resignation, or because either one of them ceases to be Ruler in his Emirate for any reason, the Supreme Council shall be called into session within one month of that date to elect a successor to the vacant office for the period stipulated in Article 52 of this Constitution.

In the event that the two offices of the President of the Supreme Council and his Deputy become vacant simultaneously, the Council shall be immediately called into session by any one of its members of by a Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Union, to elect a new President and Vice President to fill the two vacant offices.

Article 54

The President of the Union shall assume the following powers:

1. Presiding [over] the Supreme Council and directing its discussions.
2. Calling the Supreme Council into session, and terminating its sessions according to the rules of procedure upon which the Council shall decide in its bye-laws. It is obligatory for him to convene the Council for sessions, whenever one of its members so requested.
3. Calling the Supreme Council and the Council of Ministers into joint sessions whenever necessity demands.
4. Signing Union laws, decrees and decisions which the Supreme Council has sanctioned and promulgating them.
5. Appointing the Prime Minister, accepting his resignation and relieving him of office with the consent of the Supreme Council. He shall also appoint the Deputy Prime Minister and the Ministers and shall receive their resignations and relieve them of office in accordance with the proposal from the Prime Minister of the Union.
6. Appointing the diplomatic representatives of the Union to foreign states and other senior Union officials both civil and military (with the exception of the President and Judges of the Supreme Court of the Union) and accepting their resignations and dismissing them with the consent of the Council of Ministers of the Union.

Such appointments, acceptance of resignations and dismissals shall be accomplished by decrees and in accordance with Union laws.

7. Signing of letters of credence of diplomatic representatives of the Union to the foreign states and organisations and accepting the credentials of diplomatic and consular representatives of foreign states to the Union and receiving their letters of credence. He shall similarly sign documents of appointment and credence of representatives.
8. Supervising the implementation of Union laws, decrees and decisions through the Council of Ministers of the Union and the competent ministers.
9. Representing the Union internally, vis-à-vis other states and in all international relations.
10. Exercising the right of pardon and commutation of sentences and approving capital sentences according to the provisions of this Constitution and Union laws.
11. [Conferring] decorations and medals of honour, both civil and military, in accordance with the laws relating to such decorations and medals.
12. Any other power vested in him by the Supreme Council or vested in him in conformity with this Constitution or Union laws.

Chapter III—The Council of Ministers of the Union

Article 55

The Council of Ministers of the union shall consist of the Prime Minister, his Deputy and a number of Ministers.

Article 56

Ministers shall be chosen from among citizens of the Union known for their competence and experience.

Article 57

The Prime Minister, his Deputy and the Ministers shall, before assuming the responsibilities of their office, take the following oath before the President of the Union:

> "I swear by Almighty God that I will be loyal to the United Arab Emirates; that I will respect its Constitution and laws; that I will discharge my duties faithfully; that I will completely observe the interests of the people of the Union and that I will completely safeguard the existence of the Union and its territorial integrity."

Article 58

The law shall define the Jurisdiction of the Ministers and the powers of each Minister. The first Council of Ministers of the Union shall be composed of the following Ministers:

1. Foreign Affairs
2. Interior
3. Defence
4. Finance, Economy and Industry
5. Justice
6. [Education]
7. Public Health
8. Public Works and Agriculture
9. [Communications], Post, Telegraph and Telephones
10. Labour and Social Affairs
11. Information
12. Planning

Article 59

The Prime Minister shall preside over the meetings of the Council of Ministers. He shall call it into session, direct its debates, follow up the activities of Ministers and shall supervise the co-ordination of work between the various Ministries and in all executive organs of the Union.

The Deputy Prime Minister shall exercise all the powers of the Prime Minister in the event of his absence for any reason.

Article 60

The Council of Ministers, in its capacity as the executive authority of the union, and under the supreme control of the President of the Union and the Supreme Council, shall be responsible for dealing with all domestic and foreign affairs which are within the competence of the Union according to this Constitution and Union laws.

The Council of Ministers shall, in particular, assume the following powers:-

1. Following up the implementations of the general policy of the Union Government, both domestic and foreign.
2. Initiating drafts of Federal Laws and submitting them to the Union National Council before they are raised to the President of the Union for presentation to the Supreme Council for sanction.
3. Drawing up the annual general budget of the Union, and the final accounts.
4. Preparing drafts of decrees and various decisions.
5. Issuing regulations necessary for the implementation of Union laws without amending or suspending such regulations or making any exemption from their

execution. Issuing also police regulations and other regulations relating to the organization of public services and administrations, within the limits of this Constitution and Union laws. A special provision of the law or the Council of Ministers, may charge the competent Union Minister or any other administrative authority to promulgate some of such regulations.

6. Supervising the implementation of Union laws, decrees, decisions and regulations by all the concerned authorities in the Union or in the Emirates.
7. Supervising the execution of judgments rendered by Union Law Courts and the implementation of international treaties and agreements concluded by the Union.
8. Appointment and dismissal of Union employees in accordance with the provisions of the law, provided that their appointment and dismissal do not require the issue of a decree.
9. Controlling the conduct of work in departments and public services of the Union and the conduct and discipline of Union employees in general.
10. Any other authority vested in it by law or by the Supreme Council within the limits of this Constitution.

Article 61

Deliberations of the Council of Ministers shall be secret. Its resolutions shall be passed by a majority of its members. In the event that voting is evenly [divided], the side on which the Prime Minister has voted shall prevail. The minority shall abide by the opinion of the majority.

Article 62

While in office, the Prime Minister, his Deputy or any Union Minister, may not practice any professional, commercial or financial occupation or enter into any commercial transactions with the Government of the Union or the Governments of the Emirates, or combine with their office the membership of the board of directors of any financial or commercial company.

Furthermore, they may not combine with their office more than one official post in any of the Emirates and shall relinquish all other local official posts, if any.

Article 63

The members of the Council of Ministers shall aim to serve in their conduct the interests of the Union, the promotion of public welfare and totally renounce personal benefits. They must not exploit their official capacities for their own interests or that of any person related to them.

Article 64

The Prime Minister and the Ministers shall be politically responsible collectively before the President of the Union and the Supreme Council of the Union for the

execution of the general policy of the union both domestic and foreign. Each of them shall be personally responsible to the President of the Union and the Supreme Council for the activities of his Ministry or office.

The resignation of the Prime Minister, his removal from office, his death, or the vacating of his office for any reason whatsoever shall involve the resignation of the whole Cabinet. The President of the Union may require the Ministers to remain in office temporarily, to carry out immediate administration, until such time as a new Cabinet is formed.

Article 65

At the beginning of every financial year, the Council of Ministers shall submit to the President of the Union for presentation to the Supreme Council, a detailed statement of internal achievements, on the Union's relations with other states and international organisations, together with the recommendations of the Cabinet on the best and most practical means of strengthening the foundations of the Union, consolidating its security and stability, achieving its goals and progress in all fields.

Article 66

1. The Council of Ministers shall draw up its own bye-laws including its rules procedure.
2. The Council of Ministers shall establish a general Secretariat provided with a number of employees to assist it in the conduct of its business.

Article 67

The Law shall prescribe the salaries of the Prime Minister, his Deputy and the other Ministers.

Chapter IV—The National Assembly of the Union

Section 1—General Provisions

Article 68

The National Assembly of the Union shall be composed of forty members.[352] Seats shall be distributed to member Emirates as follows:

Abu Dhabi	-- 8 seats
Dubai	-- 8 seats
Sharjah	-- 6 seats
Ras Al-Khaimah	-- 6 seats
Ajman	-- 4 seats
Umm Al-Qawain	-- 4 seats
Fujairah	-- 4 seats

352 Decision of the Supreme Council of the Union No. 3, 1972.

Article 69

Each Emirate shall be free to determine the method of selection of the citizens representing it in the Union National Assembly.

Article 70

A member of the Union National Assembly must satisfy the following conditions:

1. Must be a citizen of one of the Emirates of the Union, and permanently resident in the Emirate he represents in the Assembly.
2. Must be not less than twenty-five Gregorian years of age at the time of his selection.
3. Must enjoy civil status, good conduct, reputation and not previously convicted of a dishonourable offence unless he has been rehabilitated in accordance with the law.
4. Must have adequate knowledge of reading and writing.

Article 71

Membership of the Union National Assembly shall be incompatible with any public office in the Union, including Ministerial portfolios.

Article 72

The term of membership in the Union National Assembly shall be two Gregorian years commencing from the date of its first sitting. When this period expires, the Assembly shall be completely renewed for the time remaining until the end of the transitional period as laid down in Article 144 of this Constitution.

Any member who has completed his term may be re-elected.

Article 73

Before assuming his duties in the Assembly or its Committees, a member of the Union National Assembly shall take the following oath before the Assembly in public session:-

> "I swear by Almighty God that I will be loyal to the United Arab Emirates; that I will respect the Constitution and the laws of the Union and that I will discharge my duties in the Assembly and its Committees honestly and truthfully."

Article 74

If, for any reason, a seat of any member of the Assembly becomes vacant before the end of the term of his membership, a replacement shall be selected within two months of the date on which the vacancy is announced by the Assembly, unless the vacancy occurs during the three months preceding the end of the term of the Assembly.

The new member shall complete the term of membership of his predecessor.

Article 75

Sessions of the Union National Assembly shall be held in the Union capital. Exceptionally, sessions may be held in any other place within the Union on the basis of a decision taken by a majority vote of the members and with the approval of the Council of Ministers.

Article 76

The assembly shall decide upon the validity of the mandate of its members. It shall also decide upon disqualifying members, if they lose one of the required conditions, by a majority of all its members nad on the proposal of five among them. The Assembly shall be competent to accept resignation from membership. The resignation shall be considered as final from the date of its acceptance by the Assembly.

Article 77

A member of the National Assembly of the Union shall represent the whole people of the Union and not merely the Emirate which he represents in the Assembly.

Section 2—Organisation of work in the Assembly

Article 78

The Assembly shall hold an annual ordinary session lasting not less than six months, commencing on the third week of November each year. It may be called into extraordinary session whenever the need arises. The Assembly may not consider at an extraordinary session any matter other than those for which it has been called into session.

Notwithstanding the preceding paragraph, the President of the Union shall summon the Union National Assembly to convene its first ordinary session within a period not exceeding sixty days from the entry into force of this Constitution. This session shall end at the time appointed by the Supreme Council by decree.

Article 79

The Assembly shall be summoned into session, and its session shall be terminated by decree issued by the President of the Union with the consent of the Council of Ministers of the Union. Any meeting held by the Council without a formal summons, or in a place other than that legally assigned for its meeting in accordance with this Constitution, shall be invalid and shall have no effect.

Nevertheless, if the Assembly is not called to hold its meeting for its annual ordinary session before the third week of November, the Assembly shall be ipso facto in session on the twenty first of the said month.

Article 80

The President of the Union shall inaugurate the ordinary annual session of the Assembly whereupon he shall deliver a speech reviewing the situation of the country and the important events and affairs which happened during the year and outlining the

projects and reforms, the Union Government plans to undertake during the new session. The President of the Union may depute his Vice-President or the Prime Minister to open the session or to deliver the speech.

The National Assembly shall select, from among its members, a committee to draft the reply to the Opening Speech, embodying the Assembly's observations and wishes, and shall submit the reply after approval by the Assembly to the President of the Union for submission to the Supreme Council.

Article 81

Members of the Assembly shall not be censured for any opinions or views expressed in the course of carrying out their duties within the Assembly or its Committees.

Article 82

Except in cases of "flagrante delicto", no penal proceedings may be taken against any member while the Assembly is in session, without the authorization of the Assembly. The Assembly must be notified if such proceedings are taken while it is not in session.

Article 83

The President of the Assembly and its other members shall be entitled, from the date of taking the oath before the Assembly, to a remuneration which shall be determined by law, and to travelling expenses from their place of residence to the place in which the Assembly is meeting.

Article 84

The Assembly shall have a Bureau consisting of a President, a First and Second Vice President and two controllers. The Assembly shall select them all from among its members.

The term of office of the President and the two vice Presidents shall expire when the term of the Assembly expires or when it is dissolved in accordance with the provisions of the second paragraph of Article 88.

The term of office of the controllers shall expire with the choice of new controllers at the opening of the next ordinary annual session. If any post in the Bureau becomes vacant, the Assembly shall elect who shall fill it for the remaining period.

Article 85

The Assembly shall have a Secretary-General who shall be assisted by a number of staff who shall be directly responsible to the Assembly. The Assembly's standing orders shall lay down their conditions of service and their powers.

The Assembly shall lay down its standing orders, issued by decree promulgated by the President of the Union with the consent of the Council of Ministers.

The standing orders shall define the powers of the President of the Assembly, his two Vice Presidents and the Controllers and shall define generally all matters pertaining

to the Assembly, its committees, its members, its Secretariat, its employees, its rules and procedures of discussion and voting in the Assembly and the Committees and other matters within the limits of [the] provisions of this Constitution.

Article 86

Sessions of the Assembly shall be public. Secret sessions may be held at the request of a representative of the Government, the President of te Assembly or one third of its members.

Article 87

Deliberations of the Assembly shall not be valid unless a majority of its members at least are present. Resolutions shall be taken by an absolute majority of the votes of members present, except in cases where a special majority has been prescribed. If votes are equally divided, the side which the President of the session supports shall prevail.

Article 88

Meetings of the Assembly may be adjourned by a decree promulgated by the President of the Union with the approval of the Council of Ministers of the union for a period not exceeding one month, provided that such adjournment is not repeated in one session except with the approval of the Assembly and for once only. The period of adjournment shall not be deemed part of the term of the ordinary session.

The Assembly may also be dissolved by a decree promulgated by the President of the Union with the approval of the Supreme Council of the Union, provided that the decree of dissolution includes a summons to the new Assembly to come into session within sixty days of the date of the decree of dissolution. The Assembly may not be dissolved again for the same reason.

Section 3—Powers of the National Assembly

Article 89

In so far as this does not conflict with the provisions of Article 110, Union Bills, including financial bills, shall be submitted to the National Assembly of the Union before their submission to the President of the Union for presentation to the Supreme Council for ratification. The National Assembly shall discuss these bills and may pass them, amend or reject them.

Article 90

The Assembly shall examine during its ordinary session the Annual General Budget draft law of the Union and the draft law of the final accounts, in accordance with the provisions in Chapter Eight of this Constitution.

Article 91

The Government shall inform the Union Assembly of international treaties and agreements concluded with other states and the various international organisations, together with appropriate explanations.

Article 92

The Union National Assembly may discuss any general subject pertaining to the affairs of the union unless the Council of Ministers informs the Union National Assembly that such discussion is contrary to the highest interests of the Union. The Prime Minister or the Minister concerned shall attend the debates. The Union National Assembly may express its recommendations and may define the subjects for debate. If the Council of Ministers does not approve of these recommendations, it shall notify the Union National Assembly of its reasons.

Article 93

The Government of the union shall be represented at sessions of the Union National Assembly by the Prime Minister or his deputy or one member of the Union Cabinet at least. The Prime Minister or his deputy or the competent Minister, shall answer questions put to them by any member of the Assembly requesting explanation of any matters within their jurisdiction, in conformity with the procedures prescribed in the standing orders of the Assembly.

Chapter V—The Judiciary in the Union and the Emirates

Article 94

Justice is the basis of rule. In performing their duties, judges shall be independent and shall not be subject to any authority but the law and their own conscience.

Article 95

The Union shall have a Union Supreme Court and Union Primary Tribunals as explained hereinafter.

Article 96

The Union Supreme Court shall consist of a President and a number of judges, not exceeding five in all, who shall be appointed by decree, issued by the President of the Union after approval by the Supreme Council. The law shall prescribe the number of the chambers in the Court, their order and procedures, conditions of service and retirement for its members and the preconditions and qualifications required of them.

Article 97

The President and the Judges of the Union Supreme Court shall not be removed while the administer justice. Their tenure of office shall not be terminated except for one of the following reasons:-

1. Death.
2. Resignation.
3. Expiration of term of contract for those who are appointed by fixed term contract or completion of term of secondment.
4. Reaching retirement age.
5. Permanent incapacity to carry the burdens of their duties by reasons of ill health.
6. Disciplinary discharge on the basis of the reasons and proceeding stipulated in the law.
7. Appointment to other offices, with their consent.

Article 98

The President and the Judges of the Union Supreme Court shall, before holding office, swear on oath before the President [of] the Union and in the presence of the Union Minister of Justice, that they will render justice without fear or favour and that they will be loyal to the Constitution and the laws of the Union.

Article 99

The Union Supreme Court shall have jurisdiction in the following matters:-

1. Various disputes between member Emirates in the Union, or between any one Emirate or more and the Union Government , whenever such disputes are submitted to the Court on the request of any of the interested parties.
2. Examination of the constitutionality of Union laws, if they are challenged by one or more of the Emirates on the grounds of violating the constitution of the Union.

   Examination of the constitutionality of legislations promulgated by one of the Emirates, if they are challenged by one of the Union authorities on the grounds of violation of the Constitution of the Union or of Union laws.
3. Examination of the constitutionality of laws, legislations and regulations in general, if such request is referred to it by any Court in the country during a pending case before it. The aforesaid Court shall be bound to accept the ruling of the Union Supreme Court rendered in this connection.
4. Interpretation of the provisions of the Constitution, when so requested by any Union authority or by the Government of any Emirate. Any such interpretation shall be considered binding on all.
5. Trial of Ministers and senior officials of the Union appointed by decree regarding their actions in carrying out their official duties on the demand of the Supreme Council and in accordance with the relevant law.
6. Crimes directly affecting the interests of the Union, such as crimes relating to its internal or external security, forgery of the official records or seals of any of the union authorities and counterfeiting of currency.

7. Conflict of jurisdiction between the Union judicial authorities and the local judicial authorities in the Emirates.
8. Conflict of jurisdiction between the judicial authority in one Emirate and the judicial authority in another Emirate. The rules relating thereof shall be regulated by a Union Law.
9. Any other jurisdiction stipulated in this Constitution, or which may be assigned to it by a Union law.

Article 100

The Union Supreme Court shall hold its sittings in the capital of the Union. It may, exceptionally, assemble when necessary in the capital of any one of the Emirates.

Article 101

The judgments of the Union Supreme Court shall be final and binding upon all.

If the Court, in ruling on the constitutionality of laws, legislations and regulations, decides that a Union legislations or regulations under consideration contain provisions which are inconsistent with the Union Constitution, or that local legislations or regulations under consideration contain provisions which are inconsistent with the Union Constitution or with a Union law, the authority concerned in the Union or in the Emirate, accordingly, shall be obliged to hasten to take the necessary measures to remove or rectify the constitutional inconsistency.

Article 102

The Union shall have one or more Union Primary Tribunals which shall sit in the permanent capital of the Union or in the capitals of some of the Emirates, in order to exercise the judicial powers within the sphere of their jurisdiction in the following cases:

1. Civil, commercial and administrative disputes between the Union and individuals whether the Union is plaintiff or defendant.
2. Crimes committed within the boundaries of the permanent capital of the Union, with the exception of such matters as are reserved for the Union Supreme Court under Article 99 of this Constitution.
3. Personal status cases, civil and commercial cases and other cases between individuals which shall arise in the [permanent] capital of the Union.

Article 103

The law shall regulate all matters connected with the Union Primary Tribunals in respect of their organization, formation, chambers, local jurisdiction, procedures to be followed before them, the oath to be sworn by their judges, conditions of service relating to them and the ways of appeal against their judgments.

The law may stipulate that appeals against the judgments of these Tribunals shall be heard before one of the chambers of the Union Supreme Court, in the cases and according to the procedures prescribed therein.

Article 104

The local judicial authorities in each Emirate shall have jurisdiction in all judicial matters not assigned to the Union judicature in accordance with this Constitution.

Article 105

All or part of the jurisdiction assigned to the local judicial authorities in accordance with the preceding Article may be transferred by a Union law issued at the request of the Emirate concerned, to the Primary Union Tribunals.

Circumstances in which appeals against judgments by the local judicial authorities in penal, civil, commercial and other litigations may be referred to the Union Tribunals, shall be defined by a union law provided that its decision in such appeals shall be final.

Article 106

The Union shall have a Public [Prosecutor] who shall be appointed by a Union decree issued with the approval of the Council of Ministers, assisted by a number of members of the Public [Prosecutor's] office.

The law shall regulate matters relating to the members of the Union Public Prosecutor's Office with respect to their method of appointment, ranks, promotion, retirement and the qualifications required of them.

Besides, the Union Law of Criminal Procedure and trials shall regulate the power of this body and its procedures and the competence of its assistants from the police and the public security officers.

Article 107

The President of the Union may grant pardon from the execution of any sentence passed by a Union judicature before it is carried out or while it is being served or he may commute such sentence, on the basis of the recommendation of the union Minister of Justice, after obtaining the approval of a committee formed under the chairmanship of the Minister and consisting of six members selected by the Union Council of Ministers for a term of three years which may be renewed. The members of the committee shall be chosen from citizens of good repute and capability.

Membership of the committee shall be gratis. Its deliberations shall be secret. Its decisions shall be issued by a majority vote.

Article 108

No sentence of death imposed finally by a union judicial authority shall be carried out until the President of the Union has confirmed the sentence. He may substitute it by an attenuate sentence in accordance with the procedure stipulated in the preceding Article.

Article 109

There shall be no general amnesty for a crime or for specified crimes except by law.

The promulgation of the law of amnesty shall consider such crimes being deemed non avenue, and shall remit the execution of the sentence or the remaining part of it.

Part Five
Union Legislations and Decrees and the Authorities Having Jurisdiction Therein

Chapter I- Union Laws

Article 110

1. Union laws shall be promulgated in accordance with the provisions of this Article and other appropriate provisions of the Constitution.

2. A draft law shall become a law after the adoption of the following procedure:-
    a. The Council of Ministers shall prepare a bill and submit it to the Union National Assembly.
    b. The Council of Ministers shall submit the bill to the president of the Union for his approval and presentation to the Supreme Council for ratification
    c. The President of the Union shall sign the bill after ratification by the Supreme Council and shall promulgate it.

3. (a) If the Union National Assembly inserts any amendment to the bill and this amendment is not acceptable to the President of the Union or the Supreme Council, or if the Union National Assembly rejects the bill, the President of the Union or the Supreme Council may refer it back to the National Assembly. If the Union National Assembly introduces any amendment on that occasion which is not acceptable to the President of the Union or the Supreme Council, or if the Union National Assembly decides to reject the bill, the President of the Union may promulgate the law after ratification by the Supreme Council.

   (b) The term "bill" in this clause shall mean the draft which is submitted to the President of the Union by the Council of Ministers including the amendments, if any, made to it by the Union National Assembly.

4. Notwithstanding the foregoing, if the situation requires the promulgation of Union laws when the National Assembly is not in session, the Council of Ministers of the Union may issue them through the Supreme Council and the President of the Union, provided that the Union is notified at its next meeting.

Article 111

Laws shall be published in the Official Gazette of the Union within a maximum of two weeks from the date of their signature and promulgation by the President of the Union after the Supreme Court has ratified them. Such laws shall become in force one month after the date of their publication in the said Gazette, unless another date is specified in the said law.

Article 112

No laws may be applied except on what occurs as from the date they become in force and no retroactive effect shall result in such laws. The law may, however, stipulate the contrary in matters other than criminal, if necessity so requires.

Chapter II—Laws Issued by Decrees

Article 113

Should necessity arise for urgent promulgation of Union laws between sessions of the Supreme Council, the President of the Union together with the Council of Ministers may promulgate the necessary laws in the form of decrees which shall have the force of law, provided that they are not inconsistent with the Constitution.

Such decree-laws must be referred to the Supreme Council within a week at the maximum for assent or rejection. If they are approved they shall have the force of law and the Union National Assembly shall be notified at its next meeting.

However, if the Supreme Council does not approve them, they shall cease to have the force of law unless that it has decided to sanction their effectiveness during the preceding period, or to settle in some other way the effects arising therefrom.

Chapter III—Ordinary Decrees

Article 114

No decree may be issued unless the Council of Ministers has confirmed it and the President of the Union or the Supreme Council, according to their powers, has ratified it. Decrees shall be published in the Official Gazette after signature by the President of the Union.

Article 115

While the Supreme Council is out of session and if necessity arises, it may authorize the President of the Union and the Council of Ministers collectively to promulgate decrees whose ratification is within the power of the Supreme Council, provided that such authority shall not include ratification of international agreements and treaties or declaration or [rescission] of martial law or declaration of a defensive war or appointment of the President or Judges of the Union Supreme Court.

Part Six
The Emirates

Article 116

The Emirates shall exercise all powers not assigned to the Union by this Constitution. The Emirates shall all participate in the establishment of the Union and shall benefit from its existence, services and protection.

Article 117

The exercise of rule in each Emirate shall aim in particular at the maintenance of security and order within its territories, the provision of public utilities for its inhabitants and the raising of social and economic standards.

Article 118

The member Emirates of the Union shall all work for the coordination of their legislations in various fields with the intention of unifying such legislations as far as possible.

Two or more Emirates may, after obtaining the approval of the Supreme Council, agglomerate in a political or administrative unit, or unify all or part of their public services or establish a single or joint administration to run any such service.

Article 119

Union law shall regulate with utmost ease matters pertaining to the execution of judgments, requests for commissions of rogation, serving legal documents and surrender of fugitives between member Emirates of the Union.

Part Seven
Distribution of Legislative, Executive and International Jurisdictions Between the Union and the Emirates

Article 120

The Union shall have exclusive legislative and executive jurisdiction in the following affairs:

1. Foreign affairs.
2. Defence and the Union Armed Forces.
3. Protection of the Union's security against internal or external threat.
4. Matters pertaining to security, order and rule in the permanent capital of the Union.
5. Matters relating to Union officials and Union judiciary.
6. Union finance and Union taxes, duties and fees.
7. Union public loans.

8. Postal, telegraph, telephone and wireless services.
9. Construction, maintenance and improvement of Union roads which the Supreme Council has determined to be trunk roads. The organisation of traffic on such roads.
10. Air Traffic Control and the issue of licenses to aircrafts and pilots.
11. Education.
12. Public health and medical services.
13. Currency board and coinage.
14. Measures, standards and weights.
15. Electricity services.
16. Union nationality, passports, residence and immigration.
17. Union properties and all matters relating thereto.
18. Census affairs and statistics relevant to Union purposes.
19. Union Information.

Article 121

Without prejudice to the provisions of the preceding Article, the Union shall have exclusive legislative jurisdiction in the following matters:

Labour relations and social security; real estate and expropriation in the public interest; extradition of criminals; banks; insurance of all kinds; protection of agricultural and animal wealth; major legislations relating to penal law, civil and commercial transactions and company law, procedures before the civil and criminal courts; protection of cultural, technical, and industrial property and copyright; printing and publishing; import of arms and ammunitions except for use by the armed forces or the security forces belonging to any Emirate; other aviation affairs which are not within the executive jurisdiction of the Union; delimitation of territorial waters and regulation of navigation on the high seas.

Article 122

The Emirates shall have jurisdiction in all matters not assigned to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Union in accordance with the provisions of the two preceding Articles.

Article 123

As an exception to paragraph 1 of Article 120 concerning the exclusive jurisdiction of the Union in matters of foreign policy and international relations, the member Emirates of the Union may conclude limited agreements of a local and administrative nature with the neighbouring states or regions, save that such agreements are not provided that the Supreme Council of the Union is informed in advance. If the Council objects to the [conclusion] of such agreements, it shall be obligatory to suspend the matter until the Union Court has ruled on that objection as early as possible.

The Emirates may retain their membership in the OPEC organisation and the Organisation of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries or may join them.

Article 124

Before the conclusion of any treaty or international agreement which may affect the status of any one of the Emirates, the competent Union authorities shall consult that Emirate in advance. In the event of a dispute, the matter shall be submitted to the Union Supreme Court for ruling.

Article 125

The Governments of the Emirates shall undertake the appropriate measures to implement the laws promulgated by the Union and the treaties and international agreements concluded by the Union, including the promulgation of the local laws, regulations, decisions and orders necessary for such implementation.

The Union authorities shall supervise the implementation by Emirates' Governments of the Union laws, decisions, treaties, agreements and Union judgments. The competent administrative and judicial authorities in the Emirates should forward to the Union authorities all possible assistance in this connection.

Part Eight
Financial Affairs of the Union

Article 126

The general revenues of the Union shall consist of the income from the following resources:

1. Taxes, fees and duties imposed under a Union law in matters within the legislative and executive jurisdiction of the Union.
2. Fees and rates received by the Union in return for services provided.
3. Contributions made by member Emirates of the Union in the Annual Budget of the Union in accordance with the article herein coming after.
4. Union income from its own properties.

Article 127

The member Emirates of the Union shall contribute a specified proportion of their annual revenues to cover the annual general budget expenditure of the Union, in the manner and on the scale to be prescribed in the Budget Law.

Article 128

The law shall prescribe the method of preparing the general budget of the Union and the final accounts. The law shall also define the beginning of the financial year.

Article 129

The draft annual budget of the Union, comprising estimates of revenues and expenditure, shall be referred to the Union National Assembly at least two months before the beginning of the financial year, for discussion and submission of comments thereon, before the draft budget is submitted to the Supreme Council of the Union, together with those comments, for assent.

Article 130

The annual general budget shall be issued by a law. In all cases, where the budget law has not been promulgated before the beginning of the financial year, temporary monthly funds may be made by Union decree on the basis of one [twelfth] of the funds of the previous financial year. Revenues shall be collected and expenditure disbursed in accordance with the laws in force at the end of the preceding financial year.

Article 131

All expenditure not provided for in the budget, all expenditure in excess of the budget estimates and all transfers of sums from one part to another of the Budget must be covered by a law.

Notwithstanding the foregoing, in cases of extreme urgency, such expenditure or transfer may be arranged by decree-law in conformity with the provisions of Article 113 of this Constitution.

Article 132

The Union shall allocate in its annual budget a sum from its revenue to be expended on building and construction projects, internal security and social affairs according to the urgent needs of some of the Emirates.

The execution of these projects and the disbursement thereon shall be drawn from these funds, accomplished by means of and under the supervision of the competent Union bodies with the agreement of authorities of the Emirates concerned.

The Union may establish a special fund for this purpose.

Article 133

No Union tax may be imposed, amended or abolished except by virtue of law. No person may be exempted from payment of such taxes except in the cases specified by law.

Union taxes, duties and fees may not be levied on any person except within the limits of the law and in accordance with its provisions.

Article 134

No public loan may be contracted except by a Union law. No commitment involving the payment of sums from union Exchequer in a future year or years may be concluded except by means of a Union law.

Article 135

The final accounts of the financial administration of the Union for the completed financial year shall be referred to the Union National Assembly within the four months following the end of the said year, for its comments thereon, before their submission to the Supreme Council for approval, in the light of the Auditor-General's report.

Article 136

An independent Union department headed by an Auditor-General who shall be appointed by decree, shall be established to audit the accounts of the Union and its organs and agencies, and to audit any other accounts assigned to the said department for that purpose in accordance with [the] law.

The law shall regulate this department and shall define its jurisdiction and the competence of those working therein, and the guarantees to be given to it, its head and the employees working in it in order that [they] may carry out their duties in the most efficient manner.

Part Nine
Armed Forces and Security Forces

Article 137

Every attack upon any member Emirates of the Union shall be considered an attack upon all the Emirates and upon the existence of the Union itself, which all Union and local forces will co-operate to repel by all means possible.

Article 138

The Union shall have army, navy and air forces with unified training and command. The Commander in Chief of these forces and the Chief of the General Staff shall be appointed and dismissed by means of a Union decree.

The Union may have a Union Security Forces.

The Union Council of Ministers shall be responsible directly to the President of the Union and the Supreme Council of the Union for the affairs of all these forces.

Article 139

The law shall regulate military service, general or partial mobilisation, the rights and duties of members of the Armed Forces, their disciplinary procedures and similarly the special regulations of the Union Security Forces.

Article 140

The declaration of defensive war shall be declared by a Union decree issued by the President of the Union after its approval by the Supreme Council. Offensive war shall be prohibited in accordance with the provisions of international charters.

Article 141

A Supreme Defence Council shall be set up under the chairmanship of the President of the Union. Among its members shall be the Vice President of the Union, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Union, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Defence, Finance, Interior, the Commander in Chief and the Chief of the General Staff. It shall advise and offer views on all matters pertaining to defence, maintenance of the peace and security of the Union, forming of the armed forces, their equipment and development and the determination of their posts and camps.

The Council may invite any military adviser or expert or other persons it wishes to attend its meetings but they shall have no decisive say in its deliberations. All matters pertaining to this Council shall be regulated by means of a law.

Article 142

The member Emirates shall have the right to set up local security forces ready and equipped to join the defensive machinery of the Union to defend, if need arises, the Union against any external aggression.

Article 143

Any Emirate shall have the right to request the assistance of the Armed Forces or the Security Forces of [the] Union in order to maintain security and order within its territories whenever it is exposed to danger. Such a request shall be submitted immediately to the Supreme Council of the Union for decision.

The Supreme Council may call upon the aid of the local armed forces belonging to any Emirate for this purpose provided that the Emirate requesting assistance and the Emirate to whom the forces belong agree.

The President of the Union and the Council of Ministers of the Union collectively, may, if the Supreme Council is not in session, take any immediate measure which cannot be delayed and considered necessary and may call the Supreme Council into immediate session.

Part Ten
The Final and Transitional Provisions

Article 144

1. Subject to the provisions of the following paragraphs, the provisions of this Constitution shall apply for a transitional period of five Gregorian years beginning from the date of its entry into force in accordance with provisions of Article 152.
2. (a) If the Supreme Council considers that the topmost interests of the Union require the amendment of this Constitution, it shall submit a draft constitutional amendment to the Union National Assembly.

(b) The procedure for approving the constitutional amendment shall be the same as the procedure for approving laws.

(c) The approval of the Union National Assembly for a draft constitutional amendment shall require the agreement of two-thirds of the votes of members present.

The President of the Union shall sign the constitutional amendment in the name of the Supreme Council and as its representative and shall promulgate the amendment.

3. During the transitional period, the Supreme Council shall adopt the necessary measures to prepare a draft permanent Constitution to take the place of this temporary constitution. It shall submit the draft permanent Constitution to the Union National Assembly for debate before promulgating it.
4. The Supreme Council shall call the Union National Assembly into extraordinary session at a time not more than six months before the end of the period of validity of this temporary Constitution. The permanent Constitution shall be presented at this session. It shall be promulgated according to the procedure laid down in paragraph 2 of this Article.

Article 145

Under no circumstances, may any of the provisions of this Constitution be suspended, except when Martial Law is in force and within the limits specified by this law.

Notwithstanding the foregoing, sessions of the National Assembly of the Union may not be suspended during that period nor may the immunity of its members be violated.

Article 146

In case of necessity defined by law, Martial law shall be declared by a decree promulgated with the approval of the Supreme Council on the basis of a proposal made by the President of the Union with the consent of the Council of Ministers of the Union. Such decree shall be notified to the Union National Assembly at its next meeting.

Martial law shall be similarly lifted by decree issued with the approval of the Supreme Council when the need, for which it was imposed, no longer exists.

Article 147

Nothing in the application of this Constitution shall affect treaties or agreements concluded by member Emirates with state or international organisations unless such treaties or organisations unless such treaties or agreements are amended or abrogated by agreement between the parties concerned.

Article 148

All matters established by laws, regulations, decrees, orders and decisions in the various member Emirates of the Union in effect upon the coming into force of this Constitution, shall continue to be applicable unless amended or replaced in accordance with the provisions of this Constitution.

Similarly, the measures and organisations existing in the member Emirates shall continue to be effective until the promulgation of laws amending them in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution.\

Article 149

As an exception to the provisions of Article 121 of this Constitution, the Emirates may promulgate legislations necessary for the regulation of the matters set out in the said Article without violation of the provisions of Article 151 of this Constitution.

Article 150

The Union authorities shall strive to issue the laws referred to in this Constitution as quickly as possible so as to replace the existing legislations and systems, particularly those which are not consistent with [the] provisions of the Constitution.

Article 151

The provisions of this Constitution shall prevail over the Constitutions of the member Emirates of the Union and the Union laws which are issued in accordance with the provisions of this Constitution shall have priority over the legislations, regulations and decisions issued by the authorities of the Emirates.

In case of conflict, that part of the inferior legislation which is inconsistent with the superior legislation shall be rendered null and void to the extent that removes the inconsistency. In case of dispute, the matter shall be referred to the Union Supreme Court for its ruling.

Article 152

This Constitution shall take effect from the date to be fixed in a declaration to be issued by the Rulers [signatory] to this Constitution.

Signed in Dubai on this day the 18th of July, 1971, corresponding to this day the 25th month of Jamad Awwal 1391.

(Signatures of the Rulers of Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Ajman, Umm Al Qaiwain, Fujairah).

Appendix B: The Provisional Constitution of the United Arab Emirates (Arabic)

الدستور المؤقت للإمارات العربية المتحدة

نحن حكام إمارات أبوظبي ودبي والشارقة وعجمان وأم القيوين والفجيرة.

نظراً لأن إرادتنا وإرادة شعب إماراتنا قد تلاقت على قيام اتحاد بين هذه الإمارات ، من أجل توفير حياة أفضل ، واستقرار أمكن ، ومكانة دولية أرفع لها ولشعبها جميعاً .

ورغبة في انشاء روابط أوثق بين الإمارات العربية في صورة دولة اتحادية مستقلة ذات سيادة ، قادرة على الحفاظ على كيانها وكيان أعضائها ، متعاونة مع الدول العربية الشقيقة ، ومع كافة الدول الأخرى الصديقة الأعضاء في منظمة الأمم المتحدة ، وفي الأسرة الدولية عموما ، على أساس الإحترام المتبادل ، وتبادل المصالح والمنافع .

ورغبة كذلك في إرساء قواعد الحكم الإتحادي خلال السنوات المقبلة على أسس سليمة ، تتمشى مع واقع الإمارات وإمكاناتها في الوقت الحاضر، وتطلق يد الإتحاد بما يمكنه من تحقيق أهدافه، وتصون الكيان الذاتي لأعضائه بما لا يتعارض وتلك الأهداف، وتعد شعب الإتحاد في الوقت ذاته للحياة الدستورية الحرة الكريمة، مع السير به قدماً نحو حكم ديمقراطي نيابي متكامل الأركان، في مجتمع عربي إسلامي متحرر من الخوف والقلق.

ولما كان تحقيق ذلك من أعز رغباتنا ومن أعظم ما تتجه إليه عزائمنا، حرصاً على النهوض ببلادنا وشعبها الى المنزلة التي تؤهلهما لتبوء المكان اللائق بهما بين الدول المتحضرة وأممها .

ومن أجل ذلك كله والى أن يتم إعداد الدستور الدائم للإتحاد نعلن أمام الخالق العلي القدير، وأمام الناس أجمعين، موافقتنا على هذا الدستور المؤقت المذيل بتواقيعنا ليطبق أثناء الفترة الإنتقالية المشار إليها فيه .

والله وليّ التوفيق ، وهو نعم المولى ونعم النصير .

﴿ الباب الأول ﴾

الإتحاد ومقوماته وأهدافه الأساسية

مادة (١)

الإمارات العربية المتحدة دولة اتحادية مستقلة ذات سيادة ، ويشار إليها فيما بعد في هذا الدستور بالإتحاد .

ويتالف الإتحاد من الإمارات التالية :

أبوظبي – دبي – الشارقة – عجمان – أم القيوين – الفجيرة .

ويجوز لأي قطر عربي مستقل أن ينضم إلى الإتحاد ، متى وافق المجلس الأعلى للإتحاد على ذلك بإجماع الآراء .

مادة (٢)

يمارس الإتحاد في الشؤون الموكولة إليه بمقتضى أحكام هذا الدستور السيادة على جميع الأراضي والمياه الإقليمية الواقعة داخل الحدود الدولية للإمارات الأعضاء .

مادة (٣)

تمارس الإمارات الأعضاء السيادة على أراضيها ومياهها الإقليمية في جميع الشؤون التي لا يختص بها الإتحاد بمقتضى هذا الدستور .

مادة (٤)

لا يجوز للإتحاد أن يتنازل عن سيادته ، أو أن يتخلى عن أي جزء من أراضيه أو مياهه .

مادة (٥)

يكون للإتحاد علمه وشعاره ونشيده الوطني . ويحدد القانون العلم والشعار وتحتفظ كل إمارة بعلمها الخاص لاستخدامه داخل إقليمها .

مادة (٦)

الإتحاد جزء من الوطن العربي الكبير ، تربطه به روابط الدين واللغة والتاريخ والمصير المشترك .

وشعب الإتحاد شعب واحد ، وهو جزء من الأمة العربية .

مادة (٧)

الإسلام هو الدين الرسمي للإتحاد ، والشريعة الإسلامية مصدر رئيسي للتشريع فيه ، ولغة الإتحاد الرسمية هي اللغة العربية .

مادة (٨)

يكون لمواطني الإتحاد جنسية واحدة يحددها القانون . ويتمتعون في الخارج بحماية حكومة الإتحاد وفقاً للأصول الدولية المرعية .

ولا يجوز اسقاط الجنسية عن المواطن ، او سحبها منه ، إلا في الحالات الإستثنائية التي ينص عليها القانون .

مادة (٩)

١- تنشأ عاصمة الإتحاد في منطقة تمنحها للإتحاد إمارتا أبوظبي ودبي على الحدود بينهما ، ويطلق عليها اسم " الكرامة " .

٢- يرصد في ميزانية الإتحاد للسنة الأولى ما يكفي لتغطية نفقات الدراسات الفنية والتخطيط لإنشاء العاصمة على أن يباشر في

أعمال انشائها باقرب وقت ممكن وعلى أن يتم انشاؤها خلال مدة لا تجاوز سبع سنوات اعتباراً من تاريخ نفاذ هذا الدستور .

٣- وإلى أن يتم إنشاء عاصمة الإتحاد تكون أبوظبي المقر المؤقت للإتحاد.

مادة (١٠)

أهداف الإتحاد هي الحفاظ على استقلاله وسيادته وعلى أمنه واستقراره، ودفع كل عدوان على كيانه أو كيان الإمارات الأعضاء فيه ، وحماية حقوق وحريات شعب الإتحاد وتحقيق التعاون الوثيق فيما بين إماراته لصالحها المشترك من أجل هذه الأغراض ، ومن أجل ازدهارها وتقدمها في كافة المجالات وتوفير الحياة الأفضل لجميع المواطنين مع احترام كل إمارة عضو لإستقلال وسيادة الإمارات الأخرى في شؤونها الداخلية في نطاق هذا الدستور .

مادة (١١)

١- تشكل امارات الإتحاد وحدة اقتصادية وجمركية وتنظم القوانين الإتحادية المراحل التدريجية المناسبة لتحقيق تلك الوحدة .

٢- حرية انتقال رؤوس الأموال ومرور جميع البضائع بين إمارات الإتحاد مكفولة ولا يجوز تقييدها إلا بقانون اتحادي .

٣- تلغى جميع الضرائب والرسوم والعوائد والمكوس المفروضة على انتقال البضائع من إمارة الى أخرى من الإمارات الأعضاء .

مادة (١٢)

تستهدف سياسة الإتحاد الخارجية نصرة القضايا والمصالح العربية والإسلامية وتوثيق أواصر الصداقة والتعاون مع جميع الدول والشعوب ، على أساس مبادئ ميثاق الأمم المتحدة ، والأخلاق المثلى الدولية .

﴿ الباب الثاني ﴾

الدعامات الاجتماعية والاقتصادية الأساسية للاتحاد

مادة (١٣)

يتعاون الإتحاد والإمارات الأعضاء فيه ، كل في حدود اختصاصاته وامكانياته ، في تنفيذ أحكام هذا الباب .

مادة (١٤)

المساواة ، والعدالة الإجتماعية ، وتوفير الأمن والطمانينة ، وتكافؤ الفرص لجميع المواطنين ، من دعامات المجتمع . والتعاضد والتراحم صلة وثقى بينهم .

مادة (١٥)

الأسرة أساس المجتمع قوامها الدين والأخلاق وحب الوطن ، ويكفل القانون كيانها ، ويصونها ويحميها من الإنحراف .

مادة (١٦)

يشمل المجتمع برعايته الطفولة والأمومة ويحمي القصر وغيرهم من الأشخاص العاجزين عن رعاية أنفسهم لسبب من الأسباب ، كالمرض أو العجز أو الشيخوخة أو البطالة الإجبارية ، ويتولى مساعدتهم وتاهيلهم لصالحهم وصالح المجتمع .

وتنظم قوانين المساعدات العامة والتامينات الإجتماعية هذه الأمور .

مادة (١٧)

التعليم عامل أساسي لتقدم المجتمع . وهو إلزامي في مرحلته الإبتدائية ومجاني في كل مراحله داخل الإتحاد . ويضع القانون الخطط اللازمة لنشر التعليم وتعميمه بدرجاته المختلفة ، والقضاء على الأمية .

مادة (١٨)

يجوز للأفراد والهيئات انشاء المدارس الخاصة وفقاً لأحكام القانون ، على أن تخضع لرقابة السلطات العامة المختصة وتوجيهاتها .

مادة (١٩)

يكفل المجتمع للمواطنين الرعاية الصحية ، ووسائل الوقاية والعلاج من الأمراض والأوبئة .

ويشجع على انشاء المستشفيات والمستوصفات ودور العلاج العامة والخاصة .

مادة (٢٠)

يقدر المجتمع العمل كركن أساسي من أركان تقدمه . ويعمل على توفيره للمواطنين وتأهيلهم له . ويهيء الظروف الملائمة لذلك بما يضعه من تشريعات تصون حقوق العمال ومصالح أرباب العمل ، على ضوء التشريعات العمالية العالمية المتطورة .

مادة (٢١)

الملكية الخاصة مصونة . ويبين القانون القيود التي ترد عليها . ولا ينزع من أحد ملكه إلا في الأحوال التي تستلزمها المنفعة العامة وفقاً لأحكام القانون ، وفي مقابل تعويض عادل .

مادة (٢٢)

للأموال العامة حرمة ، وحمايتها واجبة على كل مواطن . ويبين القانون الأحوال التي يعاقب فيها على مخالفة هذا الواجب .

مادة (٢٣)

تعتبر الثروات والموارد الطبيعية في كل إمارة مملوكة ملكية عامة لتلك الإمارة . ويقوم المجتمع على حفظها وحسن استغلالها ، لصالح الإقتصاد الوطني .

مادة (٢٤)

الإقتصاد الوطني أساسه العدالة الإجتماعية وقوامه التعاون الصادق بين النشاط العام والنشاط الخاص ، وهدفه تحقيق التنمية الإقتصادية وزيادة الإنتاج ورفع مستوى المعيشة وتحقيق الرخاء للمواطنين في حدود القانون .

ويشجع الإتحاد التعاون والإدخار .

﴿ الباب الثالث ﴾

الحريات والحقوق والواجبات العامة

مادة (٢٥)

جميع الأفراد لدى القانون سواء ، ولا تمييز بين مواطني الإتحاد بسبب الأصل أو الموطن أو العقيدة الدينية أو المركز الإجتماعي .

مادة (٢٦)

الحرية الشخصية مكفولة لجميع المواطنين . ولا يجوز القبض على أحد أو تفتيشه أو حجزه أو حبسه إلا وفق أحكام القانون .

ولا يعرض أي انسان للتعذيب أو المعاملة الحاطة بالكرامة .

مادة (٢٧)

يحدد القانون الجرائم والعقوبات . ولا عقوبة على ما تم من فعل أو ترك قبل صدور القانون الذي ينص عليها .

مادة (٢٨)

العقوبة شخصية ، والمتهم بريء حتى تثبت إدانته في محاكمة قانونية وعادلة ، وللمتهم الحق في أن يوكل من يملك القدرة للدفاع عنه أثناء المحاكمة .

ويبين القانون الأحوال التي يتعين فيها حضور محام عن المتهم .

وإيذاء المتهم جسمانياً أو معنوياً محظور .

مادة (٢٩)

حرية التنقل والإقامة مكفولة للمواطنين في حدود القانون .

مادة (٣٠)

حرية الراي والتعبير عنه بالقول والكتابة ، وسائر وسائل التعبير مكفولة في حدود القانون .

مادة (٣١)

حرية المراسلات البريدية والبرقية وغيرها من وسائل الإتصال وسريتها مكفولة وفقاً للقانون .

مادة (٣٢)

حرية القيام بشعائر الدين طبقاً للعادات المرعية مصونة ، على الا يخل ذلك بالنظام العام ، أو ينافي الآداب العامة .

مادة (٣٣)

حرية الإجتماع ، وتكوين الجمعيات ، مكفولة في حدود القانون .

مادة (٣٤)

كل مواطن حر في اختيار عمله أو مهنته أو حرفته في حدود القانون ، وبمراعاة التشريعات المنظمة لبعض هذه المهن والحرف .

ولا يجوز فرض عمل اجباري على أحد إلا في الأحوال الإستثنائية التي ينص عليها القانون ، وبشرط التعويض عنه .

لا يجوز استعباد أي انسان .

مادة (٣٥)

باب الوظائف العامة مفتوح لجميع المواطنين ، على أساس المساواة بينهم في الظروف ، ووفقاً لأحكام القانون .

والوظائف العامة خدمة وطنية تناط بالقائمين بها . ويستهدف الموظف العام في أداء واجبات وظيفته المصلحة العامة وحدها .

مادة (٣٦)

للمساكن حرمة فلا يجوز دخولها بغير إذن أهلها إلا وفق أحكام القانون وفي الأحوال المحددة فيه .

مادة (٣٧)

لا يجوز ابعاد المواطنين ، أو نفيهم من الإتحاد .

مادة (٣٨)

تسليم المواطنين ، واللاجئين السياسيين ، محظور .

مادة (٣٩)

المصادرة العامة للأموال محظورة ، ولا تكون عقوبة المصادرة الخاصة إلا بناءً على حكم قضائي ، وفي الأحوال المنصوص عليها في القانون .

مادة (٤٠)

يتمتع الأجانب في الإتحاد بالحقوق والحريات المقررة في المواثيق الدولية المرعية ، أو في المعاهدات والإتفاقيات التي يكون الإتحاد طرفا فيها وعليهم الواجبات المقابلة لها .

مادة (٤١)

لكل انسان أن يتقدم بالشكوى الى الجهات المختصة بما في ذلك الجهات القضائية من امتهان الحقوق والحريات المنصوص عليها في هذا الباب .

مادة (٤٢)

أداء الضرائب والتكاليف العامة المقررة قانوناً ، واجب على كل مواطن .

مادة (٤٣)

الدفاع عن الإتحاد فرض مقدس على كل مواطن ، وأداء الخدمة العسكرية شرف للمواطنين ينظمه القانون .

مادة (٤٤)

إحترام الدستور والقوانين والأوامر الصادرة من السلطات العامة تنفيذاً لها ومراعاة النظام العام واحترام الآداب العامة ، واجب على جميع سكان الإتحاد .

﴿ الباب الرابع ﴾

السلطـات الاتحاديـة

مادة (٤٥)

تتكون السلطات الإتحادية من :-

١- المجلس الأعلى للإتحـاد .

٢- رئيس الإتحـاد ونائبـه .

٣- مجلس وزراء الإتـحاد .

٤- المجلس الوطني الإتحادي .

٥- القضـاء الإتـحـادي .

﴿ الفصل الأول ﴾

الـمجلس الأعلى للإتحاد

مادة (٤٦)

المجلس الأعلى للإتحاد هو السلطة العليا فيه . ويشكل من حكام جميع الإمارات المكونة للإتحاد، أو من يقوم مقامهم في اماراتهم ،في حال غيابهم ، أو تعذر حضورهم .

ولكل امارة صوت واحد في مداولات المجلس .

مادة (٤٧)

يتولى المجلس الأعلى للإتحاد الأمور التالية :-

١- رسم السياسة العامة في جميع المسائل الموكولة للإتحاد بمقتضى هذا الدستور والنظر في كل ما من شانه أن يحقق أهداف الإتحاد والمصالح المشتركة للإمارات الأعضاء .

٢- التصديق على القوانين الإتحادية المختلفة قبل اصدارها بما في ذلك قوانين الميزانية العامة السنوية للإتحاد والحساب الختامي .

٣- التصديق على المراسيم المتعلقة بأمور خاضعة بمقتضى أحكام هذا الدستور لتصديق او موافقة المجلس الأعلى ، وذلك قبل اصدار هذه المراسيم من رئيس الإتحاد .

٤- التصديق على المعاهدات والإتفاقيات الدولية ، ويتم هذا التصديق بمرسوم .

٥- الموافقة على تعيين رئيس مجلس وزراء الإتحاد وقبول استقالته واعفائه من منصبه بناءً على اقتراح رئيس الإتحاد .

٦- الموافقة على تعيين رئيس وقضاة المحكمة الإتحادية العليا وقبول استقالاتهم وفصلهم في الأحوال التي ينص عليها هذا الدستور، ويتم كل ذلك بمراسيم .

٧- الرقابة العليا على شؤون الإتحاد بوجه عام .

٨- اية اختصاصات أخرى منصوص عليها في هذا الدستور او في القوانين الإتحادية .

مادة (٤٨)

١- يضع المجلس الأعلى لانحته الداخلية متضمنة نظام سير العمل فيه، وطريقة التصويت على قراراته . ومداولات المجلس سرية .

٢- ينشئ المجلس الأعلى امانة عامة له تزود بعدد كاف من الموظفين لمعاونته على اداء اعماله .

مادة (٤٩)

تصدر قرارات المجلس الأعلى في المسائل الموضوعية بأغلبية خمسة أعضاء من أعضائه على أن تشمل هذه الأغلبية صوتي امارتي أبوظبي ودبي . وتلتزم الأقلية برأي الأغلبية المذكورة .

اما قرارات المجلس في المسائل الإجرائية فتصدر بأغلبية الأصوات . وتحدد اللائحة الداخلية للمجلس هذه المسائل .

مادة (٥٠)

يعقد المجلس الأعلى اجتماعاته في عاصمة الإتحاد . ويجوز أن ينعقد في أي مكان آخر يتم الإتفاق عليه مسبقاً .

﴿ الفصل الثاني ﴾

رئيس الاتحاد ونائبه

مادة (٥١)

ينتخب المجلس الأعلى للإتحاد من بين أعضائه رئيساً للإتحاد ونائباً لرئيس الإتحاد. ويمارس نائب رئيس الإتحاد جميع اختصاصات الرئيس عند غيابه لأي سبب من الأسباب .

مادة (٥٢)

مدة الرئيس ونائبه خمس سنوات ميلادية . ويجوز اعادة انتخابهما لذات المنصب . ويؤدي كل منهما عند توليه أعباء منصبه اليمين التالية أمام المجلس الأعلى :

'' أقسم بالله العظيم أن أكون مخلصاً للإمارات العربية المتحدة وأن أحترم دستورها وقوانينها وأن أرعى مصالح شعب الإتحاد ، وأن أؤدي واجبي بأمانة واخلاص وأحافظ على استقلال الإتحاد وسلامة أراضيه '' .

مادة (٥٣)

عند خلو منصب الرئيس أو نائبه بالوفاة أو الإستقالة أو انتهاء حكم أي منهما في امارته لسبب من الأسباب ، يدعى المجلس الأعلى خلال شهر من ذلك التاريخ للاجتماع ، لانتخاب خلف لشغل المنصب الشاغر للمدة المنصوص عليها في المادة (٥٢) من هذا الدستور ، وعند خلو منصبي رئيس المجلس الأعلى ونائبه معاً ، يجتمع المجلس فوراً بدعوة بأي من أعضائه ، أو من رئيس مجلس وزراء الإتحاد ، لانتخاب رئيس ونائب رئيس جديدين لملء المنصبين الشاغرين .

مادة (٥٤)

يباشر رئيس الإتحاد الإختصاصات التالية :-

١- يرأس المجلس الأعلى ، ويدير مناقشاته .

٢- يدعو المجلس الأعلى للإجتماع ، ويفض اجتماعاته ، وفقاً للقواعد الإجرائية التي يقررها المجلس في لائحته الداخلية . ويجب دعوة المجلس للإجتماع متى طلب ذلك أحد أعضائه .

٣- يدعو لاجتماع مشترك بين المجلس الأعلى ومجلس وزراء الإتحاد كلما اقتضت الضرورة ذلك .

٤- يوقع القوانين والمراسيم والقرارات الإتحادية التي يصدق عليها المجلس الأعلى ، ويصدرها .

٥- يعين رئيس مجلس وزراء الإتحاد ويقبل استقالته ويعفيه من

منصبه بموافقة المجلس الأعلى . كما يعين نائب رئيس مجلس وزراء الإتحاد والوزراء ويقبل استقالاتهم ويعفيهم من مناصبهم بناءً على اقتراح رئيس مجلس وزراء الإتحاد .

٦- يعين الممثلين الدبلوماسيين للإتحاد لدى الدول الإجنبية وغيرهم من كبار الموظفين الإتحاديين المدنيين والعسكريين (باستثناء رئيس وقضاة المحكمة الإتحادية العليا) ويقبل استقالاتهم ويعزلهم بناءً على موافقة مجلس وزراء الإتحاد . ويتم هذا التعيين أو قبول الإستقالة أو العزل بمراسيم وطبقاً للقوانين الإتحادية .

٧- يوقع أوراق اعتماد الممثلين الدبلوماسيين للإتحاد لدى الدول والهيئات الأجنبية ويقبل اعتماد الممثلين الدبلوماسيين والقنصليين للدول الإجنبية لدى الإتحاد ويتلقى أوراق اعتمادهم كما يوقع وثائق تعيين وبراءات اعتماد الممثلين .

٨- يشرف على تنفيذ القوانين والمراسيم والقرارات الاتحادية بواسطة مجلس وزراء الإتحاد والوزراء المختصين .

٩- يمثل الإتحاد في الداخل وتجاه الدول الأخرى ، وفي جميع العلاقات الدولية .

١٠- يمارس حق العفو أو تخفيف العقوبة ويصادق على أحكام الاعدام وفقاً لأحكام الدستور والقوانين الاتحادية .

١١- يمنح أوسمة وأنواط الشرف العسكرية والمدنية ، وفقاً للقوانين الخاصة بهذه الأوسمة والأنواط .

١٢- اية اختصاصات اخرى يخوله إياها المجلس الأعلى او تخول له بمقتضى احكام هذا الدستور او القوانين الإتحادية .

﴿ الفصل الثالث ﴾

مجلس وزراء الاتحاد

مادة (٥٥)

يتكون مجلس الوزراء الاتحادي من رئيس مجلس الوزراء ونائبه وعدد من الوزراء .

مادة (٥٦)

يكون اختيار الوزراء من بين مواطني الإتحاد المشهود لهم بالكفاءة والخبرة.

مادة (٥٧)

يؤدي رئيس مجلس الوزراء ونائبه والوزراء ، قبل مباشرة أعباء مناصبهم أمام رئيس الإتحاد اليمين التالية :

" أقسم بالله العظيم أن أكون مخلصاً للإمارات العربية المتحدة وأن أحترم دستور الإتحاد وقوانينه ، وأن أؤدي واجباتي بالأمانة وأن أرعى مصالح شعب الإتحاد رعاية كاملة ، وأن أحافظ محافظة تامة على كيان الإتحاد وسلامة أراضيه " .

مادة (٥٨)

يحدد القانون اختصاصات الوزارات وصلاخيات كل وزير . ويشمل اول مجلس وزراء اتحادي الوزارات التالية :

١- الخارجيـــــــة ٢- الداخليـــــــــــة
٣- الدفـــــــــاع ٤- المالية والاقتصاد والصناعة
٥- العـــــــــدل ٦- التربيـــــة والتعليـــــم
٧- الصحـــة العامـــــة ٨- الأشغال العامـة والزراعـــة
٩- المواصلات والبريد والبرق والهاتف ١٠- العمل والشؤون الاجتماعية
١١- الإعـــــــــلام ١٢- التخطيـــــــــــط

مادة (٥٩)

يتولى رئيس مجلس الوزراء رئاسة جلسات المجلس ، ويدعوه للانعقاد ويدير مناقشاته ويتابع نشاط الوزراء ، ويشرف على تنسيق العمل بين الوزارات المختلفة وفي كافة الأجهزة التنفيذية للإتحاد .

ويمارس نائب رئيس الوزراء جميع سلطات الرئيس عند غيابه لأي سبب من الأسباب .

مادة (٦٠)

يتولى مجلس الوزراء ، بوصفه الهيئة التنفيذية للإتحاد وتحت الرقابة العليا لرئيس الإتحاد وللمجلس الأعلى ، تصريف جميع الشؤون الداخلية والخارجية التي يختص بها الإتحاد بموجب هذا الدستور والقوانين الاتحادية .

ويمارس مجلس الوزراء بوجه خاص ، الاختصاصات التالية :

١- متابعة تنفيذ السياسة العامة لحكومة الإتحاد في الداخل والخارج .

٢- اقتراح مشروعات القوانين الإتحادية واحالتها الى المجلس الوطني الاتحادي قبل رفعها الى رئيس الإتحاد لعرضها على المجلس الأعلى للتصديق عليها .

٣- اعداد مشروع الميزانية السنوية العامة للإتحاد ، والحساب الختامي .

٤- اعداد مشروعات المراسيم والقرارات المختلفة .

٥- وضع اللوائح اللازمة لتنفيذ القوانين الإتحادية بما ليس فيه تعديل أو تعطيل لها أو اعفاء من تنفيذها ، وكذلك لوائح الضبط ، واللوائح الخاصة بترتيب الإدارات والمصالح العامة ، في حدود أحكام هذا الدستور والقوانين الإتحادية . ويجوز بنص خاص في القانون ، أو لمجلس الوزراء ، تكليف الوزير الإتحادي المختص أو أية جهة ادارية أخرى ، في اصدار بعض هذه اللوائح .

٦- الإشراف على تنفيذ القوانين والمراسيم واللوائح والقرارات الإتحادية بواسطة كافة الجهات المعنية في الإتحاد أو الإمارات .

٧- الإشراف على تنفيذ أحكام المحاكم الإتحادية ، والمعاهدات والإتفاقيات الدولية التي يبرمها الإتحاد .

٨- تعيين وعزل الموظفين الاتحاديين وفقاً لأحكام القانون ، ممن لا يتطلب تعيينهم أو عزلهم إصدار مراسيم بذلك .

٩- مراقبة سير الإدارات والمصالح العامة الاتحادية ، ومسلك وانضباط موظفي الإتحاد عموماً .

١٠- أية اختصاصات أخرى يخوله إياها القانون ، أو المجلس الأعلى ، في حدود هذا الدستور

مادة (٦١)

مداولات مجلس الوزراء سرية وتصدر قراراته بأغلبية جميع أعضائه وعند تساوي الأصوات يرجح الجانب الذي فيه الرئيس .

وتلتزم الأقلية براي الأغلبية .

مادة (٦٢)

لا يجوز لرئيس مجلس الوزراء أو نائبه أو لأي وزير اتحادي ، أثناء توليه منصبه ، ان يزاول أي عمل مهني أو تجاري او مالي ، أو ان يدخل في

معاملة تجارية مع حكومة الإتحاد أو حكومات الإمارات ، أو أن يجمع بين منصبه والعضوية في مجلس إدارة شركة تجارية أو مالية .

كما لا يجوز له أن يجمع الى منصبه أكثر من منصب رسمي واحد في إحدى الإمارات مع التخلي عن سائر مناصبه الرسمية المحلية الأخرى إن وجدت .

مادة (٦٣)

على اعضاء مجلس الوزراء ان يستهدفوا بسلوكهم مصالح الإتحاد وإعلاء كلمة الصالح العام وإنكار المصالح الذاتية إنكاراً كلياً والا يستغلوا مراكزهم الرسمية بأية صورة كانت لفائدتهم أو لفائدة من تصلهم به علاقة خاصة .

مادة (٦٤)

رئيس مجلس الوزراء والوزراء مسؤولون سياسياً بالتضامن أمام رئيس الإتحاد والمجلس الأعلى للإتحاد عن تنفيذ السياسة العامة للإتحاد في الداخل والخارج . وكل منهم مسؤول شخصياً أمام رئيس الإتحاد والمجلس الأعلى عن اعمال وزارته أو منصبه .

تؤدي استقالة رئيس مجلس الوزراء، أو إعفاؤه من منصبه، أو وفاته، أو خلو منصبه لأي سبب من الأسباب الى استقالة الوزارة بكاملها . ولرئيس الإتحاد ان يطلب الى الوزراء البقاء في مناصبهم مؤقتاً ، لتصريف العاجل من الأمور الى حين تشكيل الوزارة الجديدة .

مادة (٦٥)

يقدم مجلس الوزراء الى رئيس الإتحاد لعرضه على المجلس الأعلى ، في بداية كل سنة مالية تقريراً مفصلاً عن الأعمال التي انجزت في الداخل ، وعن علاقات الإتحاد بالدول الأخرى والمنظمات الدولية ، مقروناً بتوصيات الوزارة عن افضل الوسائل الكفيلة بتوطيد أركان الإتحاد وتعزيز أمنه واستقراره ، وتحقيق أهدافه وتقدمه في كافة الميادين .

مادة (٦٦)

١- يضع مجلس الوزراء لائحته الداخلية متضمنة نظام سير العمل فيه .

٢- ينشئ مجلس الوزراء أمانة عامة له تزود بعدد من الموظفين لمعاونته على أداء أعماله .

مادة (٦٧)

يعين القانون مرتبات رئيس مجلس الوزراء ونائبه وسائر الوزراء .

﴿ الفصل الرابع ﴾

المجلس الوطني الاتحادي

الفرع الأول
أحكام عامة

مادة (٦٨)

يشكل المجلس الوطني الإتحادي من ٣٤ عضواً ويوزع عدد مقاعد المجلس على الإمارات الأعضاء كما يلي :

أبوظبي	(٨) مقاعد
دبي	(٨) مقاعد
الشارقة	(٦) مقاعد
عجمان	(٤) مقاعد
أم القيوين	(٤) مقاعد
الفجيرة	(٤) مقاعد

مادة (٦٩)

يترك لكل إمارة تحديد طريقة اختيار المواطنين الذين يمثلونها في المجلس الوطني الإتحادي .

مادة (٧٠)

يشترط في عضو المجلس الوطني الإتحادي :

١- أن يكون من مواطني إحدى امارات الإتحاد ، ومقيماً بصفة دائمة في الإمارة التي يمثلها في المجلس .

٢- لا تقل سنه عند اختياره عن خمس وعشرين سنة ميلادية .

٣- أن يكون متمتعاً بالأهلية المدنية ، محمود السيرة ، حسن السمعة ، لم يسبق الحكم عليه في جريمة مخلة بالشرف ، ما لم يكن قد رد اليه اعتباره طبقاً للقانون .

٤- أن يكون لديه إلمام كاف بالقراءة والكتابة .

مادة (٧١)

لا يجوز الجمع بين عضوية المجلس الوطني الإتحادي واية وظيفة من الوظائف العامة في الإتحاد بما في ذلك المناصب الوزارية .

مادة (٧٢)

مدة العضوية في المجلس سنتان ميلاديتان ، تبدأ من تاريخ أول اجتماع له . ويحدد المجلس بعدها تجديداً للمدة الباقية حتى نهاية فترة الإنتقال المشار اليها في المادة ١٤٤ في هذا الدستور .

ويجوز إعادة اختيار من انتهت مدة عضويتهم من الأعضاء .

مادة (٧٣)

قبل أن يباشر عضو المجلس الوطني الإتحادي أعماله في المجلس ولجانه، يؤدي أمام المجلس في جلسة علنية اليمين التالية :-

" أقسم بالله العظيم أن أكون مخلصاً للإمارات العربية المتحدة وأن أحترم دستور الإتحاد وقوانينه ، وأن أؤدي أعمالي في المجلس ولجانه بأمانة وصدق " .

مادة (٧٤)

إذا خلا محل أحد أعضاء المجلس قبل نهاية مدة عضويته لسبب من الأسباب فيجري اختيار بدل خلال شهرين من تاريخ إعلان المجلس هذا الخلو ، ما لم يقع الخلو خلال الأشهر الثلاثة السابقة على نهاية مدة المجلس .

ويكمل العضو الجديد مدة عضوية سلفه .

مادة (٧٥)

يعقد المجلس جلساته في مقر عاصمة الإتحاد ، ويجوز استثناءً أن ينعقد في أي مكان آخر داخل الإتحاد ، بناءً على قرار يتخذه المجلس بأغلبية أصوات أعضائه جميعاً وبموافقة مجلس الوزراء .

مادة (٧٦)

يفصل المجلس في صحة نيابة أعضائه ، وفي اسقاط العضوية عنهم اذا فقدوا أحد شروطها وذلك بأغلبية جميع أعضائه بناءً على اقتراح خمسة منهم .

وهو المختص بقبول الإستقالة من العضوية ، وتعتبر الإستقالة نهائية من تاريخ قبول المجلس لها .

مادة (٧٧)

عضو المجلس الإتحادي ينوب عن شعب الإتحاد جميعه ، وليس فقط عن الإمارة التي يمثلها داخل المجلس .

الفرع الثاني

نظـام العمـل في المجلس

مادة (٧٨)

يعقد المجلس دورة عادية سنوية لا تقل مدتها عن ستة شهور ، تبدأ في الأسبوع الثالث من شهر نوفمبر من كل عام ، ويمكن دعوته للانعقاد في دور غير عادي كلما دعت الحاجة ، ولا يجوز للمجلس في دور الإنعقاد غير العادي أن ينظر في غير الأمور التي دعي من أجلها واستثناء من حكم الفقرة السابقة ، يدعو رئيس الإتحاد المجلس الوطني الإتحادي لعقد دورته العادية الأولى في ظرف مدة لا تجاوز ستين يوماً من تاريخ العمل بهذا الدستور وتنتهي هذه الدورة في الموعد الذي يقرره المجلس الأعلى بمرسوم .

مادة (٧٩)

تكون دعوة المجلس للانعقاد ، وفض الدورة "بمرسوم" يصدره رئيس الإتحاد بموافقة مجلس وزراء الإتحاد ، وكل اجتماع يعقده المجلس بدون دعوة رسمية للانعقاد ، أو في غير المكان القانوني المقرر لعقد اجتماعاته بموجب هذا الدستور يعتبر باطلاً ولا يترتب عليه أي أثر .

ومع ذلك إذا لم يدع المجلس للانعقاد لدورته العادية السنوية قبل الأسبوع الثالث من نوفمبر ، انعقد من تلقاء نفسه في الحادي والعشرين من الشهر المذكور .

مادة (٨٠)

يفتتح رئيس الاتحاد الدور العادي السنوي للمجلس ، ويلقي فيه خطاباً يتضمن بيان أحوال البلاد ، وأهم الأحداث والشؤون الهامة التي جرت خلال العام ، وما تعتزم حكومة الإتحاد اجراءه من مشروعات واصلاحات خلال الدورة الجديدة .

ولرئيس الإتحاد أن ينيب عنه في الإفتتاح ، أو في إلقاء الخطاب ، نائبه أو رئيس مجلس وزراء الإتحاد .

وعلى المجلس الإتحادي أن يختار لجنة من بين أعضائه لإعداد مشروع الرد على خطاب الإفتتاح ، متضمناً ملاحظات المجلس وأمانيه ، ويرفع الرد بعد اقراره من المجلس الى رئيس الإتحاد ، لعرضه على المجلس الأعلى .

مادة (٨١)

لا يؤاخذ أعضاء المجلس عما يبدونه من الأفكار والآراء في أثناء قيامهم بعملهم داخل المجلس أو لجانه .

مادة (٨٢)

لا يجوز أثناء انعقاد المجلس ، وفي غير حالة التلبس بالجريمة أن تتخذ أية اجراءات جزائية ضد أي من أعضائه ، إلا بأذن المجلس ، وفي حالة اتخاذ مثل هذه الإجراءات في غيبة المجلس يجب اخطاره بها .

مادة (٨٣)

يستحق رئيس المجلس وسائر أعضائه من تاريخ حلف اليمين أمام المجلس مكافأة يحددها القانون ، وبدل انتقال من محال اقامتهم الى مقر اجتماعات المجلس .

مادة (٨٤)

يكون للمجلس هيئة مكتب تشكل من رئيس ونائب اول ونائب ثان ، ومن مراقبين اثنين يختارهم المجلس جميعاً من بين اعضائه .

وتنتهي مدة كل من الرئيس ونائبيه بانتهاء مدة المجلس او بحله وفقاً لأحكام الفقرة الثانية من المادة (٨٨) .

وتنتهي مدة المراقبين باختيار مراقبين جديدين في مستهل الدورة السنوية العادية التالية ، واذا خلا احد المناصب في هيئة المكتب اختار المجلس من يشغله للمدة الباقية .

مادة (٨٥)

يكون للمجلس امين عام ، يعاونه عدد من الموظفين يتبعون المجلس مباشرة ، وتحدد اللائحة الداخلية للمجلس شروط خدماتهم واختصاصاتهم .

ويتولى المجلس وضع لائحته الداخلية . وتصدر بمرسوم يصدره رئيس الإتحاد بموافقة مجلس الوزراء .

وتحدد اللائحة الداخلية اختصاصات رئيس المجلس ونائبيه والمراقبين ، وبوجه عام كل ما يتعلق بشؤون المجلس ولجانه واعضائه وهيئة امانته وموظفيه ، وقواعد واجراءات المناقشة والتصويت في المجلس واللجان ، وغير ذلك من شؤون ، في حدود احكام هذا الدستور .

مادة (٨٦)

جلسات المجلس علنية . وتعقد الجلسات سرية إذا طلب ذلك ممثل الحكومة او رئيس المجلس او ثلث اعضائه .

مادة (٨٧)

لا تكون مداولات المجلس صحيحة إلا بحضور أغلبية أعضائه على الأقل.

وتصدر القرارات بالأغلبية المطلقة لأصوات الأعضاء الحاضرين ، وذلك في غير الحالات التي يشترط فيها أغلبية خاصة ، واذا تساوت الأصوات يرجح الجانب الذي فيه رئيس الجلسة .

مادة (٨٨)

يجوز بمرسوم يصدره رئيس الإتحاد بموافقة مجلس وزراء الإتحاد تأجيل اجتماعات المجلس لمدة لا تجاوز شهراً واحداً ، على ألا يتكرر ذلك في الدورة الواحدة إلا بموافقة المجلس ولمرة واحدة . ولا تحتسب فترة التأجيل ضمن مدة الدورة العادية .

كما يجوز بمرسوم يصدره رئيس الإتحاد بموافقة المجلس الأعلى للإتحاد حل المجلس الوطني الإتحادي ، على أن يتضمن مرسوم الحل دعوة المجلس الجديد للإنعقاد في أجل لا يجاوز ستين يوماً من تاريخ مرسوم الحل . ولا يجوز حل المجلس مدة أخرى لنفس الأسباب .

الفرع الثالث

اختصاصات المجلس

مادة (٨٩)

مع عدم الإخلال بأحكام المادة (١١٠) تعرض مشروعات القوانين الإتحادية بما في ذلك مشروعات القوانين المالية على المجلس الوطني الإتحادي قبل رفعها الى رئيس الإتحاد لعرضها على المجلس الأعلى للتصديق عليها ويناقش المجلس الوطني الإتحادي هذه المشروعات وله أن يوافق عليها أو يعدلها أو يرفضها .

مادة (٩٠)

ينظر المجلس في دورته العادية في مشروع قانون الميزانية العامة السنوية للإتحاد ، وفي مشروع قانون الحساب الختامي وذلك طبقاً للأحكام الواردة في الباب الثامن من هذا الدستور .

مادة (٩١)

تتولى الحكومة إبلاغ المجلس الإتحادي بالمعاهدات والإتفاقيات الدولية التي تجريها مع الدول الأخرى والمنظمات الدولية المختلفة ، مشفوعة بما يناسب من بيان .

مادة (٩٢)

للمجلس الوطني الإتحادي أن يناقش أي موضوع من الموضوعات العامة المتعلقة بشؤون الإتحاد إلا إذا أبلغ مجلس الوزراء المجلس الوطني الإتحادي بأن مناقشة ذلك الموضوع مخالفة لمصالح الاتحاد العليا ، ويحضر رئيس الوزراء او الوزير المختص النقاش ، وللمجلس الوطني الإتحادي أن يعبر عن توصياته ويحدد الموضوعات التي يناقشها واذا لم يقر مجلس الوزراء تلك التوصيات اخطر المجلس الوطني الإتحادي بأسباب ذلك .

مادة (٩٣)

يمثل حكومة الإتحاد في جلسات المجلس الوطني الإتحادي ، رئيس مجلس الوزراء او نائبه أو احد أعضاء الوزارة الإتحادية على الأقل .

ويجيب رئيس الوزراء او نائبه او الوزير المختص على الأسئلة التي يوجهها إليهم أي عضو من أعضاء المجلس للاستفسار عن الأمور الداخلة في اختصاصاتهم ، وذلك وفقاً للإجراءات المقررة في اللائحة الداخلية للمجلس .

﴿ الفصل الخامس ﴾

القضاء في الاتحاد والامارات

مادة (٩٤)

العدل أساس الملك . والقضاة مستقلون لا سلطان عليهم في أداء واجبهم لغير القانون وضمانرهم .

مادة (٩٥)

يكون للإتحاد محكمة اتحادية عليا ، ومحاكم اتحادية ابتدائية وذلك على الوجه المبين في المواد التالية .

مادة (٩٦)

تشكل المحكمة الإتحادية العليا من رئيس وعدد من القضاة لا يزيدون جميعاً على خمسة يعينون بمرسوم يصدره رئيس الإتحاد بعد مصادقة المجلس الأعلى عليه . ويحدد القانون عدد دوائر المحكمة ونظامها واجراءاتها وشروط الخدمة والتقاعد لأعضائها والشروط والمؤهلات الواجب توافرها فيهم .

مادة (٩٧)

رئيس المحكمة الإتحادية العليا وقضاتها لا يعزلون إبان توليهم القضاء، ولا تنتهي ولايتهم إلا لأحد الأسباب التالية :

١- الوفـــاة .

٢- الإستقالة .

٣- انتهاء مدة عقود المتعاقدين منهم أو مدة اعارتهم .

٤- بلوغ سن الإحالة الى التقاعد .

٥- ثبوت عجزهم عن القيام بمهام وظائفهم لأسباب صحية .

٦- الفصل التأديبي بناءً على الأسباب والإجراءات المنصوص عليها في القانون .

٧- إسناد مناصب أخرى لهم بموافقتهم .

مادة (٩٨)

يؤدي رئيس المحكمة الإتحادية العليا وقضاتها ، قبل مباشرة وظائفهم اليمين أمام رئيس الإتحاد ، بحضور وزير العدل الإتحادي ، بأن يحكموا بالعدل دون خشية أو محاباة ، وبأن يخلصوا لدستور الإتحاد وقوانينه .

مادة (٩٩)

تختص المحكمة الإتحادية العليا بالفصل في الأمور التالية :

١- المنازعات المختلفة بين الإمارات الأعضاء في الإتحاد ، أو بين أية إمارة أو أكثر وبين حكومة الإتحاد ، متى أحيلت هذه المنازعات الى المحكمة بناءً على طلب أي طرف من الأطراف المعنية .

٢- بحث دستورية القوانين الإتحادية ، اذا ما طعن فيها من قبل امارة أو أكثر لمخالفتها لدستور الإتحاد .

وبحث دستورية التشريعات الصادرة عن إحدى الإمارات ، إذا ما طعن فيها من قبل إحدى السلطات الإتحادية ، لمخالفتها لدستور الإتحاد، أو للقوانين الإتحادية .

٣- بحث دستورية القوانين والتشريعات واللوائح عموماً ، إذا ما أحيل إليها هذا الطلب من أية محكمة من محاكم البلاد أثناء دعوى منظورة أمامها وعلى المحكمة المذكورة أن تلتزم بقرار المحكمة الإتحادية العليا الصادر بهذا الصدد .

٤- تفسير أحكام الدستور اذا ما طلبت اليها ذلك إحدى سلطات

الإتحاد، أو حكومة إحدى الإمارات. ويعتبر هذا التفسير ملزماً للكافة،

٥- مسائلة الوزراء ، وكبار موظفي الإتحاد المعينين بمرسوم ، عما يقع منهم من أفعال في أداء وظائفهم الرسمية بناءً على طلب المجلس الأعلى ووفقاً للقانون الخاص بذلك .

٦- الجرائم التي لها مساس مباشر بمصالح الإتحاد ، كالجرائم المتعلقة بأمنه في الداخل أو الخارج ، وجرائم تزوير المحررات أو الأختام الرسمية لأحدى السلطات الإتحادية، وجرائم تزييف العملة .

٧- تنازع الإختصاص بين القضاء الإتحادي والهيئات القضائية المحلية في الإمارات .

٨- تنازع الإختصاص بين هيئة قضائية في امارة وهيئة قضائية في امارة أخرى وتنظم القواعد الخاصة بذلك بقانون اتحادي .

٩- أية اختصاصات أخرى منصوص عليها في هذا الدستور أو يمكن أن تحال إليها بموجب قانون إتحادي .

مادة (١٠٠)

تعقد المحكمة الإتحادية العليا جلساتها بمقر عاصمة الإتحاد . ويجوز لها استثناء أن تنعقد عند الإقتضاء في أية عاصمة من عواصم الإمارات .

مادة (١٠١)

أحكام المحكمة الإتحادية العليا نهائية ، وملزمة للكافة .

وإذا ما قررت المحكمة عند فصلها في دستورية القوانين والتشريعات واللوائح ، أن تشريعاً اتحادياً ما جاء مخالفاً لدستور الإتحاد ، أو أن التشريع أو اللائحة المحلية موضوع النظر يتضمنان مخالفة لدستور الإتحاد أو لقانون إتحادي ، تعين على السلطة المعنية في الإتحاد أو في الإمارات بحسب الأحوال ، المبادرة الى اتخاذ ما يلزم من تدابير لإزالة المخالفة الدستورية ، أو لتصحيحها .

مادة (١٠٢)

يكون للإتحاد محكمة اتحادية ابتدائية أو أكثر ، تنعقد في عاصمة الإتحاد الدائمة ، أو في بعض عواصم الإمارات ، لممارسة الولاية القضائية في دائرة اختصاصها في القضايا التالية :-

١- المنازعات المدنية والتجارية والإدارية بين الإتحاد والأفراد ، سواء كان الإتحاد مدعياً أو مدعى عليه فيها .

٢- الجرائم التي ترتكب ضمن حدود العاصمة الإتحادية الدائمة باستثناء ما تختص بنظره المحكمة الإتحادية العليا بموجب المادة (٩٩) من هذا الدستور .

٣- قضايا الأحوال الشخصية والقضايا المدنية والتجارية وغيرها بين الأفراد التي تنشأ في العاصمة الإتحادية الدائمة .

مادة (١٠٣)

ينظم القانون كل ما يتعلق بالمحاكم الإتحادية الإبتدائية من حيث ترتيبها وتشكيلها ودوائرها واختصاصها المكاني ، والإجراءات التي تتبع أمامها ، واليمين التي يؤديها قضاة هذه المحاكم ، وشروط الخدمة المتعلقة بهم ، وطرق الطعن في أحكامهم .

ويجوز أن ينص القانون على استئناف أحكام تلك المحاكم أمام إحدى دوائر المحكمة الإتحادية العليا ، في الحالات وبالإجراءات التي يحددها .

مادة (١٠٤)

تتولى الهيئات القضائية المحلية في كل إمارة جميع المسائل القضائية التي لم يعهد بها للقضاء الإتحادي بمقتضى أحكام هذا الدستور .

مادة (١٠٥)

يجوز بقانون إتحادي يصدر بناءً على طلب الإمارة المعنية ، نقل كل او بعض الإختصاصات التي تتولاها هيئاتها القضائية المحلية بموجب المادة

السابقة الى المحاكم الإتحادية الإبتدائية .

كما يحدد بقانون اتحادي الحالات التي يجوز فيها استئناف أحكام الهيئات القضائية المحلية في القضايا الجزائية والمدنية والتجارية وغيرها، أمام المحاكم الإتحادية على أن يكون قضاؤها عند الفصل في هذا الإستئناف نهائياً .

مادة (١٠٦)

يكون للإتحاد نائب عام يعين بمرسوم اتحادي يصدر بموافقة مجلس الوزراء . ويعاون النائب العام عدد من أعضاء النيابة العامة .

وينظم القانون الشؤون المتعلقة بأعضاء النيابة العامة الإتحادية ، من حيث طريقة تعيين أعضائها ودرجاتهم وترقياتهم وتقاعدهم والمؤهلات الواجب توافرها فيهم .

كما ينظم قانون الإجراءات والمحاكمات الجزائية الإتحادي اختصاصات هذه الهيئة واجراءاتها ، وصلاحيات معاونيها من رجال الضبط والأمن العام .

مادة (١٠٧)

لرئيس الإتحاد أن يعفو عن تنفيذ العقوبة المحكوم بها من جهة قضائية اتحادية ، قبل تنفيذ الحكم ، أو أثناء التنفيذ ، أو أن يخفف هذه العقوبة ، وذلك بناءً على عرض وزير العدل الإتحادي ، وبعد موافقة لجنة مشكلة برئاسة الوزير ، من ستة أعضاء يختارهم مجلس وزراء الإتحاد ، لمدة ثلاث سنوات قابلة للتجديد ، من بين المواطنين ذوي الراي والكفاية في البلاد .

والعضوية في اللجنة مجانية ، ومداولاتها سرية . وتصدر قراراتها بأغلبية الأصوات .

مادة (١٠٨)

لا تنفذ عقوبة الإعدام الصادرة نهائياً من جهة قضائية اتحادية ، إلا بعد مصادقة رئيس الإتحاد على الحكم . وله أن يستبدل بها عقوبة أخرى أخف منها ، وذلك بمراعاة الإجراءات المنصوص عليها في المادة السابقة.

مادة (١٠٩)

العفو الشامل عن جريمة أو جرائم معينة ، لا يكون إلا بقانون .

ويترتب على صدور قانون العفو اعتبار تلك الجرائم كأن لم تكن ، والإعفاء من تنفيذ العقوبة أو الجزء المتبقي منها .

﴿ الباب الخامس ﴾

التشريعات والمراسيم الاتحادية والجهات المختصة بها

﴿ الفصل الأول ﴾

القوانين الاتحادية

مادة (١١٠)

١- تصدر القوانين الإتحادية بموجب احكام هذه المادة وغيرها من احكام الدستور المناسبة .

٢- يصبح مشروع القانون قانوناً بعد اتخاذ الإجراءات التالية :-

أ - يعد مجلس الوزراء مشروع القانون ويعرضه على المجلس الوطني الإتحادي .

ب - يعرض مجلس الوزراء مشروع القانون على رئيس الإتحاد للموافقة عليه ولعرضه على المجلس الأعلى للتصديق عليه.

جـ - يوقع رئيس الإتحاد القانون بعد تصديقه من المجلس الأعلى ، ويصدره .

٣- أ - اذا ادخل المجلس الوطني الإتحادي تعديلاً على مشروع القانون ولم يكن هذا التعديل مقبولاً لدى رئيس الإتحاد او المجلس الأعلى ، او اذا رفض المجلس الوطني الإتحادي المشروع ، فإن لرئيس الإتحاد او المجلس الأعلى ان يعيده الى المجلس الوطني الإتحادي. فإذا اجرى المجلس الوطني الإتحادي في ذلك اي تعديل لم يكن مقبولاً لدى رئيس الإتحاد او رأى المجلس الأعلى او رأى المجلس الوطني الإتحادي رفض المشروع ، كان لرئيس الإتحاد أن يصدرالقانون بعد مصادقة المجلس الأعلى عليه .

ب — يقصد بعبارة "مشروع القانون" الواردة في هذه الفقرة المشروع الذي يقدم لرئيس الإتحاد من مجلس الوزراء مشتملا على التعديلات التي ادخلها عليه المجلس الوطني الإتحادي ، إن وجدت .

٤— ومع ذلك إذا اقتضى الحال اصدار قوانين اتحادية في غياب المجلس الوطني الإتحادي ، فلمجلس وزراء الإتحاد أن يستصدرها عن المجلس الأعلى ورئيس الإتحاد على أن يخطر المجلس الإتحادي بها في اول اجتماع له .

مادة (١١١)

تنشر القوانين في الجريدة الرسمية للإتحاد خلال اسبوعين على الأكثر من تاريخ توقيعها واصدارها من قبل رئيس الإتحاد ، بعد تصديق المجلس الأعلى عليها . ويعمل بها بعد شهر من تاريخ نشرها في الجريدة المذكورة ، ما لم ينص على تاريخ آخر في القانون ذاته .

مادة (١١٢)

لا تسري احكام القوانين إلا على ما يقع من تاريخ العمل بها ، ولا يترتب عليها أثر فيما يقع قبل هذا التاريخ . ويجوز عند الإقتضاء ، وفي غير المواد الجزائية ، النص في القانون على خلاف ذلك .

﴿ الفصل الثاني ﴾

المراسيم بقوانين

مادة (١١٣)

اذا حدث فيما بين أدوار انعقاد المجلس الأعلى ، ما يوجب الإسراع على اصدار قوانين اتحادية لا تحتمل التأخير ، فلرئيس الإتحاد ومجلس الوزراء مجتمعين اصدار ما يلزم منها ، وذلك في شكل مراسيم لها قوة القانون بشرط الا تكون مخالفة للدستور .

ويجب أن تعرض هذه المراسيم بقوانين على المجلس الأعلى خلال أسبوع على الأكثر للنظر في اقرارها أو الغائها ، فإذا أقرها تأيد ما كان لها من قوة القانون ، ويخطر المجلس الوطني الإتحادي بها في أول اجتماع لـه .

أما اذا لم يقرها المجلس الأعلى فيزول ما كان لها من قوة القانون ، إلا اذا رأى اعتماد نفاذها في الفترة السابقة ، أو تسوية ما ترتب عليها من آثار بوجه آخر .

﴿ الفصل الثالث ﴾

المراسيم العادية

مادة (١١٤)

لا يصدر مرسوم إلا إذا أقره مجلس الوزراء وصدق عليه رئيس الإتحاد أو المجلس الأعلى كل حسب اختصاصه ، وتنشر المراسيم بعد توقيعها من رئيس الإتحاد في الجريدة الرسمية .

مادة (١١٥)

للمجلس الأعلى أن يفوض رئيس الإتحاد ومجلس الوزراء مجتمعين في اصدار ما يقتضي الأمر اصداره في غيبة المجلس الأعلى من المراسيم التي يختص المجلس المذكور بالتصديق عليها على ألا يشمل هذا التفويض الموافقة على المعاهدات والإتفاقيات الدولية أو إعلان الأحكام العرفية ورفعها . أو اعلان قيام الحرب الدفاعية ، أو تعيين رئيس أو قضاة المحكمة الإتحادية العليا .

﴿ الباب السادس ﴾

الامـــــــارات

مادة (١١٦)

تتولى الإمارات جميع السلطات التي لم يعهد بها هذا الدستور للإتحاد، وتشارك جميعاً في بنيانه وتفيد من وجوده وخدماته وحمايته .

مادة (١١٧)

يستهدف الحكم في كل إمارة بوجه خاص ، حفظ الأمن والنظام داخل أراضيها وتوفير المرافق العامة ورفع المستوى الإجتماعي والإقتصادي فيها .

مادة (١١٨)

تعمل الإمارات الأعضاء في الإتحاد جميعاً ، على تنسيق تشريعاتها في مختلف المجالات بقصد توحيدها قدر الإمكان .

ويجوز لإمارتين أو أكثر ، بعد مصادقة المجلس الأعلى ، التكتل في وحدة سياسية أو إدارية أو توحيد كل أو بعض مرافقها العامة ، أو انشاء ادارة واحدة أو مشتركة للقيام بأي مرفق من هذه المرافق .

مادة (١١٩)

تنظم بقانون اتحادي ، وبمراعاة أكبر قدر من التيسير ، الأمور المتعلقة بتنفيذ الأحكام والإنابات القضائية ، وإعلان الأوراق القضائية وتسليم الفارين من العدالة فيما بين الإمارات الأعضاء في الإتحاد .

﴿ الباب السابع ﴾

توزيع الاختصاصات التشريعية والتنفيذية والدولية بين الاتحاد والامارات

مادة (١٢٠)

ينفرد الإتحاد بالتشريع والتنفيذ في الشؤون التالية :-

١- الشؤون الخارجية .

٢- الدفاع والقوات المسلحة الإتحادية .

٣-حماية أمن الإتحاد مما يتهدده من الخارج أو الداخل .

٤- شؤون الأمن والنظام والحكم في العاصمة الدائمة للإتحاد .

٥- شؤون موظفي الإتحاد والقضاء الإتحادي .

٦- مالية الإتحاد والضرائب والرسوم والعوائد الإتحادية .

٧- القروض العامة الإتحادية .

٨- الخدمات البريدية والبرقية والهاتفية واللاسلكية .

٩- شق الطرق الإتحادية التي يقرر المجلس الأعلى أنها طرق رئيسية وصيانتها وتحسينها وتنظيم حركة المرور على هذه الطرق .

١٠- المراقبة الجوية واصدار تراخيص الطيارات والطيارين .

١١- التعليـــــم .

١٢- الصحة العامة والخدمات الطبية .

١٣- النقد والعملة .

١٤- المقاييس والمكاييل والموازين .

١٥- خدمات الكهرباء .

١٦- الجنسية الإتحادية والجوازات والإقامة والهجرة .

١٧- أملاك الإتحاد وكل ما يتعلق بها .

١٨- شؤون التعداد والإحصاء الخاصة بأغراض الإتحاد .

١٩- الإعلام الإتحادي .

مادة (١٢١)

بغير اخلال بما هو منصوص عليه في المادة السابقة ، ينفرد الإتحاد بالتشريع في الشؤون التالية :-

علاقات العمل والعمال والتأمينات الإجتماعية - الملكية العقارية ونزع الملكية للمنفعة العامة - تسليم المجرمين - البنوك - التأمين بانواعه - حماية الثروة الزراعية والحيوانية - التشريعات الكبرى المتعلقة بقوانين الجزاء والمعاملات المدنية والتجارية والشركات ، والإجراءات أمام المحاكم المدنية والجزائية - حماية الملكية الأدبية والفنية والصناعية وحقوق المؤلفين - المطبوعات والنشر - استيراد الأسلحة والذخائر ما لم تكن لاستعمال القوات المسلحة أو قوات الأمن التابعة لأي إمارة - شؤون الطيران الأخرى التي لا تدخل في اختصاصات الإتحاد التنفيذية - تحديد المياه الإقليمية وتنظيم الملاحة في أعالي البحار .

مادة (١٢٢)

تختص الإمارات بكل ما لا تنفرد فيه السلطات الإتحادية بموجب أحكام المادتين السابقتين .

مادة (١٢٣)

استثناء من نص المادة (١٢٠) (بند ١) بشأن انفراد الإتحاد أصلاً بالشؤون الخارجية والعلاقات الدولية ، يجوز للإمارات الأعضاء في الإتحاد عقد اتفاقيات محدودة ذات طبيعة ادارية محلية مع الدول والأقطار المجاورة لها على الا تتعارض مع مصالح الإتحاد ولا مع القوانين الإتحادية، وبشرط اخطار المجلس الأعلى للإتحاد مسبقاً . فإذا اعترض المجلس على إبرام مثل تلك الإتفاقيات فيتعين ارجاء الأمر الى أن تبت المحكمة الإتحادية بالسرعة الممكنة في هذا الإعتراض .

كما يجوز للإمارات الإحتفاظ بعضويتها في منظمة الأوبك ومنظمة الدول العربية المصدرة للنفط او الإنضمام إليهما .

مادة (١٢٤)

على السلطات الإتحادية المختصة ، قبل ابرام اية معاهدة او اتفاقية دولية يمكن ان تمس المركز الخاص بإحدى الإمارات ، استطلاع راي هذه الإمارة مسبقاً ، وعند الخلاف يعرض الأمر على المحكمة الإتحادية العليا للبت فيه .

مادة (١٢٥)

تقوم حكومات الإمارات باتخاذ ما ينبغي من تدابير لتنفيذ القوانين الصادرة عن الإتحاد والمعاهدات والإتفاقيات الدولية التي يبرمها ، بما في ذلك اصدار القوانين واللوائح والقرارات والأوامر المحلية اللازمة لهذا التنفيذ، وللسلطات الإتحادية الإشراف على تنفيذ حكومات الإمارات للقوانين والقرارات والمعاهدات والإتفاقيات الدولية والأحكام القضائية الإتحادية . وعلى السلطات الإدارية والقضائية المختصة في الإمارات ، تقديم كل المساعدات الممكنة لسلطات الإتحاد في هذا الشأن .

﴿ الباب الثامن ﴾

الشئـــون الماليـــة للاتحـــــاد

مادة (١٢٦)

تتكون الإيرادات العامة للإتحاد من الموارد التالية :-

١- الضرائب والرسوم والعوائد التي تفرض بموجب قانونٍ اتحادي في المسائل الداخلة في اختصاص الإتحاد تشريعاً وتنفيذاً .

٢- الرسوم والأجور التي يحصلها الإتحاد في مقابل الخدمات التي يؤديهـــا .

٣- الحصة التي تسهم بها الإمارات الأعضاء في الإتحاد ، في ميزانيته السنوية وفقاً للمادة التالية .

٤- إيراد الإتحاد من أملاكه الخاصة .

مادة (١٢٧)

تخصص الإمارات الأعضاء في الإتحاد نسبة معينة من مواردها السنوية لتغطية نفقات الميزانية العامة السنوية للإتحاد وذلك على النحو وبالقدر اللذين يحددهما قانون الميزانية .

مادة (١٢٨)

يحدد القانون قواعد اعداد الميزانية العامة للإتحاد ، والحساب الختامي ، كما يحدد بدء السنة المالية .

مادة (١٢٩)

يعرض مشروع الميزانية السنوية للإتحاد متضمناً تقديرات الإيرادات والمصروفات ، قبل بدء السنة المالية بشهرين على الأقل على المجلس الوطني الإتحادي لمناقشتها وابداء ملاحظاته عليها ، وذلك قبل رفع مشروع الميزانية الى المجلس الأعلى للإتحاد ، مصحوبة بهذه الملاحظات لإقرارها .

مادة (١٣٠)

تصدر الميزانية العامة السنوية بقانون .

وفي جميع الأحوال التي لا يصدر فيها قانون الميزانية قبل بدء السنة المالية ، يجوز بمرسوم اتحادي اقرار اعتمادات شهرية مؤقتة ، على أساس جزء من اثنى عشر من اعتمادات السنة المالية السابقة ، وتجبى الإيرادات وتنفق المصروفات وفقاً للقوانين النافذة في نهاية السنة المالية السابقة .

مادة (١٣١)

كل مصروف غير وارد بالميزانية ، أو زائد عن التقديرات الواردة بها ، وكل نقل لأي مبلغ من باب الى باب آخر من ابواب الميزانية ، يجب أن يكون بقانون .

ومع ذلك يجوز ، في حالة الضرورة الملحة ، تقرير هذا الصرف أو النقل بمرسوم بقانون وفقاً لأحكام المادة (١١٣) من هذا الدستور .

مادة (١٣٢)

يخصص الإتحاد في ميزانيته السنوية مبالغ من ايراداته للإنفاق على مشروعات الإنشاء والتعمير والأمن الداخلي والشؤون الإجتماعية حسب الحاجة الماسة لبعض الإمارات . ويتم تنفيذ هذه المشروعات والإنفاق عليها ، من اعتمادات هذه المبالغ ، بواسطة أجهزة الإتحاد المختصة وتحت اشرافها بالإتفاق مع سلطات الإمارة المعنية .

ويجوز للإتحاد انشاء صندوق خاص لهذه الأغراض .

مادة (١٣٣)

لا يجوز فرض أية ضريبة اتحادية أو تعديلها أو الغاؤها إلا بقانون ، ولا يجوز اعفاء أحد من اداء هذه الضرائب في غير الأحوال المبينة في القانون .

كما لا يجوز تكليف أحد بأداء أموال أو رسوم أو عوائد اتحادية إلا في حدود القانون وطبقاً لأحكامه .

مادة (١٣٤)

لا يجوز عقد القروض العامة ، أو الإرتباط بالتزامات يترتب عليها انفاق مبالغ من الخزانة العامة للإتحاد في سنة أو سنوات مقبلة ، إلا بقانون اتحادي .

مادة (١٣٥)

الحساب الختامي للإدارة المالية للإتحاد عن السنة المالية المنقضية ، يقدم الى المجلس الوطني الإتحادي خلال الأربعة أشهر التالية لانتهاء السنة المذكورة لإبداء ملاحظاته عليه ، قبل رفعه الى المجلس الأعلى لإقراره ، على ضوء تقرير المراجع العام .

مادة (١٣٦)

تنشأ ادارة اتحادية مستقلة يراسها مراجع عام يكون تعيينه بمرسوم ، لمراجعة حسابات الإتحاد والأجهزة والهيئات التابعة له ، وكذلك لمراجعة اية حسابات اخرى يوكل الى الإدارة المذكورة مراجعتها ، طبقاً للقانون .

وينظم القانون هذه الإدارة ويحدد اختصاصاتها ، وصلاحيات العاملين فيها ، والضمانات الواجب توفيرها لها ولرئيسها ولموظفيها ، من أجل القيام بوظائفهم على خير وجه .

﴿ الباب التاسع ﴾

القوات المسلحة وقوات الأمن

مادة (١٣٧)

كل اعتداء على اية امارة من الإمارات الأعضاء في الإتحاد يعتبر اعتداء عليها جميعاً ، وعلى كيان الإتحاد ذاته وتتعاون جميع القوى الاتحادية والمحلية على دفعه ، بكافة الوسائل الممكنة .

مادة (١٣٨)

يكون للإتحاد قوات مسلحة برية وبحرية وجوية ، موحدة التدريب والقيادة ، ويكون تعيين القائد العام لهذه القوات ، ورئيس الأركان العامة، واعفاؤهما من منصبيهما بمرسوم اتحادي .

كما يجوز أن يكون للإتحاد قوات امن اتحادية .

ومجلس وزراء الإتحاد هو المسؤول مباشرة أمام رئيس الإتحاد والمجلس الأعلى للإتحاد عن شؤون هذه القوات جميعاً .

مادة (١٣٩)

ينظم القانون الخدمة العسكرية ، والتعبئة العامة او الجزئية ، وحقوق وواجبات افراد القوات المسلحة ، وقواعد انضباطها ، وكذلك الأنظمة الخاصة بقوات الأمن الإتحادية .

مادة (١٤٠)

يكون اعلان قيام الحرب الدفاعية بمرسوم يصدره رئيس الإتحاد بعد مصادقة المجلس الأعلى عليه . اما الحرب الهجومية فمحرمة عملاً بأحكام المواثيق الدولية .

مادة (١٤١)

ينشأ مجلس أعلى للدفاع برئاسة رئيس الإتحاد ويكون من بين اعضائه نائب رئيس الإتحاد ورئيس مجلس وزراء الإتحاد ووزير الخارجية والدفاع والمالية والداخلية والقائد العام ، ورئيس الأركان العامة ، وذلك لإبداء الراي والمشورة في كل ما يتعلق بشؤون الدفاع ، والمحافظة على سلامة الإتحاد وامنه ، واعداد القوات المسلحة وتجهيزها وتطويرها ، وتحديد اماكن اقامتها ومعسكراتها .

وللمجلس أن يدعو لحضور جلساته من يرى دعوتهم من المستشارين والخبراء العسكريين وغيرهم ، دون أن يكون لهم راي معدود في المداولات .

وينظم القانون كل ما يتعلق بهذا المجلس .

مادة (١٤٢)

يكون للإمارات الأعضاء حق انشاء قوات مسلحة محلية قابلة ومجهزة لأن يضمها الجهاز الدفاعي للإتحاد عند الاقتضاء للدفاع ضد اي عدوان خارجي .

مادة (١٤٣)

يحق لأية إمارة من الإمارات طلب الإستعانة بالقوات المسلحة ، أو بقوات الأمن الإتحادية للمحافظة على الأمن والنظام داخل اراضيها إذا ما تعرضت للخطر، ويعرض هذا الطلب فوراً على المجلس الأعلى للإتحاد، لتقرير ما يراه .

وللمجلس الأعلى أن يستعين لهذه الغاية بالقوات المسلحة المحلية التابعة لإحدى الإمارات شريطة موافقة الإمارة طالبة الإستعانة والإمارة التابعة لها تلك القوات .

ويجوز لرئيس الإتحاد ومجلس الوزراء الإتحادي مجتمعين ، اذا لم يكن المجلس الأعلى منعقداً اتخاذ ما يلزم من التدابير العاجلة التي لا تحتمل التأخير ودعوة المجلس الأعلى للإنعقاد فوراً .

﴿ الباب العاشر ﴾

الأحكام الختامية والمؤقتة

مادة (١٤٤)

١- مع مراعاة أحكام الفقرات التالية تسري أحكام هذا الدستور خلال فترة انتقالية مدتها خمس سنوات ميلادية تبدأ من تاريخ سريانه وفقاً لأحكام المادة (١٥٢) .

٢- أ - إذا رأى المجلس الأعلى أن مصالح الإتحاد العليا تتطلب تعديل هذا الدستور ، قدم مشروع تعديل دستوري الى المجلس الوطني الإتحادي .

ب - تكون إجراءات اقرار التعديل الدستوري مماثلة لإجراءات اقرار القانون .

جـ - يشترط لإقرار المجلس الوطني الإتحادي مشروع التعديل الدستوري موافقة ثلثي الأصوات للأعضاء الحاضرين .

د _ يوقع رئيس الإتحاد باسم المجلس الأعلى ونيابة عنه التعديل الدستوري ويصدره .

٣- يتخذ المجلس الأعلى خلال فترة الإنتقال الإجراءات اللازمة لإعداد مشروع دستور دائم يحل محل هذا الدستور المؤقت . ويعرض مشروع الدستور الدائم على المجلس الوطني الإتحادي لمناقشته قبل اصداره .

٤- يدعو المجلس الأعلى لعقد اجتماع غير عادي للمجلس الوطني الإتحادي بموعد لا يجاوز ستة أشهر قبل انتهاء مدة سريان هذا الدستور المؤقت . ويطرح في هذا الإجتماع مشروع الدستور الدائم. وتتبع في اصداره الإجراءات المنصوص عليها بالفقرة الثانية من هذه المادة .

مادة (١٤٥)

لا يجوز بأي حال تعطيل أي حكم من أحكام هذا الدستور ، إلا أثناء قيام الأحكام العرفية وفي الحدود التي يبينها القانون المنظم لتلك الأحكام.

ولا يجوز مع ذلك تعطيل انعقاد المجلس الوطني الإتحادي في تلك الأثناء ، أو المساس بحصانة أعضائه .

مادة (١٤٦)

يكون إعلان الأحكام العرفية ، بمرسوم يصدر بمصادقة المجلس الأعلى بناءً على عرض رئيس الإتحاد وموافقة مجلس وزراء الإتحاد وذلك في أحوال الضرورة التي يحددها القانون ، ويبلغ هذا المرسوم الى المجلس الوطني الإتحادي في أول اجتماع له .

وترفع الأحكام العرفية بمرسوم يصدر بمصادقة المجلس الأعلى كذلك، متى زالت الضرورة التي استدعت اعلانها .

مادة (١٤٧)

لا يخل تطبيق هذا الدستور بما ارتبطت به الإمارات الأعضاء في الإتحاد مع الدول والهيئات الدولية من معاهدات او اتفاقيات ، ما لم يجر تعديلها او الغاؤها بالإتفاق بين الأطراف المعنية .

مادة (١٤٨)

كل ما قررته القوانين واللوائح والمراسيم والأوامر والقرارات المعمول بها عند نفاذ هذا الدستور ، في الإمارات المختلفة الأعضاء في الإتحاد

ووفقـاً للأوضاع السائدة فيها يظل سارياً ما لم يعدل أو يلغ وفقاً لما هو مقرر في هذا الدستور .

كما يستمر العمل بالتدابير والأنظمة السائدة فيها حتى تصدر القوانين المعدلة لها وفقاً لأحكامه .

مادة (١٤٩)

استثناء من أحكام المادة (١٢١) من هذا الدستور ، يجوز للإمارات أن تصدر التشريعات اللازمة لتنظيم الشؤون المبينة في المادة المذكورة ، وذلك دون اخلال بأحكام المادة (١٥١) من هذا الدستور .

مادة (١٥٠)

تعمل السلطات الإتحادية على استصدار القوانين المشار اليها في هذا الدستور بالسرعة اللازمة ، لكي تحل محل التشريعات والأوضاع الحالية ، وخاصة ما يتعارض منها مع أحكامه .

مادة (١٥١)

لأحكام هذا الدستور السيادة على دساتير الإمارات الأعضاء في الإتحاد . وللقوانين الإتحادية التي تصدر وفقاً لأحكامه الأولوية على التشريعات والقرارات الصادرة عن سلطات الإمارات .

وفي حال التعارض ، يبطل من التشريع الأدنى ما يتعارض مع التشريع الأعلى ، وبالقدر الذي يزيل ذلك التعارض ، وعند الخلاف يعرض الأمر على المحكمة الإتحادية العليا للبت فيه .

مادة (١٥٢)

يعمل بهذا الدستور اعتباراً من التاريخ الذي يحدد بإعلان يصدره الحكام الموقعون على هذا الدستور .

وقع في دبي في هذا اليوم الثامن عشر من شهر يوليو سنة ١٩٧١م الموافق لهذا اليوم الخامس والعشرين من شهر جمادى الأولى سنة ١٣٩١هـ

توقيع
زايد بن سلطان آل نهيان
حاكم إمارة أبوظبي

توقيع
راشد بن سعيد المكتوم
حاكم إمارة دبي

توقيع
خالد بن محمد القاسمي
حاكم إمارة الشارقة

توقيع
حميد بن راشد النعيمي
عن/حاكم إمارة عجمان

توقيع
راشد بن أحمد المعلا
عن/حاكم إمارة ام القيوين

توقيع
محمد بن حمد الشرقي
حاكم إمارة الفجيرة

Appendix C: Rulers of the Trucial States from 1947-Present

Bahrain
Sheikh Salman ibn Hamad al-Khalifa, 1942-1961
Amir ʻIsa bin Salman al-Khalifa, 1961-1999
King Hamad bin ʻIsa al-Khalifa, 1999-Present

Qatar
Sheikh Ali bin Abdallah al-Thani, 1948-1960
Sheikh Ahmad bin Ali al-Thani, 1960-1972
Sheikh Khalifa bin Hamad al-Thani, 1972-1995
Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani, 1995-Present

Abu Dhabi
Sheikh Shakhbut bin Sultan al-Nahayan, 1928-1966
Sheikh Zayid bin Sultan al-Nahayan, 1966-2001
Sheikh Khalifah bin Zayid al-Nahayan, 2001-Present

Dubai
Sheikh Said bin Maktoum al-Maktoum, 1912-1958
Sheikh Rashid bin Maktoum al-Maktoum, 1958-1990
Sheikh Maktoum bin Rashid al-Maktoum, 1990-2006
Sheikh Muhammad bin Rashid al-Maktoum, 2006-Present

Sharjah
Sheikh Sultan bin Saqr al-Qasimi, 1924-1951
Sheikh Muhammad bin Saqr al-Qasimi, 1951
Sheikh Saqr bin Sultan al-Qasimi, 1951-1965
Sheikh Khalid bin Muhammad al-Qasimi, 1965-1972
Dr. Sheikh Sultan bin Muhammad al-Qasimi, 1972-1987
Sheikh ʻAbd al-ʻAziz bin Muhammad al-Qasimi, 1987-1987
Dr. Sheikh Sultan bin Muhammad al-Qasimi, 1987-Present

Fujairah
Sheikh Muhammad bin Hamad al-Sharqi, 1938-1952 (leading sheikh), 1952-1974 (ruler)
Sheikh Hamad bin Muhammad al-Sharqi, 1974-Present
Ajman
Sheikh Rashid bin Humaid al-Nuaimi, 1928-1981
Sheikh Humaid bin Rashid al-Nuaimi, 1981-Present

Umm al-Qaywain
Sheikh Ahmad bin Rashid al-Muᶜalla, 1928-1981
Sheikh Rashid bin Ahmad al-Muᶜalla, 1981-2009
Sheikh Saud bin Rashid al-Muᶜalla, 2009-Present

Ras al-Khaimah
Sheikh Sultan bin Salem al-Qasimi, 1919-1948
Sheikh Saqr bin Muhammad al-Qasimi, 1948-Present
Sheikh Saud bin Saqr al-Qasimi, Crown Prince and Deputy Ruler (since 2003)

Kalba
Sheikh Hamad bin Said al-Qasimi, 1937-1951
Sheikh Saqr bin Sultan al-Qasimi, 1951-1952

Appendix D: Selection of British Officials, 1947-1971

Prime Ministers

Clement Attlee, 1945-1951
Sir Winston Churchill, 1951-1955
Sir Anthony Eden, 1955-1957
Harold MacMillan, 1957-1963
Sir Alec Douglas-Home, 1963-1964
Harold Wilson, 1964-1970
Edward Heath, 1970-1974

Secretaries of State for Foreign Affairs

Ernest Bevin, 1945-1951
Herbert Morrison, 1951-51
Anthony Eden, 1951-1955
Harold Macmillan, 1955
Selwyn Lloyd, 1955-1960
Sir Alec Douglas-Home, 1960-1963
R. A. Butler, 1963-1964
Patrick Gordon Walker, 1964-1965
Michael Stewart, 1965-1966
George Brown, 1966-1968
Michael Stewart, 1968

Secretaries of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (est. 1968)

Michael Stewart, 1968-1970
Sir Alec Douglas-Home, 1970-1974

Political Residents at Bahrain
Lt. Col. William Rupert Hay, 1946-1953
Sir Bernard A. B. Burrows, 1953-1961
Sir William H. T. Luce, 1961-1966
Sir Stewart Crawford, 1966-1970
Sir Geoffrey Arthur, 1970-1971

Political Agents at Dubai
C. M. Pirie-Gordon, 1953-1955
J. P. Tripp, 1955-1958
Donald Hawley, 1958-1959
E. R. Worsnop (Acting), 1959-1961
A. J. M. Craig, 1961-1964
H. G. Balfour-Paul, 1964-1966
D. A. Roberts, 1966-1968
Julian Bullard, 1968-1971
J. F. Walker, 1970-1971

Political Officers at Abu Dhabi
The Hon. M. S. Buckmaster, 1955-1958
E. R. Morsnop, 1958-1959
B. F. Henderson, 1959-61

Political Agents at Abu Dhabi

Col. John Edmund Hugh Boustead, 1961-1965
A. T. Lamb, 1965-1968
C. J. Treadwell, 1968-1971

Political Officers at Sharjah
Capt. J. E. H. Hudson, 1946-1947
G. H. Jackson, 1948-1949
R. D. Stobart, 1949-1951
A. J. Wilton, 1951-1952
M. S. Weir, 1952-1953

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